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This thesis investigates the emergence and development of the international norm 
against the recruitment and use of child soldiers. Starting with a historical 
contextualisation of the shift in perception of young people fighting as heroes to the 
traumatised child soldier so prominently featured today, it shows how the change in 
conceptions of childhood in the West and the rise of humanitarianism and human 
rights has come to define the norm against child soldiering today. This norm finds 
expression in the work of a network of international organisations, human rights 
activists, and child protection NGOs. Continuity and change in the strategies 
international actors employ to implement the norm against child soldiering are 
analysed by focusing on two cases: Sierra Leone, which is one of the most prominent 
and earliest cases in which the international network against child soldiering was 
very active; and Myanmar, which to this date is presumed to be the state with the 
worst child soldier record but only recently made it onto the international agenda. 
This thesis ultimately challenges the idea of a coherent and uncontested international 
norm, which has become dominated by the idea of the ‘universal child soldier’ as 
being very young, male, African, defined by his victim status, lacking agency, and 
irrationality. It argues that in order to understand how and why the international 
norm against child soldiering is implemented with different degrees of success in 
Sierra Leone and Myanmar, we have to pay attention to the specific histories and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The idea of the child soldier combines two seemingly contradictory concepts: First, a 
child, which is thought of as innocent, playful and in need of our protection; and 
second, a soldier, fighting in violent conflict, at best a protector of civilians and 
fighting for a just cause, at worst committing atrocities. Around the world, many, 
perhaps most, heads of states, activists, NGOs, communities, and parents all agree 
that the participation of children in conflict is wrong. The condemnation of armed 
groups, states, or individuals who recruit children is strong and has made groups like 
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra 
Leone, or the Lord’s Resistance Army under Joseph Kony in Uganda infamous.  
 
There seems to be widespread international agreement that forcing children to bear 
weapons and to fight in wars is one of the most serious offences during conflict. This 
is codified in various instruments of international law: from Article 8 of the Rome 
Statute, which denotes conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 as a war 
crime to Article 38 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which is the 
most widely ratified international human rights treaty—every single member state of 
the United Nations apart from the United States has ratified it.1 Various international 
NGOs, such as Save the Children and World Vision, development organisations like 
Plan International or CARE, human rights advocacy groups, like Human Rights 
Watch or Amnesty International, and UN agencies like UNICEF or the ILO have 
been advocating for the last 30 years for better protection of children in conflict, for a 
higher minimum age of recruitment, and for a more rigorous enforcement of 
international norms for actors who do not abide by them. International advocacy 
efforts have succeeded in increasing the minimum age of recruitment from 15 to 18 
years, the international community is equipped with a wide range of tools and 
strategies to encourage or enforce the prohibition of child soldiering, and all state 
actors who still recruit and use children in their militaries have at least rhetorically 
committed to ending that practice with the help of the UN. Nonetheless, there are 
still thousands of children currently on the battlefields and new child combatants are 
recruited every day in recently erupted or intensified conflicts in the Middle East, 
Central Africa, and around the world.  
                                                
1  United Nations News Service, “Hailing Somalia’s Ratification, UN Renews Call for 





One of the strongest and most widely agreed upon and promoted international 
norms—children should not fight in wars—is nonetheless continuously violated. To 
solve this puzzle, we need to first answer why children are recruited in the first place, 
and many scholars and practitioners attend to this question, and second, what the role 
of international actors is in pushing for this norm and how these activities relate to 
those actors who do use children in conflict. It is this second part, that this thesis will 
explore. It asks:  
 
(1) How did the international norm against child soldiering emerge and diffuse?  
(2) How is the norm against child soldiering implemented? 
 
International norms do not exist in a vacuum. They have roots and histories and have 
to be promoted and established through specific actions by a variety of actors, most 
commonly NGOs, international organisations, or states. The study of international 
norm diffusion in International Relations has taken place largely within a 
constructivist research framework that has, over the last 30 years, first focused on 
whether norms matter, then on how and when they matter on to analysing norm 
diffusion processes, specifically the strategies of norm promotion and the interaction 
with local actors. 
 
Strategies of the implementation of various different norms have been studied in a 
plethora of different contexts. In fact, through the tracing of processes of norm 
diffusion in different contexts, the literature identifying these strategies has been 
updated and refined to account for non-linear processes, continued contestation even 
when the norm has been internationally accepted, and the various forms of 
interaction with and responses from local actors. I build on this refined constructivist 
framework of international norm diffusion and apply it to one of the most widely 
accepted and seemingly uncontested international norms that is part of the 
international normative structure today: the norm against the recruitment and use of 
child soldiers.  
 
This thesis aims to interrogate and develop the theoretical contribution of the 
constructivist literature on strategies of norm implementation through a case study of 




how and why international norms are implemented with different degrees of success 
in different contexts, we have to pay attention to the specific histories and power 
relations embedded within the norm since its inception. Strategies of norm promotion 
and responses by targeted actors are filtered through these histories.  
 
Based on this literature, this study is concerned with the ways in which the claim to 
universality and actual historical contingency of the norm impacts the actors it is 
supposedly diffused through as well as those it is promoted to. It posits that in order 
to understand how the strategies of international norm promotion affect actors in 
different ways we must look first at the history of the norms as well as the meaning 
of the concepts embedded within those norms before developing a thick 
understanding of the contexts in which they operate.  
 
In order to explain different practices of norm implementation, I examine the daily 
work of international actors and their interaction with local actors in two different 
contexts. 
1.1 The International Norm Against Child Soldiering  
Despite the almost universal agreement on the prohibition of using children as 
combatants in conflict today, this strong moral stance is fairly new. Indeed, children 
have always been part of militaries, reports range from wars in Ancient Greece and 
the Children’s Crusade in the 13th century and other warfare in Europe in the Middle 
Ages, over wars of anti-colonial national liberation from the late 18th well into the 
20th century around the world, to World War Two, and contemporary conflict in the 
post-Cold War era, which is the focus of this study. So there has been no sudden 
change in the nature of warfare resulting in the supposedly new appearance of child 
soldiers. What has changed however is that children in war are now seen as a 
problem. When early accounts of child soldiers described them as fighting alongside 
their communities or even as heroic fighters, starting from the middle of the 20th 
century and especially after the end of the Cold War, their depiction has changed 
drastically. Today, child soldiers are largely understood as innocent victims of the 
brutal conflicts around them, they have been forced to fight by adults who failed to 





Based on these observations, this thesis analyses the emergence and development of 
the international norm against the recruitment and use of child soldiers. It argues that 
the shift in the perception of young people fighting as heroes to the traumatised child 
soldier that defines the international norm today is a result of the change in 
conceptions of childhood in the West and the concomitant rise of humanitarian and 
human rights discourses. The idea of the ‘universal child soldier’ is institutionalised 
in a range of international legal treaties, UN resolutions, and action plans and is put 
into practice by a network of international organisations, human rights and child 
protection activists, and development NGOs, constituting the content of the 
international norm against the recruitment and use of child soldiers. This study 
challenges the idea that the norm against child soldiering is coherent and uncontested 
and shows how it has become dominated by the idea of the ‘universal child soldier’ 
as being male, very young, and African; and as defined by his victim status, lack of 
agency, and irrationality. This, in turn, affects how the strategies international actors 
employ to promote the norm and encourage norm compliant behaviour operate in 
different contexts.  This study contributes to the debate on the strategies of 
international norm promotion, how they interact with local actors, as well as on 
processes of knowledge production and institutional learning in international 
organisations.  
 
The first research question aims precisely at unpacking the history of the 
international norm against the recruitment and use of child soldiers. Understanding 
when, where, how, and by whom this norm was developed and established 
contextualises the norm and helps to understand it as a product of certain historical 
developments rather than an abstract moral principle and sets up the groundwork for 
the case study analysis. Instead of starting with the already established international 
norm against the use of child soldiers, I unpack the historical origin of the norm by 
tracing the conception of universal childhood that is contained within it. This is not 
only relevant to place our current perception of child soldiering in historical context 
but also to understand the power relationships embedded within the norm that are 
sustained and reinforced by applying it in different contexts. Child soldiers have been 
part of fighting forces around the world for as long as we know; they have been 
fulfilling different roles and responsibilities and have been met with different 
attitudes. These attitudes and portrayals of children fighting have changed 




being taken for granted as recently as World War Two, we have seen a shift both in 
the way childhood but also child soldiers are conceptualised and understood since 
then. The fourth chapter will shed more light on the way changing conceptions of 
childhood in the West have ultimately changed the perception of children fighting 
around the world. As well as providing a historical contextualisation of the 
international norm against the use of child soldiers, I also analyse the legal and 
organisational structures through which the norm is institutionalised on the 
international stage today. Taking a closer look at the international legal framework 
around the recruitment and use of child soldiers already exposes key tensions that 
will be seen in practice in the later case studies, such as inter-institutional politics and 
different understandings of child soldiering. 
 
This part of the empirical analysis, the tracing of the emergence of the norm against 
child soldiering, also introduces the key actors on the international stage, mostly UN 
agencies, interested states and international NGOs, in chapter four. This includes an 
overview of the main organisations of the network, predominantly different parts of 
the UN family (e.g. UNICEF, ILO, the Security Council, the Office of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict), some 
major international nongovernmental organisations (e.g. Save the Children, World 
Vision), and activist groups (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, now Child 
Soldiers International, which was originally a collection of activists from major 
human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch). Setting up the community of practice on the international level allows me to 
trace the work of these actors in the two case studies later on. 
 
The second step of the empirical analysis is then shifting our attention from the 
international level to the work of international actors in specific country contexts in 
which child soldiers have been recruited. Norms do not just magically diffuse into 
different contexts; they are translated, applied, and implemented by specific actors in 
specific contexts. We must pay attention to how the different contexts and histories 
of child soldier use and conflict in each country affect the work of international 
actors in that space. Particularly, different actors – international, local, state – operate 
with different understandings of childhood, informed by international law, 
international human rights discourse, local history and practice. They also differ in 




choice and implementation of strategies to further norm compliance and how they 
resonate with local actors. Building on the shift in conception of childhood and the 
concomitant rise of human rights discourse on the international level post-WWII, 
children’s rights have entered international political discourse, championed largely 
by a network of human rights activists, international organisations, and NGOs 
focusing on development, child protection, or humanitarian relief. This study is 
interested in how these actors implement the seemingly universal international norm 
and its accompanying provisions in varying contexts.  
 
Thus, the second part of the thesis focuses on two contemporary cases, starting from 
the late 1990s and tracing the changing implementation strategies of international 
actors, the processes of knowledge production and institutional learning within and 
across cases as well as the development on the policy level until today.2 I select 
Sierra Leone and Myanmar as two cases that illustrate the development and change 
of strategies and practices of international norm implementation. These two cases 
vary significantly in terms of their temporal and spatial location. Sierra Leone is one 
of the earliest large-scale cases of child recruitment that has received a lot of 
international attention and activity. Both state and non-state actors recruited large 
numbers of children throughout the civil war there. Myanmar on the other hand, 
while described as the state with a military that is the ‘worst offender with the 
highest number of underage soldiers in absolute terms’, has received relatively little 
attention until recently. Rather than comparing the effectiveness of different norm 
promotion strategies in these very different contexts directly, examining the work of 
international actors in Sierra Leone and Myanmar allows me to shed light on the 
changing nature of the work international actors engage in when promoting the norm 
against child soldiering.   
 
Within the case studies, I turn my attention to the changing strategies of norm 
implementation that international actors use. Important to note is that the 
international normative landscape and the ‘trends’ of international normative agendas 
have developed quite considerably between the two cases that this project looks at. 
                                                
2 The issue of child soldiering, as part of the wider children and armed conflict agenda, became a 
central focus of the network in the late 1990s after the publication of the Machel report in 1996, which 
set the advocacy agenda for the next years. See Machel, “Promotion and Protection of the Rights of 





At the end of the Sierra Leone Civil war in 2002, the OPAC had just been ratified 
and advocacy against child recruitment was at the forefront of the child rights 
agenda. At the same time, the UN and UNICEF specifically did not have much 
experience in running child-focused DDR programmes. Many decisions were made 
on an ad-hoc basis and lessons were learned on the ground. Serious cooperation with 
the Myanmar military, the Tatmadaw, did not start until about ten years later, at 
which point a wide range of tools and strategies had been developed. However, 
although there was now a clear UN mandate on the issue of child soldiers, the topic 
did not remain at the top of the agenda, especially with the overall peace process and 
geopolitical concerns becoming increasingly relevant. By focusing on the changing 
strategies of norm implementation used by international actors working with child 
soldiers on the ground, common threads can be identified across both contexts, for 
example the mismatch between perceptions of child soldiers, how success is 
measured, or the lack of coordination and cooperation among different international 
actors, e.g. ILO and UNICEF in Myanmar or DDR and post-DDR activity in Sierra 
Leone. 
 
In answering this question, I also look at whether and how institutional learning has 
taken place and whether key lessons that were seemingly learned by international 
actors in Sierra Leone were notably absent from more recent contexts, such as 
Myanmar. In order to do this, firstly, learning is analysed within the two cases, 
exploring how actors react to unexpected circumstances in their daily work for 
example by drawing on local expertise or by relying on established international 
mechanisms and standards. I show how actors adapt their strategies of norm 
implementation based on knowledge acquired on the ground and in a second step, 
how this knowledge feeds up to the international stage. On the international stage, 
this knowledge is analysed, evaluated and eventually, lessons are drawn from it, 
which might be relevant for future contexts. As a response, international actors might 
change how they choose specific strategies, how they are implemented, and what the 
expected results of them are. Interlinked with these learning processes are systems of 
knowledge production, which determine how this particular group of actors knows 






After having analysed the ways in which international actors understand and apply 
the norm against child soldiering in Sierra Leone and Myanmar specifically, the 
debate leaves us with the broader question of what the implications of this are. The 
later part of the thesis will show that beyond the tangible impact of programmes and 
strategies of norm promotion, international actors actively contribute to (re-) creating 
the image of the child soldier as an innocent victim of the chaotic and violent conflict 
around him, which at the same time flattens the specific contextual conditions as well 
as neglects the global structures these conflicts are often a result of. The 
implementation of international norms does not only have a direct effect in terms of 
programmes and advocacy, but international actors also contribute to (re-)defining 
the concepts that the norm builds on in the process. In particular, this thesis will 
analyse in which ways the implementation of the international norm against child 
soldiering contributes to (re-) creating an image of the child soldier in a specific 
light, which in turn affects how the norm is implemented in the future.  
1.2 Thesis outline 
This introductory chapter has set the framework and research questions for the 
project, outlined the research agenda, and positioned it within the wider research 
community. The rest of the thesis proceeds as follows:  
 
The second chapter sets out the theoretical framework that guides the empirical 
analysis. It first outlines the constellation of actors that form the community of 
practice around the international norm against child soldiering. It secondly reviews 
the relevant constructivist literature on norm diffusion from early approaches to more 
recent approaches that respond to the critique of assuming an overly linear process of 
norm diffusion by highlighting the conditions under which the process is likely to 
occur. They also theorise the various ways local actors interact with and influence 
the process of international norm diffusion. Building on these approaches, I set up 
the theoretical framework for this study: I look at the strategies international actors 
can employ to achieve norm compliance and the possible responses by actors who 
are the target of norm promotion efforts. Both strategies and responses are affected 
by conditions and limitations, on the level of the norm as well as the context. To 
conclude, I outline how international actors employ these strategies in their daily 
work, by navigating institutional politics, producing knowledge and learning in and 





Before delving into the empirics, chapter three turns to the research design and 
methods for the empirical analysis. It starts with outlining the qualitative case study 
design as the overall empirical research approach to this project. To continue, it 
discusses the methods of data collection and analysis. Regarding the first research 
question, tracing the emergence of the norm, I largely rely on text analysis of official 
IO documentation, supplemented by interviews with practitioners. To answer the 
second question, which focuses on the implementation of the norm in Sierra Leone 
and Myanmar, I focus on qualitative interviewing. The chapter pays special attention 
to the selection of participants and the context of the interviews as well as how the 
choice of methods and data collection influences the empirical findings. It lays out 
the strengths and limitations of my approach before finally turning to the case 
selection. I outline my justification for choosing Sierra Leone and Myanmar as the 
cases for my analysis, which allow me to trace the development of the strategies and 
practices of norm implementation across different contexts over time.  
 
Chapter four places the norm against the recruitment and use of child soldiers in its 
historical context. It does this by tracing the history and perception of child soldier 
use to disrupt the narrative that child soldiers are a recent phenomenon. I show that 
while children have been part of armies for centuries, they have only recently been 
imagined as a problem, a moral wrong, something that must be rectified. The 
construction of the child soldier by international activists and organisations as a 
young boy, who has been abducted from his family in an African village, forced to 
fight and then committed horrible atrocities is not only empirically misleading—
most underage soldiers are between 15 and 18, seven of the fourteen countries with 
parties listed at the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for 
Children and Armed Conflict are not in Africa, voluntary enlistment is not 
uncommon and neither are girl soldiers—but also serves to justify international 
intervention on behalf of rescuing and saving these children.  
 
The fifth chapter starts the second part of the empirical analysis by focusing on the 
practices of international actors as they work with child soldiers around the world. 
Sierra Leone, as outlined before, is one of the first cases where the international 
network around combating child soldiering, consisting of several UN agencies, most 




Caritas, and their local partners come together. The end of the civil war in Sierra 
Leone in 2002 coincides with the ratification of the Optional Protocol on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict and thus a lot of international attention 
on the issue. Before analysing the work of international actors with child combatants 
in Sierra Leone, this chapter highlights the historical context of child soldiering in 
Sierra Leone, focusing on the establishment of power relationships during colonial 
rule as well as the conflict history. It also establishes the network of actors working 
on child soldiering in Sierra Leone after the end of the civil war.  
 
The sixth chapter, the second one on Sierra Leone, continues from the historical 
background to the analysis of the work of international actors in the context, mostly 
focusing on the child section of the Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration 
programme. It investigates the divergent perceptions of the success of the 
programme by international and local actors by looking at markers of success, long-
term and short-term impact, as well as the perceived failure of reintegration efforts, 
especially of girl soldiers. Underlying these diverging assessments of the practices of 
international actors in Sierra Leone are differing conceptions of childhood, which, in 
combination with the problems of implementation, make the framing of Sierra Leone 
as a ‘poster-child’ problematic, both in terms of child soldier use but also in terms of 
international response. This reflects on the ahistoric understanding of the 
international norm against child soldering, which presumes only one conception of 
childhood as the universal, and universally applicable one. 
 
Chapter seven shifts the attention to Myanmar, which to this date is presumed to be 
the state actor with the worst record in terms of having (former) child soldiers in their 
military and which recently has moved into the focus of international efforts to 
eliminate the use of child soldiers. Understanding the context of child soldiering 
practices in Myanmar means understanding the role of the Tatmadaw in Burmese 
society historically and today, the drivers of child recruitment as well as Burmese 
understandings of children and child soldiers in particular.  
 
The second Myanmar chapter, chapter eight, investigates the strategies of 
international norm promotion against child soldiering in Myanmar, starting in the 
late 2000s. Focusing on the two main international organisations that are active in 




which they aim to affect change in the Tatmadaw’s use of child soldiers. First, the 
differences between the work of these two organisations are drawn out by tracing 
their history and relationship with the military, which clarifies the different types of 
background knowledge they build their work on. UNICEF, having already 
established a presence in Myanmar, relies much more on personal relationships and 
close connections with the military in order to guarantee access and influence, 
whereas the ILO built an informant network largely independent of the government 
to learn about human rights abuses and instances of underage recruitment.  
 
Chapter nine compares and analyses the findings of the in-depth case studies of the 
practices of international actors combating the use of child soldiers in Sierra Leone 
and Myanmar. It first shows how the international debate has moved from the 
definition and codification of the norm against the recruitment and use of child 
soldiers to an ‘era of application’, moving the discussion on to implementation. The 
chapter further traces processes of institutional learning and knowledge production 
within and between the two case studies. The issue of female child combatants and 
reintegration more broadly are drawn out as specific examples of institutional 
learning.  
 
The conclusion (Chapter 10) summarises the findings of the empirical analysis and 
outlines their theoretical implications as well as overall contribution of this study. I 
outline the limits of this study, regarding access to data, the methods of data 
collection and analysis as well as limits of generalizability. Next, I highlight the 
contributions and point to future avenues of research. I conclude with a list of policy 
recommendations, suggesting alternative ways of thinking about child soldiering and 
offering some specific suggestions for improving international norm promotion 





Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework and Research Design  
2.1 Introduction  
Within International Relations (IR), scholars have paid attention to the impact of 
international norms on states and other international actors for the better part of the 
last 30 years. The conversation has moved from first, trying to establish that norms 
matter3, to understanding actors and processes through which they are diffused4, 
specifying under which conditions norm promotion efforts might be more or less 
successful5, and expanding the universe of actors, for example by focusing on the 
agency of local actors and how international norms promotion affects non-state 
actors, like rebel groups or corporations.  
 
Early constructivist approaches have shown how international norms are promoted 
by different actors and become established internationally. They have focused mainly 
on the international side of the explanation—who are the international advocacy 
networks? 6  How do states support their efforts? Which campaigns are most 
influential? This has been followed by studies focusing on the move from 
commitment to compliance and the analysis of the conditions and limitations under 
which norm compliance is more likely to happen. They also addressed the question 
of how local actors interact with international norms and focused on what happens to 
the states (and other actors) who are at the receiving end of international norm 
diffusion. 
 
                                                
3 Many early constructivist works have shown the influence of international norms on world politics, 
such as Kratochwil, “THRASYMMACHOS REVISITED”; Kratochwil and Ruggie, “International 
Organization”; Finnemore, “Norms, Culture, and World Politics”; Finnemore and Toope, 
“Alternatives to ‘Legalization’”; Klotz, “Norms Reconstituting Interests”; Katzenstein, The Culture of 
National Security; Risse-Kappen et al., The Power of Human Rights. 
4  Alderson, “Making Sense of State Socialization”; Checkel, International Institutions and 
Socialization in Europe; Flockhart, “‘Complex Socialization’”; Hooghe, “Several Roads Lead to 
International Norms, but Few Via International Socialization”; Greenhill, “The Company You Keep”; 
Kent, “China’s International Socialization”; Lewis, “The Janus Face of Brussels”; Schimmelfennig, 
“International Socialization in the New Europe”; Acharya, “How Ideas Spread”; Zimmermann, “Same 
Same or Different?” 
5 Keck and Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders; Keck and Sikkink, “Transnational Advocacy Networks 
in International and Regional Politics”; Risse-Kappen et al., The Power of Human Rights; Finnemore, 
“International Organizations as Teachers of Norms”; Wexler, “The International Deployment of 
Shame, Second-Best Responses, and Norm Entrepreneurship.” 
6 Keck and Sikkink, “Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics”; 
Nelson, “Heroism and Ambiguity”; Hudson, “NGOs’ Transnational Advocacy Networks”; Wexler, 
“The International Deployment of Shame, Second-Best Responses, and Norm Entrepreneurship”; 
Lester, “A Place at the Table”; Brown, Ebrahim, and Batliwala, “Governing International Advocacy 




This thesis aims to interrogate and develop the theoretical contribution of 
constructivist literature to processes of norm diffusion through a case study of the 
international norm against child soldiering. It argues that in order to understand how 
and why international norms are implemented with different degrees of success in 
different contexts, we have to pay attention to the specific histories and power 
relations embedded within the norm since its emergence. This will help to make 
better sense of the effects of (the choice of) strategies to promote specific 
international norms. Strategies of norm promotion and responses by targeted actors 
are filtered through these histories. This claim is implicit in some recent 
constructivist scholarship aiming to specify the conditions under which norms may 
be more or less successful in finding acceptance and compliance across contexts. 
Particularly, discussions on the localisation of international norms take into account 
the ‘match’ of the international norm in question with the existing normative 
framework in the target country.7 To develop the theoretical contribution of this 
work, I examine the daily work of international actors and their (lack of) interaction 
with local actors in different contexts to highlight the practice of norm 
implementation.  
 
This chapter proceeds as follows: I first outline the constellation of actors that are 
engaged in promoting the international norm against the recruitment and use of child 
soldiers before moving on to the development of the norm diffusion literature from 
early models such as the ‘spiral model’8 that theorise the core mechanism to more 
recent approaches that highlight the conditions under which the mechanism is likely 
to work as well as the agency of local actors. To set up the theoretical framework for 
my empirical analysis, I look at which strategies international actors use to achieve 
norm compliance before turning to the possible responses by actors at the receiving 
end of norm promotion. Both norm promotion strategies and local responses are 
affected by a number of conditions and limitations, on the level of the international 
norm as well as context. Finally, international actors implement these strategies in 
their daily work; they navigate inter-institutional politics, produce knowledge and 
learn in and between contexts. Focusing on processes of knowledge production and 
learning help understand how the history of the norm and the power relations 
embedded within it influence the choice and effect of strategies of norm 
                                                
7 Acharya, “How Ideas Spread”; Merry and Levitt, “The Vernacularization of Women’s Human 
Rights.” 




implementation. By making the links between the emergence of the norm, the 
strategies of its promotion and its implementation explicit in the case of the 
international norm against child soldiering, we can see how and why this norm 
emerged and diffused and how it is applied in Sierra Leone and Myanmar. 
 
2.2 Actors and Structure 
On the international level, the most important actors for the development and 
implementation of international norms are international organisations. They are 
predominantly the actor in and through which most international norms are codified 
and institutionalised, for example through international treaties, resolutions, and the 
establishment of implementing organisations. 9  Most international norms are 
promoted and implemented by more than one international organisation and the 
interplay, coordination, or competition by various organisations can affect the 
effectiveness of the norm promotion effort (see 2.6.1 of this chapter).  
 
In terms of bringing issues to the attention of international organisations, 
international nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) play a key role. They act as 
norm entrepreneurs by promoting and advocating for e.g. human rights or 
environmental standards to be regulated on an international level. Wielding neither 
grand military, economic, nor ‘soft’ power, NGOs are not traditionally influential 
international actors, but use new strategies and techniques such as information 
provision to raise awareness, symbolic politics to publicise issues, issue linkage to 
push third parties to attach conditionality for e.g. aid or military assistance; and 
accountability politics to highlight previous commitments that states are now 
violating.  
 
Information provision and symbolic politics contribute to the agenda-setting role of 
NGOs, both at the norm emergence and at later stages. Through showing certain 
effects of previously acceptable behaviour, they contribute to defining international 
norms and what constitutes a norm violation, either through expanding or restricting 
their definition. The campaign against the use of anti-personnel landmines is one 
                                                
9 See for example Wiener, “Contested Compliance,” p.195 who argues that ‘the world political arena 
where politics is guided by international law and the organizational environment is set by the UN, 
NATO, OECD, WTO and others’ is the most familiar setting in which debates about international 




such example of attempting and succeeding to reframe a previously acceptable 
behaviour into an impermissible one.10 The strategies of information provision and 
symbolic politics were used in this case to describe and publicise the abhorrent 
effects of the practice (loss of legs, feet, …) and confront states that use these mines. 
While this connection is quite direct, some campaigns link much broader issues to 
specific norm violations. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines for 
example, gives a long list of negative effects of landmines, including the slowing of 
refugee repatriation and the burdening of healthcare systems, which go far beyond 
the immediate damage to the individual.11  
 
The last, and often most powerful, actor on the international stage is the state. States 
are for the most part the decision-making actor in international organisations, 
although IO agencies can act with a significant degree of independence.12 They are 
also the actor with the most leverage to put material pressure on norm-violating 
actors, such as cutting aid payments or decreasing trade. This applies especially to 
the most powerful states on the international stage who have significant influence 
over IO decision making, NGO funding, and bilateral relations. Once a powerful 
state has publicly adopted a norm, they can become an important ally for other norm 
promoting actors.  
 
There are a number of important local actors for understanding how the promotion of 
international norms plays out in different contexts. First, international norms do not 
just appear on the domestic level, they have to be actively promoted. Local offices of 
international organisations and internationally active NGOs most often fill this role, 
whereas human rights advocacy organisations rarely have local implementation 
capacity. The second set of local actors engaged in promoting the implementation of 
international norms are local civil society and human rights organisations. Often 
partnering with local offices of IOs and international NGOs, they engage and interact 
with international norms in a number of ways—later sections of this chapter will 
detail these processes (see 2.4). 
 
                                                
10  Wexler, “The International Deployment of Shame, Second-Best Responses, and Norm 
Entrepreneurship.” 
11 “International Campaign to Ban Landmines - Arguments for the Ban | Problem | ICBL.” 
12 Martin and Simmons, “Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions”; Barnett and 
Finnemore, “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations”; Hawkins et al., 




While the distinction between the international and the local level holds for some 
actors, e.g. human rights advocacy organisations who almost exclusively operate on 
an international level and local civil society organisations who only have a domestic 
focus, most relevant actors for the development, promotion, and diffusion of 
international norms transcend these categories. States are both members of 
international organisations, thereby possibly contributing to the development of the 
international normative agenda, and responsible for protecting human rights 
domestically. NGOs advocate for the codification and implementation of 
international norms on the international stage, and often implement programmes 
directly in various contexts that are affected by these issues. Similarly, international 
organisations are the institutions in which debate about international norms takes 
place and where international law is made. At the same time, they fund or directly 
implement projects that uphold or promote these norms, often alongside NGOs, in 
different contexts.  
2.2.1 Communities of Practice  
This constellation of international (and sometimes also locally operating) actors is 
quite similar to what most constructivist literature refers to as ‘transnational 
advocacy networks’. It describes exactly the interplay and cooperation of local and 
international human rights advocating organisations with the aim to improve human 
rights practice around the world. For the purpose of this project, I set a slightly 
different focus and therefore employ slightly different terminology. In fact, I am not 
only interested in the emergence and proliferation of the international norm against 
child soldiering but also in how this norm is implemented on the ground through the 
work of international actors. Thus, I distinguish between transnational advocacy 
networks and communities of practice.  
 
According to Keck and Sikkink, transnational advocacy networks are ‘networks of 
activists, distinguishable largely by the centrality of principled ideas or values in 
motivating their formation.’13 They aim to influence policy. Communities of practice 
on the other hand, aim to directly influence practice. This term refers to groups of 
people who share background knowledge and discourse—this also applies to 
transnational advocacy networks—but crucially, are also engaged in the ‘actual 
                                                




doing of social change’, they share an interest in doing.14 Amnesty International is an 
example for an international actor that is part of the transnational advocacy network 
on refugee rights. Amnesty International researches and campaigns for better 
protection of refugees’ human rights and aims to influence states’ refugee policies. 
We can think of UNHCR as an actor that would be part of the same transnational 
advocacy network, also pushing states to implement better policies. UNHCR, 
however, is also part of the community of practice on refugee protection. They 
actively build and maintain refugee camps on the ground, they are engaged in the 
practice of refugee rights protection. A third type of actor would not be part of the 
transnational advocacy network but only of the community of practice. Médecins 
Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders (MSF) is probably the best example for an 
NGO that is engaged in practice without much policy advocacy. MSF works in 
refugee camps providing medical care and humanitarian aid to its inhabitants but 
does not campaign for better refugee protection vis-à-vis host or donor governments. 
Any advocacy they are engaged in focuses on their target communities, e.g. 
healthcare outreach. 15  Many international actors working on human rights are part 
of transnational advocacy networks and communities of practice at the same time but 
they are worth distinguishing analytically.  
 
Chapter 4 shows how a variety of actors form a community of practice around the 
international norm against the use of child soldiers on a transnational level, 
consisting of various parts of different UN agencies, such as UNICEF, the ILO, the 
Security Council and its Child Protection Working Group and Special 
Representative, large child protection and development NGOs like Save the Children 
and World Vision, human rights advocacy groups, mostly Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International, transnational networks, predominantly Child Soldiers 
International (which used to be the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers) and 
Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, as well as some state development 
agencies, especially Canada and Sweden. A part of this community has a physical 
presence in countries where child soldiering takes place (mostly UN agencies and the 
NGOs) where they form a sub-community with, for example, youth ministries of 
local governments, national militaries, or national NGOs and activists. 
 
                                                





Communities of practice are also spaces in which intersubjective meanings of norms 
are created and contested, in which learning takes place and practices evolve.16  
According to Gross Stein who writes about the humanitarian community, practices 
are likely to change as a reaction to new problems arising, which cannot be solved by 
drawing on existing shared knowledge. Faced with a changing humanitarian space 
where ‘deepening globalization, retreating but regulating states, and a changing 
strategic environment’ forced a conversation about whether humanitarian actors were 
actually ‘doing harm instead of good’. 17  This process brought usually tacit 
background knowledge into the foreground, to actively evaluate whether existing 
(knowledge about) practices are still adequate for the given situation. She argues that 
this is a conscious and reflective process of learning where structure and agency 
intersect.18 Later parts of this chapter will return to this process of institutional 
learning.  
2.2.2 Target Actors 
Apart from the communities of practice, we must highlight the targets of their norm 
promotion effort, which might be labelled norm recipients or receivers, or norm-
violating actors by different authors respectively. 19  Most often, international 
advocacy efforts are directed at the state. Since states are the signatory parties to 
international human rights treaties and are members of international organisations, 
they are formally responsible for protecting the human rights of their citizens and 
abstain from violating them themselves as well as stop other actors within their 
territory from doing so. However, the state is not a unitary actor and consists of many 
different institutions with different interests, which may be quite independent and 
over which the government has only limited control. Often relevant in a human rights 
context are for example the military, the police force, and the judiciary.  
 
The second group of important targets of international norm promotion are non-state 
actors (NSAs). These can be non-state armed groups, secessionist movements, 
opposition parties, associated militias or private corporations.20 Although not part of 
the state apparatus, according to international law, they are still under the 
                                                
16 Adler, Communitarian International Relations, 16. 
17 Gross Stein, 88. 
18 Gross Stein, 90–91. 
19 These labels are for example used by Acharya, “How Ideas Spread”; Muller and Wunderlich, Norm 
Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control; Allison‐Reumann, “The Norm-Diffusion Capacity of 
ASEAN.” 




responsibility of the state regarding their human rights violations. At times, 
international actors address non-state actors directly, such as the parties listed for the 
so-called ‘six grave violations’ in the annex to the annual report of the Office of the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict 
(SRSG).21 Scholars such as Hyeran Jo have shown that some of the strategies 
international actors pursue to promote international norms can apply to NSAs under 
certain conditions, such as the group having explicit political goals and a centralised 
command structure, making them somewhat state-like actors.22  
 
2.3 Strategies of Norm Promotion  
Now that we have established the actors that are involved in the process of 
international norm diffusion, the next section focuses on the process of socialisation 
as the prime mechanism of how states are theorised to adopt international norms and 
on four strategies that are employed by international actors to induce norm compliant 
behaviour: (1) coercion; (2) material and social incentives; (3) persuasion; and (4) 
capacity building. While these are analytically divergent strategies with different 
underlying assumptions about behavioural and attitude change, they are often 
employed concomitantly—later sections of this chapter take a closer look at potential 
interactions between them. The following empirical chapters return to these 
strategies and show how and to which effects international actors use different 
strategies to encourage and sustain the prevention of child soldiering in Sierra Leone 
and Myanmar.  
 
2.3.1 Socialisation 
The main process through which norm diffusion happens is socialisation, which in its 
broadest conceptualisation is understood to be a process of learning.23 Authors place 
different emphasis on whether socialisation is to be studied as a process, an outcome, 
                                                
21 These six grave violations include the recruitment and use of children, killing and maiming 
children, committing rape and other forms of sexual violence, attacking schools and hospitals, and 
abducting children. See Tremblay, “The Six Grave Violations.” Some international NGOs also work 
directly with NSAs in trying to improve their protection of human rights, such as Geneva Call.  
22 Jo and Bryant, “Taming of the Warlords”; Jo, Compliant Rebels. 
23 Finnemore, “Norms, Culture, and World Politics”; Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm 
Dynamics and Political Change”; Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics; Thies, “Sense and 




or—most likely—both. 24  Norms are most likely diffused through socialisation, 
ultimately leading to all actors sharing the same intersubjective understanding of 
appropriate behaviour, which then becomes internalised.  
 
The most prominent account of socialisation as a process is the ‘spiral model’, 
developed by Risse, Ropp and Sikkink in 1999, which theorises norm diffusion from 
the international stage to the country level.25 There are five phases during this 
socialisation process, building on earlier work by Keck/Sikkink on transnational 
advocacy networks 26 : (1) repression – no international advocacy efforts find 
resonance yet; (2) denial – discursive engagement with norm-violating actor, refusal 
to agree with accusations; (3) tactical concessions – when the repressive state uses 
low-cost tactical concession to avoid further international pressure; (4) prescriptive 
status – states begin to adopt human rights norms and implement them more 
meaningfully, e.g. translating relevant international treaties into domestic law; and 
(5) rule-consistent behaviour – sustained compliance with the international norm.27 
 
The spiral model has since been adopted, adapted, and applied by many scholars in 
IR to a number of human rights issues, such as transitional justice28, environmental 
protection29, the banning of landmines30, or whaling31, just to name a few. It has also 
been nuanced and refined in response to criticism from within the constructivist 
tradition and from critical theorists, post- and decolonial scholars. One common 
critique challenges the dominant focus of constructivist research on studying the 
proliferation and socialisation of ‘good norms’. This is predominantly an empirical 
argument based on the observation of which kind of norms have been studied 
through this lens. Indeed, constructivists have largely focused on how particular 
ideas, e.g. democracy, human rights, rule of law, legitimacy, foreign aid, 
                                                
24 See Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 901–4. who see 
socialization as a process, Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics; Alderson, “Making Sense 
of State Socialization.”, who see it as an outcome and for example Schimmelfennig, “International 
Socialization in the New Europe”; Kent, “China’s International Socialization”; Thies, “Sense and 
Sensibility in the Study of State Socialisation”; Park, World Bank Group Interactions with 
Environmentalists., who conceptualize it as both.  
25 Risse-Kappen et al., The Power of Human Rights. 
26  Keck and Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders; Keck and Sikkink, “Transnational Advocacy 
Networks in International and Regional Politics.” 
27 Risse and Ropp, “Introduction and Overview,” 6–7. 
28 Subotic, Hijacked Justice; Sikkink, The Justice Cascade. 
29 Haas, Epistemic Communities, Constructivism, and International Environmental Politics. 
30  Wexler, “The International Deployment of Shame, Second-Best Responses, and Norm 
Entrepreneurship.” 




environmental protection, etc., have diffused on the international stage.32 Implied is 
that by understanding the processes through which these norms diffuse and become 
more widely shared, we can further the proliferation of said norms and ultimately, 
create a better world. Thus, it is assumed that progress, can be achieved through the 
promotion of certain universal international norms.  
 
However, there is no inherent theoretical bias in the conceptualisation of the role of 
international norms but rather an ideological charge expressed in the continuous 
selection of liberal norms as case studies. Hoffman for example argues that 
constructivist theorising is in itself a theory of social process, which does not make 
assumptions about the ‘ahistorical nature’ of particular actors or behavioural patterns 
like other IR theories such as neorealism or neoliberalism.33 As Barkin notes, there 
has been a ‘tendency […] to study issue areas compatible with liberal idealism in 
relatively noncritical ways.’34 A ‘unilinear, liberal understanding of progress is 
concealing its own normative origins, casting as universal what is always necessarily 
a localised and historically specific set of values.’35  
 
This focus on ‘good norms’ is problematic in a number of ways. First, a singular 
vision on how international norms can improve the international community and 
what that will look like might silence other conceptions of progress or alternative 
visions of community. Its universalising tendency does not allow for less powerful or 
marginal voices to contribute. 36  Second, what are understood to be ‘good’ 
international norms are often the ones currently promoted by international actors, 
such as international organisations, NGOs, but also by powerful, norm-leading states. 
These are often the main benefactors of this particular normative structure. In fact, 
what is presented as a potentially better future might indeed look a lot like the status 
quo in which for example the violation of human rights has been used as a 
justification for military interventions and sanctions.37 Furthermore, if indeed the 
‘good’ norms are the ones currently promoted by powerful states and international 
                                                
32 Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo; Risse-Kappen et al., The Power of Human Rights; Bernstein, 
The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism; Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics; 
Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention.  
33 Hoffmann, “Is Constructivist Ethics an Oxymoron?,” 241. 
34 Barkin, “Realist Constructivism,” 335. 
35 Epstein, “Stop Telling Us How to Behave: Socialization or Infantilization?,” 136. 
36 Epstein, “Stop Telling Us How to Behave: Socialization or Infantilization?”; Chua, “Against 
Localization: Rethinking Compliance and Antagonism in Norm Dynamics.” 




actors, this might necessitate intervention (militarily or otherwise) by those actors in 
contexts where these norms are not sufficiently upheld. This thesis confronts this 
challenge by unpacking the ways in which specific international norms emerge 
historically, who they are imagined and constructed by as well as who champions 
them and why. I argue that doing so is crucial to fully understanding the often widely 
varying effects of norm promotion strategies across different contexts. 
 
Ten years after the publication of the spiral model, its authors returned to their 
original claims, addressing some of the most common criticism and updating their 
framework, publishing The Persistent Power of Human Rights (PPoHR) in 2013.38 
For example, the seemingly straightforward final phase of the spiral model (rule 
consistent behaviour) is often more nuanced. Instead of presuming that once ‘good 
norms’ had become official state policy, there would be no further normative 
challenges to it, targeted actors often employ counter-strategies to minimise 
international pressure (see 2.4.3 in this chapter).39 Furthermore, norms are not only 
externally contested and inherently stable but can also be contested internally 
between actors that promote and implement them. Based on these insights of 
constructivist theorising, the remainder of this chapter first outlines the strategies of 
international norm promotion before specifying the responses to international norms, 
nuancing the later stages of the spiral model and grounding this framework in 
practices within specific contexts.  
2.3.1.1 Coercion  
Coercion is and will remain a strategy rarely used to bring about human rights 
change. As Risse and Ropp outline in PPoHR, it describes the forced implementation 
of the protection of human rights by all means, including military humanitarian 
intervention, as is for example envisioned in the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
principle in case of egregious human rights violations, such as genocide or crimes 
against humanity.40 In practice, although military interventions are almost always 
also justified in human rights terms, coercive strategies to enforce human rights will 
remain at the margins of international politics and only happen in a fraction of 
relevant cases. A coercive strategy based on the use of force is only a viable strategy 
in case there is consensus in the Security Council among all veto powers, which is 
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unlikely in some of the most striking cases of human rights violations, such as the 
Syrian civil war, combined with a willingness to invest resources and manpower in a 
solution, which is unlikely in cases without great power interest. Some scholars, such 
as those in Barnhizer’s recent edited volume on effective strategies for protecting 
human rights, aim to identify further coercive enforcement mechanism to better 
safeguard human rights.41 Risse and Ropp also argue that legal prosecution is another 
case of coercion although only if the state in question has not agreed to be subjected 
to the rules that are being enforced.42 If a state has joined the ICC, this would not 
constitute a case of coercion. However, if the Security Council would refer 
Myanmar—not a member of the ICC—to the ICC for committing crimes against 
humanity in Rakhine state, this would certainly be an example of such.  
2.3.1.2 Material & Social Incentives  
A more feasible strategy, according to PPoHR, is often the attempt to change the 
incentives of the norm-violating actor by introducing (the threat of) material or social 
sanctions and rewards. Negative material incentives might be economic sanctions or 
a decrease of international investment whereas positive material incentives could be 
an increase in foreign aid or access to preferential trade agreements. For social 
rewards and sanctions to be effective, the necessary condition is that the targeted 
actor values its reputation in the international community—we can imagine North 
Korea being immune to efforts aimed at damaging their reputation in the 
international community. Social rewards might include being invited to backchannel 
talks at international conferences (‘being part of the club’) or being positively 
mentioned in UN reports, for example in the UPR, for showing improvement in 
human rights performance. Social sanctions might refer to being named and shamed 
by international actors or third parties, e.g. being listed on the Security Council list 
for states that recruit and use child soldiers, or being uninvited from international 
summits, e.g. the expulsion of Russia from the G8, or the withdrawal of diplomatic 
staff.43  
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We can also think of actions that have both economic and social sanctioning effects, 
such as the refusal of the UN to allow states to contribute troops to its peacekeeping 
operations due to the existence of underage soldiers within their state military. This 
may result in a lack of income—as Victor argues, often a significant motivation for 
low-income states to join peacekeeping missions44—as well as reputational losses.  
2.3.1.3 Persuasion  
Using persuasion as a strategy to induce norm compliance relies on a different 
mechanism than the previous two strategies, which essentially aim at more or less 
forcefully changing the cost-benefit-analysis for states to continue violating 
international human rights norms. Persuasion aims to induce actors into voluntary 
compliance with costly rules.45 The end goal of this strategy is that the targeted actor 
will actually change its mind and believe that protecting human rights and complying 
with international normative standards is the right thing to do—and not just because 
it will suffer material consequences otherwise. Ideally, this would also be a long-
term outcome of incentive-based strategies where actors eventually change their 
mind once norm compliant behaviour has become habitualised. In contrast to 
material and social incentives, persuasion—if it happens, and this is a very rare 
occurrence—has long lasting effects and norm compliance continues even once 
international attention has diminished. Crucially, the success of this strategy is either 
dependent on the target actor or a relevant audience, such as the electorate in a 
parliamentary system, actually believes in the social validity of the norm.46   
 
Early accounts of this strategy assumed that, ultimately, arguments in favour of 
human rights protection would always turn out to be the better ones and would 
prevail in the end. This unidirectional argument has been criticised due to the lack of 
agency of the targeted actor and instead, different responses that we see in practice 
are highlighted, such as backlash and successful counter arguments against the 
hegemonic human rights discourse.47  
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2.3.1.4 Capacity Building  
An addition to the literature on strategies of international norm promotion by PPoHR 
addresses the issue of involuntary non-compliance due to capacity limitations, which 
might hinder a state’s ability to implement costly reforms, changes to the justice 
system, or security sector reform.48 In case there is already a willingness by the 
targeted state to comply with international norms, no material incentives or 
persuasive arguments have to be offered to induce norm compliant behaviour. 
International actors might instead be most successful when providing support, be it 
materially or in the form of knowledge transfer and expertise. This relates to a 
discussion on what Risse calls ‘areas of limited statehood’ that this chapter will take 
up later.49 These areas, in which the central government has limited control and 
ability to implement policies, are not confined to fragile or ‘failed’ state contexts but 
are very common occurrences in many countries. Regarding capacity building, it is 
especially important to ascertain whether the state in question is actually genuinely 
interested in improving its human rights performance. Otherwise, well-intentioned 
support to strengthen state institutions and implementation ability might end up 
strengthening the repressive abilities of the human rights violating actor.50  
2.4 Responses to International Norms 
As has been demonstrated by recent constructivist scholarship, in order to understand 
the process of norm diffusion, it is not enough only to theorise the strategies 
employed by international actors, we must also have a clear understanding of 
potential responses by local actors. In response to the previously outlined criticism of 
unidirectionality from international to local, several authors, such as Wiener51, 
Sandholtz52, Prantl/Nakano53, or Zwingel54, have tackled this by focusing on the 
agency of the ‘norm taker’. Wiener, for example, highlights the difference between a 
behaviourist understanding of norms, which presumes norms to be stable and actors 
as reacting to them, and a reflexive approach, which operates on the underlying 
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assumption of norm flexibility.55 She further argues that ‘an exclusive analytical 
focus on linear compliance behaviour does not facilitate an insight on social change’ 
and that norm contestation in the process of norm diffusion establishes the legitimacy 
of the compliance process and thus can serve to general long-term support for the 
normative change rather than just strategic compliance.  
 
Indeed, local actors—mostly states in this configuration—are not passive recipients 
of international norms; they also participate in the process of norm creation and have 
a range of actions with which they respond to international norms, such as (1) to fit 
the international norm to local ideas and practices (localisation/vernacularization); 
(2) to reinterpret the issues that the norm in question relates to (applicability 
contestation); and to (3) question the legitimacy or reject the norm itself (validity 
contestation/backlash), for example by pointing out the hypocrisy of the norm 
promoting actor or providing alternative normative frameworks. These reactions can 
be located on an escalating scale of norm challenging behaviour from the attempt to 
lightly alter the norm to fit local frames over questions of applicability and 
legitimacy to the outright rejection of the norm.  
2.4.1 Localisation/Vernacularization 
International norms do not move from the international to the local level in a direct 
and straightforward way. In response to some critiques that have highlighted the lack 
of attention paid to local actors in the process of international norm diffusion, 
scholars like Acharya and Engle Merry and Levitt have developed approaches that 
conceptualise the processes involved in local interaction with norms. Acharya for 
example argues that local agents reconstruct international norms to ensure they fit 
with the agent’s cognitive priors and identities.56 In case an international norm seems 
to clash with pre-existing local norms, a variety of strategies can be employed by 
local actors to narrow the (perceived) gap between the two—as Acharya phrases it: 
‘Localisation, not wholesale acceptance or rejection settles normative contestation.’57 
These range from re-framing to pruning and grafting, the latter referring to only 
accepting selected aspects of the norm, which do not destabilise the existing social 
order. 58  Engle Merry and Levitt explore a similar process under the label of 
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vernacularization. This describes the ‘extraction of ideas and practices from the 
universal sphere of international organisations, and their translation into ideas and 
practices that resonate with the values and ways of doing things in local contexts’.59 
NGOs are a critical interlocutor here in the way they translate global human rights 
ideas into terms that resonate with local understandings, which Engle Merry and 
Levitt demonstrate by looking at women’s rights NGOs around the world and their 
different approaches to using international human rights concepts and language to 
frame their work. They examine the extent to which emphasising the international 
human rights framework or potential alternative frameworks is a strategic 
consideration made by local actors, which brings with it a number of dilemmas: 
International human rights frameworks can offer the legitimacy of a transnational 
standard, the expertise of how to advocate as well as report and document, and most 
importantly the access to allies and international funding. On the other hand, 
emphasising local or alternative legitimation frameworks might ensure stronger 
support from the community and ultimately more successful mobilisation. Hertel 
explores similar mechanisms regarding local activists’ engagement, based in 
Bangladesh and Mexico, with big international advocacy campaigns against child 
labour and for reproductive rights.60 She highlights how these local actors can change 
the particular understandings of international norms by engaging in blocking (halting 
or stalling international campaign to pressure senders to change their frame) or 
backdoor moves (augmenting the campaign’s normative frame without stalling).61  
 
However, this process of vernacularization, if ‘straying too far’ from the core content 
of the international norm, can end up producing ideas and practices that are 
antithetical to its core, yet legitimated by the aura of international consensus.62 For 
example, child rights activists in Myanmar might ‘prune’ the international norm 
against child soldiering and argue that it only applies to children serving in active 
combat in the military whereas providing support functions, such as cooking and 
cleaning, would be acceptable because these are very similar roles to what children 
would do outside of the military too, e.g. working in tea houses etc. While this might 
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make the norm more convincing in the Burmese context, it ultimately undermines the 
core of the international norm, which is precisely aimed at including a wider range of 
activities than active combat. 
 
Along with the emphasis on local agency and the possibility of an ‘active’ response 
by the norm receiver more recent constructivist scholarship has attempted to show 
that international norms are not just thinly veiled coercive instruments to spread 
Western normative influence around the globe but that they are, in fact, constituted 
by non-Western agents and sometimes originate in the Global South as well. Recent 
publications by Sikkink and others63 trace the origins of international human rights or 
development norms to Latin American or Chinese and Indian sources.64 The claim is 
that if international human rights norms were in fact introduced and institutionalised 
internationally on the initiative of non-Western states, they are neither Eurocentric 
nor coercive.65 In Sikkink’s words: ‘Southern protagonism arguably increases the 
legitimacy of global governance projects, including the human rights project.’66 
Indeed, it is an important project to trace the authorship and influence of ‘Southern 
protagonists’ and their influence on the shaping of international norms. However, it 
remains somewhat unclear whether and how the participation, and even potential 
protagonism, of actors in the Global South in turn, also affect how the international 
norm operates once it is instituted. To unpack the impact of local actors on 
international norms, this thesis examines the explicit content of the norm, and 
crucially how it is implemented in different contexts. 
2.4.2 Applicability Contestation  
Beyond localisation, Sandholtz (2019) distinguishes between two levels of 
contestation: applicatory and validity contestation. 67  Contestation of the norm 
regarding its applicability does not challenge whether the norm should exist or is 
valid in the first place but instead questions whether it is relevant in a particular case 
or regarding a particular action. This can be achieved either by redefining the 
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boundaries of the norm in question—for example by specifying that a norm against 
women in the military might only apply to women in combat positions—or by 
invoking a different norm altogether.  
 
One prominent example of the latter is the attempt of the Russian government to 
reframe and justify their invasion of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 in terms of 
upholding the norm of protecting civilians and invoking R2P (responsibility to 
protect) rather than violating state sovereignty and starting a war of aggression. Putin 
makes this point clear in an interview from March 2014: ‘Protecting these people is 
in our national interests. This is a humanitarian mission. We do not intend 
to subjugate anyone or to dictate to anyone. However, we cannot remain indifferent 
if we see that they are being persecuted, destroyed and humiliated.’68 Another 
common way of challenging the applicability of a norm is to question the data used 
to prove that a norm violation has occurred in the first place. The UN and other 
human rights organisations are often accused by affected states of relying on 
unverified accounts and biased data collection. In a prominent example over the last 
few years, Russian state representatives and media continue to accuse the UN and 
Western governments to rely on data from unverified sources when reporting on 
attacks in Syria.69 
2.4.3 Legitimacy Contestation and Backlash  
A further possible response by the targeted actor to international pressure is to 
question the legitimacy of the international actor, state, IO, or NGO and the norms 
they promote.70 Regarding the legitimacy of the international actor, it is fairly clear 
that the UN Security Council is dominated by great power interest and it will be 
unlikely to sanction human rights violations by any state that is an ally of any of the 
permanent members. Human rights advocacy networks, such as Human Rights 
Watch or Amnesty International on the other hand, are often assumed to 
independently promote better protection for human rights around the globe. 
However, there is some evidence to suggest that human rights NGOs, in fact, do not 
base their campaigns on the severity of the human rights abuses alone, but 
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differentiate between cases.71 Ron et al. have shown that apart from the human rights 
situation in the target country, other factors such as previous reporting efforts (to 
contribute to a broader campaign), state power, US military assistance and a 
country’s media profile add to the decision of when to issue a report.72 Whilst certain 
countries are chosen to promote greater awareness, others are selected because they 
provide a good advocacy opportunity and help to raise the NGO’s profile.73 Being 
the target of such an advocacy campaign might increase potential rally-‘round-the-
flag effects in domestic audiences of the target state.  
 
Exposing the hypocrisy of international actors can be aimed both at the specific 
violation in question as well as their human rights record more broadly. As will be 
discussed later in the thesis, both the US and the UK still recruit 17-year olds into 
their armed forces and—until recently—sent them to battle in exceptional 
circumstances.74 Turning the spotlight around can also be aimed at undermining the 
legitimacy of that state as a norm leader regarding the protection of human rights 
generally. One prominent example of this is the UN itself, which has been criticised 
for its lack of accountability mechanisms and control over its own peacekeepers after 
the sexual abuse scandals involving UN Peacekeeping troops for example in 
Cambodia, Mozambique, DRC, Haiti, and Sudan75 or the sexual exploitation scandal 
regarding Oxfam staff in Haiti in 2018.76  Lynch talks about the degenerative 
potential of a systemic loss of legitimacy when the supposed norm leader, in this case 
referring to the US supported by the UN, is exposed as behaving hypocritically, 
referring to the sanctions regime in Iraq in the 1990s.77 A similar argument has been 
made regarding the United States losing much of its legitimacy regarding shaming 
human rights abusers after the torture scandals at Abu Ghraib became public 
knowledge (REF). 
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Furthermore, as advocacy efforts move predominantly from North to South, from 
developed to developing countries and from Western NGOs to non-Western 
governments, they are sometimes perceived as a neo-imperialist infringement of state 
sovereignty or cultural practices (or deliberately framed that way). This is especially 
true regarding the broader human rights discourse and civil liberty rights.78 Even at 
first glance, seemingly uncontroversial notions of children’s rights can also be 
perceived as part of this discourse as interpretations of childhood vary vastly across 
the globe. The international legal framework, and even more so the international 
advocacy network around child rights, is guided by a Western understanding of 
children as innocent and largely passive bystanders, who have to be protected—
chapter 4 will explore this idea in greater detail. 79  
 
One possible response to this perceived lack of legitimacy of the international norm 
is for targeted actors to design and promote normative counter frames.80 As a 
response to the expansion of the human rights agenda internationally, according to 
Brysk, backlash describes ‘the successful development of new rights norms and 
policies trigger[ing] counter-mobilization and state suppression.’81 States who are 
opposed to the international human rights agenda and strong enough to resist 
international pressure (see section 2.5.4 on social and material vulnerabilities) often 
use anti-imperialist or national security language to justify and mobilise domestic 
support for counter-norms.82  
 
Other scholars emphasise the reactive quality of responses to international norms 
pressure, ‘a backlash’ reaction. Vinjamuri for example contends that, in contrast to 
legitimacy contestation, backlash is reactive, seeking to undermine and block 
specific policies, it does not seek to engage with alternative norms, principles, or 
ideologies.83 Backlash can be subtle, for example by avoiding joining human rights 
organisations in the first place (US, Russia, China on ICC) or restricting activities of 
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human rights organisations. It can also be more proactive, e.g. leaving international 
organisations (Burundi and the ICC) or founding or adapting alternative ones.84 
Finally, ‘violent entrenchment’—increasing human rights abuses as a response to 
international pressure—would be the highest step on the ladder of escalation.85 
Although this mechanism can limit the legitimacy of the international norm 
promotion effort, it does not necessarily imply the norm itself is in decline. Backlash 
might in fact be, especially in the early stages, part of the ‘norm life cycle’ as 
theorised in the spiral model.86  
 
2.5 Conditions & Limitations  
This chapter has so far set up a theoretical framework by identifying the actors 
involved in norm creation and implementation, outlining the strategies employed by 
norm promoting actors and examining possible responses by targeted actors. In order 
to understand how these strategies are applied and implemented in different contexts, 
we must pay attention to both characteristics of the particular norm in question and to 
characteristics of the target state. Building on the existing literature, these conditions 
and limitations guide the empirical analysis along two dimensions: (1) salience and 
contestation of the norm and (2) the level of institutionalisation and legalisation 
regarding the characteristics of the norm. Two characteristics of the target actor will 
also guide the analysis:  (1) areas of limited statehood and (2) social and material 
vulnerability.  
2.5.1 Salience & Contestation 
Scholars such as Wiener have rightly pointed out that international norms, once they 
have reached a level of acceptance and become established as a normative standard, 
do not reach a state of stability.87 Although they might have a widespread level of 
support by a variety of actors, they might vary in terms of salience on the 
international advocacy agenda over time and in terms of contestation. Both have a 
direct influence on how much pressure international actors exert on norm violating 
actors and how easily that pressure is resisted.  
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Along the lines of the spiral model, the level of international attention focused on the 
promotion of a particular norm will vary over time. ‘International attention’ refers 
here to a variety of activities, from the publication of local newspaper articles on a 
particular human rights violation, demonstrations, reports by local and international 
human rights organisations, commentary by third party states, all the way to UN 
reports and resolutions. In the ideal model, attention keeps increasing until the norm 
reaches a ‘tipping point’ at which it becomes established.88 This might be evidenced 
for instance by a drop in reports and newspaper articles on a global scale. However, 
attention might turn to a particular context in response to a human rights crisis there.  
 
In order to understand the strength of a particular international norm, it is therefore 
not enough to look at how much international attention is dedicated to its promotion 
but also how much different actors challenge its content and applicability. Simmons 
and Jo argue for example, that we should not only look at local acceptance of 
international norms but the diversity of actors supporting it at all levels.89 We have 
seen before that targeted actors can challenge the international norm on these two 
levels—often with the intention of diverting attention away from their own 
violations. This can have implications for the overall workings of the norm, for 
example to reduce its overall scope or to define exceptions. However, it is important 
to note that contestation does not necessarily imply a weakening of the norm. 
Sandholtz (2019) brings the example of the United States’ use of torture after 9/11 as 
one such case where the local contestation of the norm—albeit by the most powerful 
state in the international system—actually lead to a strengthening of the norm 
internationally, as other states strongly opposed the US stance. 
 
Although scholars have extensively written about how international norms are 
contested by its targeted actors, the assumption that norms are stable at their core and 
only contested in their application does not hold. In fact, different international actors 
may have different interpretations of the same international norm based on different 
perceptions of the human rights issue at hand, different organisational cultures and 
histories, and therefore different approaches about how to respond. As Subotic 
argues in her account of the implementation of transitional justice norms in Serbia, 
this lack of internal coherence of international pressure might affect the effectiveness 
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of strategies to promote said norm in a particular context—and lead to unintended 
consequences.90 Goodman and Jinks argue in the same vein, emphasising that 
material sanctions will be employed inconsistently if there is no ‘prior social and 
cognitive alignment of important actors.’91 Some international actors perceive certain 
human rights norms as inviolable principles. This principled normative 
understanding might leave little space for targeted actors to adapt the norm to local 
frameworks in an effort to make it more ‘palatable’. A strict interpretation of a 
particular international norm is thus on the one hand, more likely to cause backlash 
and an outright rejection of it, but on the other hand might have the potential to lead 
to genuine persuasion and a mind-set change in the long run. A less strict 
interpretation of a particular norm with room for local adaptation leaves more space 
for the target actor to comply whilst making adjustments—deflecting from some 
violations, evading some while emphasising improvements in other areas. This could 
lead to quicker compliance and is less likely to cause backlash but it might also open 
the door for perceiving the issue as a bargaining chip, and close the door for long-
term normative change. For example, discussions on women’s quotas and equality 
can be viewed through this lens. Insisting on the principle of equal representation 
would mean demanding 50% women, for example in peace negotiations or in 
parliament. While this is more likely to be perceived as a radical demand and met 
with outright rejection, settling for a 30% quota ultimately undermines the quest for 
equality and long-term attitude change, although it is probably more likely to be 
implemented in the first place. 
2.5.2 Legalisation & Institutionalisation  
Following recent constructivist literature on norm contestation and robustness, such 
as Deitelhoff and Zimmermann (2019) and Simmons and Jo (2019), another factor 
regarding the characteristics of the norm in question is the level of legalisation and 
institutionalisation.92 Even a highly salient and uncontested international norm does 
not directly translate into a set of actions for actors on the ground trying to 
implement or apply it to a specific situation; it has to be embedded in the fabric of 
international cooperation. Most commonly, international activists and NGOs push for 
an international norm to be codified in an international treaty or a UN resolution and 
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authors such as Simmons (2009) have demonstrated the effect of treaty ratification 
on a state behaviour regarding human rights protection.93 Norms become harder to 
defy once they are ‘enmeshed in law and institutions at the international, regional, 
and local levels.’ 94  Once this milestone has been reached, the norm can be 
institutionalised, most likely in the workings of an international organisation. Post 
codification, next steps often include the establishment of a monitoring body plus the 
setting of guidelines and principles of how the norm should be implemented. This 
can go along with national action plans, which combine a commitment of the 
targeted state to improve its human rights practice as well as concrete steps of how 
this will be realised. As Simmons and Jo argue when measuring robustness and 
strengths of norms, legalisation and institutionalization matters as they help stabilise 
expectations and raise the cost of noncompliance.’95 
2.5.3 Limited Statehood  
Whereas early accounts of norm diffusion presumed that non-compliance was largely 
due to an unwillingness of the target state to implement international norms, 
increasing attention has turned to what Risse calls ‘areas of limited statehood’ and 
the role of state capacity in the implementation of international human rights norms. 
Whereas international activism is often aimed at particular state institutions, such as 
the military, the police, or the justice system, focusing on areas of limited statehood 
will expose the relationship between international actors’ activities and the state 
more broadly. Risse defines area of limited statehood as areas in which central 
authorities, usually governments, lack the ability to implement and/or enforce rules 
and decisions and/or in which they lack the legitimate monopoly over violence.96 
This ability might be lacking in specific territories, policy areas, or over specific 
parts of the population and is not to be confused with ‘failed’ or fragile states. Risse 
however also cautions that there is no automatic connection between areas of limited 
statehood and the violation of human rights. 97  Nonetheless, weak central 
governments might fail to control their own enforcement agencies, such as the police 
or the military, or non-state armed groups might be active in the borderlands outside 
of reach of the central government. Both arguments are used for example by the 
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civilian Myanmar government to account for instances of child recruitment within 
their country: They blame ethnic armed groups for using child soldiers and claim a 
lack of control over the Tatmadaw with its own recruitment and accountability 
procedures. 
 
In these situations, as outlined before, international actors might focus on capacity 
building as a strategy to promote the compliance with international norms. One 
potential consequence of the international community providing extensive support or 
even taking over certain functions of the state is that it might prevent more long-term 
sustainable capacity building to guarantee the continued protection of human rights 
once international attention has subsided. For example, if the UN or an NGO are 
largely in charge of setting up child protection systems in a post-conflict context 
without much institution building on the local government level, these systems might 
dwindle away once international attention and funding runs out. It is not surprising 
then that the response to another crisis would not be much different.  
 
In practice, capacity building is already often used by NGOs as a strategy to improve 
human rights performance. Knowledge of this is sometimes also utilised strategically 
by norm violating states to either excuse their human rights violations or to attract 
funding, without necessarily having the intention to improve their human rights 
practice.  
2.5.4 Social/material vulnerability 
Related to the previous point about state capacity is the social and material 
vulnerability of the target actor. Especially the strategy of material and social 
incentives but also coercion and capacity building are dependent on the target actor 
being susceptible to these different forms of pressure. This also explains why very 
powerful international actors, such as the US, China or Russia are largely resistant to 
any type of international pressure.98  
 
Material vulnerability might relate straightforwardly to a dependency on 
international aid or asymmetric trade relationships where states might be heavily 
dependent on a few third parties for the majority of their imports and exports. They 
might also be materially vulnerable regarding military assistance, for example in the 
                                                





fight against rebel movements or weapons supplies. Social vulnerability relates to a 
state’s international reputation. The effects of international normative pressure are 
filtered through the positionality of a state’s standing in the international 
community—North Korea as an already totally isolated actor will be largely immune 
to international human rights demands whereas for example the king of Morocco, as 
van Hüllen argues, concerned by his waning legitimacy in the wake of the Arab 
spring, is more responsive to international human rights pressure.99 States might want 
to redefine their standing internationally—Myanmar is one such example, which is 
explored in detail in later chapters of this thesis—and non-state groups who want to 
be seen as legitimate international actors by abiding by the standards of the 
international community.100 This is most often seen in secessionist movements that 
aim to establish an independent state, such as in South Sudan, where the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army, prior to gaining independence in 2011, worked 
extensively with international actors to improve their recruitment procedures and 
adherence to international law. However, this initial commitment to working with the 
international community quickly dissipated after the outbreak of the South Sudanese 
Civil War in 2013.101 Following existing literature, we would expect the strategies of 
international norm promotion listed above to be more effective in contexts where the 
target state is socially and/or materially vulnerable. 
 
2.6 The Practice of Norm Implementation 
This chapter has so far set up the relevant actors for the empirical analysis—
international and local actors interacting in the process of norm diffusion—as well as 
the strategies that international actors employ to encourage norm compliant 
behaviour and target states’ responses. The last step before examining the 
specificities of the international norm against child soldiering is to focus not just on 
what strategies actors choose to promote the norm but also what they do once they 
have to translate these strategies into action on the ground. As the previous section 
on conditions and limitations has shown, there can be a gap between ideas and 
discourse on an abstract level and material reality and restrictions in spaces where 
practitioners try to apply these norms. Therefore, apart from the overarching 
strategies, we must also pay attention to the daily work international actors have to 
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do in practice to promote the norm. This section outlines how practitioners navigate 
these contextual conditions and limitations in their day-to-day engagement.  
 
We know that international norms do not magically appear in different places around 
the world, they are entrenched in international resolutions, policy documents, and 
field guides and have to be enacted by people in specific places. The staff of 
international organisations and NGOs does not just implement these documents 
directly. They know that international law and/or international commitments cannot 
be directly translated into a specific country or conflict contexts. Instead, in their 
daily work, they negotiate understandings, adapt objectives to their immediate 
environment, manage donor requirements and reports, adjust unreasonable 
expectations, and learn from interactions with colleagues, other international and 
local staff, and their everyday surroundings.102 These daily encounters, which shape 
and influence how specific international norms operate, may also gradually shift the 
meaning of the norm as it is enacted in practice.  
2.6.1 Inter-institutional Politics 
One such daily encounter is a result of the fact that there is often more than one actor 
working towards the implementation of a particular norm in a given context. Inter-
institutional politics about the interpretation of the norm (internal contestation) and 
disagreement about the right choice of strategy are common. Thus, different 
strategies are often employed simultaneously by different actors or by the same actor 
on the same issue over time. As Goodman and Junks argue, one important weakness 
of the ‘spiral model’ as outlined above is the failure to conceptualise the relationship 
between the various strategies.103 It is based on the assumption that strategies of 
norm promotion are complementary and more intense international pressure, 
combining different strategies, would be more likely to lead to an improvement of 
human rights practice by the targeted state. However, they remind us of the fact that 
strategies such as coercion, material/social incentives, and persuasion operate on 
different logics and might have negative interaction effects that we need to 
consider.104  
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Offering material incentives or threatening material sanctions in exchange for norm 
compliance/violation indirectly assumes that it can be bargained over or traded. If 
norm compliance can be ‘bought’ by offering material incentives or if there is a 
‘price’ on norm violation (material sanctions), the underlying logic is one of cost-
benefit-analysis rather than a moral argument for complying with the norm. In the 
short term, this might well be more likely to produce norm compliant behaviour 
although it is worth considering if it might hinder the shift from incentive-based 
compliance—because there’s a material motivation to do so—to normative 
compliance—complying with the norm because it is believed to be the right thing to 
do. Goodman and Jinks call this process ‘crowding out’, whereby the operation of 
one mechanism might undercut another and potentially reduce the overall effect.105 
The material reward or punishment might ‘crowd out’ potential intrinsic motivation 
for engaging in norm-compliant behaviour in various ways. For example, it 
encourages behaviour guided by rational self-interest rather than moral 
considerations. For actors who might already have a minimum level of intrinsic 
motivation to comply with the norm, offering material rewards could weaken the 
strength of the social signal. Not wanting to be seen as someone who just complies 
with a given norm for material reward or because of international coercion could also 
lead to less likely norm compliance. Finally, especially with materially less 
vulnerable states, material sanctions might be seen as a price to pay for norm 
violation, which might well be worth paying. Paying attention to these potential 
trade-offs and being aware that ‘more is more’ in terms of international pressure does 
not always hold will help get a better understanding of the observed empirical reality 
in which accumulating strategies does not automatically result in better human rights 
practice.  
2.6.2 Knowledge Production 
The daily work of international actors on the ground is not just an implementation of 
international norms but in the process, in their negotiation and adaptation of the norm 
to specific actors in specific contexts, they create knowledge about the very issue 
they are promoting. Processes of knowledge production are also part of the full 
picture of how a norm is applied and implemented in a particular context. This 
implies paying attention to how this knowledge is produced, what background 
knowledge international actors draw on to do so, and what the potential implications 
                                                




for the meaning and diffusion of the norm are. One example would be international 
actors’ engagement on the post-war reintegration of female combatants. Based on the 
(assumed) background knowledge that women in a particular society fulfil certain 
gendered roles, demobilised female ex-combatants are offered skills trainings in  
 
This is a two-step iterative process: The first step is to understand how international 
actors know whether an international norm is being followed or violated when it has 
been ‘diffused’ or whether it had an effect on actors’ preferences or practices. On a 
technical level, the international norm against the use of child soldiers is defined by 
various regulations in international law, UN conventions and resolutions, as 
elaborated upon in the following chapter. Norm diffusion through these instruments 
and their effects are measured by norm promoting actors like various UN agencies in 
different ways. Measurement happens both on an international and on a local level. 
Following, for example, the Office of the Special Representative website in March 
2018: 
 
[…] Thousands of child soldiers have been released and reintegrated with 
the assistance of UNICEF, peacekeeping and political missions, and other 
UN and NGO partners on the ground. All Governments concerned by the 
Campaign are engaged in an Action Plan process with the United Nations. 
Chad put in place all necessary measures to end and prevent the recruitment 
of children in its armed forces and is no longer listed. While crises have 
hampered progress in Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen, there has been 
significant progress and a reduction in verified cases of recruitment and use 
of children by national security forces, especially in Afghanistan, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Myanmar and Sudan.106 
 
This quote contains a number of measurements of positive change as a result of the 
proliferation of the norm: how many child soldiers have been released and 
reintegrated and whether governments have agreed and implemented Action Plans 
with the UN. All of these measurements are first of all quantifiable; the number of 
child soldiers released and reintegrated through a UN-sponsored programme is easily 
identifiable. According to these indicators, it is clear that progress is being made and 
that it is verifiable.107 Most international human rights norms have been defined and 
redefined through international (legal) regulations. Beyond this formal stipulation, 
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the norm is further defined and re-defined by the daily practices of specific actors, 
both on the policy level at the UN and in country contexts. What is less clearly 
defined is how we know what a child soldier is in the first place and how the 
quantification of the issue affects its promotion.  
 
Therefore, secondly, international actors, through their practices but also the 
discourse they employ and contribute to, also re-create the imagery of the child 
soldier in a particular way, which, as the case study analysis will show, in turn, 
affects which types of interventions they run. The often problematic empirical base 
built on quantifying success combined with a lack of awareness of the power 
relations embedded within the norm may lead to a particular understanding of the 
‘child soldier problem’, resulting in potentially inadequate programming and 
approaches for specific contexts. The following chapter will show how the 
community of practice creates knowledge about ‘the universal child soldier’ and the 
case studies show how this particular understanding, in turn, affects the 
implementation and diffusion of the norm in different contexts.  
2.6.3 Institutional Learning 
By looking at how the daily work of international actors on the ground evolves and 
changes over time, we can capture another process: institutional learning within these 
communities of practice. They create the ‘social fabric of learning’ in this context.108 
Often provoked by a change of external circumstances or an internal drive to 
improve a specific set of actions, there is a move to adapt, e.g. learn by a specific 
group of actors. This mostly happens as learning by doing, without verbal 
communication or active teaching.109  
 
Campbell distinguishes between two levels of learning in the context of UN 
Peacebuilding activities.110 First level learning takes place within mission, so within 
a specific country context. Actors have to adapt to the environment they are working 
in, inventing mechanisms to understand their surroundings. Second level learning 
takes place between missions, so across countries but within the same international 
organisation. It requires that ‘lessons learned’ at the first level are fed up to the 
international level, are assessed and evaluated before informing how future missions 
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are planned, prepared, and executed. This ideally leads to an improvement in 
preconditions to first level learning as a result of examining underlying assumptions 
and behaviours that may cause gaps between intended and actual outcomes.111  
 
This ideal type of double loop learning assumes that the work of international actors 
can improve over time but it can also be used to elucidate how problematic or even 
harmful practices become entrenched and institutionalised. Drawing lessons from 
history with a certain set of precursors, experiences, and assumptions may lead to 
coming to the same conclusions repeatedly. Furthermore, even if the ‘right’ lessons 
were to be learned, a focus on output over outcome, a tendency towards external 
accountability, high staff turnover and challenges of measuring impact in the first 
place might all hinder translating these lessons into actual changing practice.112 
Additionally, with a plethora of different agents active in the contexts this thesis is 
looking at (various UN agencies, national development agencies, NGOs, etc), 
coordination of both goals and strategies is often lacking (see 2.6.1). Fulfilling the 
organisation’s mandate becomes paramount, by following a certain set of routines, 
abiding by certain accountability structures while being embedded in a specific 
organisational culture; resulting in competition, mostly for funding but also for 
controlling the narrative or international attention. At least within the realm of 
peacekeeping, learning lessons has not been a strength of the UN. Chesterman goes 
on to quote a senior UN Secretariat official who says it is an unwritten rule that ‘no 
wheel shall go un-reinvented’.113 This reflexive process of learning also reveals how 
international actors interpret and evaluate their actions themselves. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the theoretical framework that will guide the two parts of 
the historical and empirical analysis in the following chapters. The thesis starts from 
a constructivist understanding of international norms and their proliferation but 
through an engagement with critiques of constructivist literature, it argues that we 
must pay more attention to the power relations that are embedded in international 
norms by analysing their historical emergence, who the actors were that 
institutionalised them in the first place and whether this history affects how they 
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operate today. Focusing on systems of knowledge production will help to achieve 
this. Understanding how knowledge about the content and violation of a particular 
international standard is created allows us to avoid a unilinear perception of progress. 
In the following empirical chapters, an analysis of strategies and processes of norm 
diffusion, such as socialisation and localisation are combined with a thick study of 
the contexts in which they take place. By focusing on strategies and practices of 
norm implementation, this thesis shows how different norm promotion strategies 
affect actors on the ground, focuses on knowledge production processes, studies 
institutional learning as a process of social change, and thereby aims to connect the at 
times abstract idea of international norms to the activities of international actors on 
the ground. 
 
One contribution of this thesis is the development of a two-step approach to the study 
of international norms. While it is crucial to question the origins and emergence of 
international norms, which this thesis does in chapter four, once a norm has become 
institutionalised on the international level with a body of international law, 
resolutions, and implementation programmes attached, we can analyse its impact on 
different contexts. However, these processes are not divorced from each other and in 
fact, the empirical analysis in this thesis focuses precisely on how the histories of and 
discourses embedded in the international norm affect its application in practice later 
on.  
 
Overall, this thesis works within a constructivist framework of international norm 
diffusion with an emphasis on the origins of the norm against child soldiering, which 
conceptions of childhood are embedded within it and what consequences this 
particular idea of childhood has for the promotion and implementation of the norm 
and for any development projects that are based on it. The following chapter unpacks 
the historical shift in the conception of childhood that has become the basis for the 





Chapter 3: Methodology and Research Design  
3.1 Introduction 
Having set up the theoretical framework, this chapter turns to the research design and 
methods of the empirical analysis. I employ a qualitative case study design to analyse 
the context and processes of the emergence and promotion of the international norm 
against the recruitment and use of child soldiers.  
 
This chapter elaborates the research methodology for the following empirical 
analysis, with an emphasis on the fieldwork in the two case study contexts. It 
proceeds in three steps. First, I outline my overall empirical research approach. 
Second, I discuss my methods of data collection and analysis. In order to trace the 
emergence and development of the norm, I largely rely on UN Security Council 
resolutions as well as the reports of the Office of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, supplemented with interviews 
of practitioners in New York, to establish how and driven by whom the norm 
emerged and became institutionalised in the international normative order. Regarding 
the application and implementation of the norm, I focus on qualitative interviewing 
in two case study contexts as the key source for my analysis, paying special attention 
to the selection of participants and context of the interviews. I further rely on UN and 
policy documents and reports to support my analysis and establish the official 
narrative about the norm and its status of implementation. I lay out the strengths and 
limitations of my approach as well as how the choice of methods and data collection 
can affect the subsequent empirical findings, which helps to assess the claims being 
made. Finally, the third section details the selection of Sierra Leone and Myanmar as 
the case studies for this thesis. These two cases vary in terms of temporal and spatial 
location, allowing me to trace the development of the strategies and practices of 
norm implementation. 
 
As the previous chapter has shown, how an international norm operates is both 
dependent on the content and history of the norm itself as well as the particular 
context of its implementation. As Hartley argues, ‘[t]he phenomenon is not isolated 
from its context (as in say, laboratory research) but is of interest precisely because 




context.’114 Instead of developing a set of hypotheses derived from theory, which 
would then be tested empirically, I take a more inductive approach. The analysis of 
the cases is structured along a number of concepts based on the theoretical 
considerations outlined in the preceding chapter, to guide the empirical analysis and 
ensure a level of comparability whilst allowing for the very different contexts to 
unfold fully. Guided by these concepts, I then allow the empirical cases to drive the 
analysis. Starting with the theoretical framework, I engage in a reflective process in 
which empirical data and theoretical concepts inform and refine each other in a 
dynamic way. The aim is not to come to generalizable conclusions or assess whether 
the international norm against child soldiering in Sierra Leone and Myanmar has 
been implemented ‘successfully’, but to understand the processes through which the 
norm has emerged in this way and how it is diffused and applied by international 
actors in different contexts. It is diffused and applied through the actions and 
interactions of people in specific places.  
 
In order to identify the strategies used by international actors to promote norm 
compliance and how they navigate the conditions and limitations of the particular 
context, I look at the daily work of these actors, who they interact with how, on 
which assumptions and understandings they operate, and how they evaluate their 
work.  Traditionally, research focusing on daily interactions and practices often relies 
on extensive ethnographic fieldwork and participant observation as its main method. 
This approach was not appropriate for the empirical inquiry of this project for a 
number of reasons: First, the civil war and subsequent child soldier reintegration 
programmes in Sierra Leone, which are the focus of this study, ended almost 15 
years ago. Thus, the actors that implemented the international norm against child 
soldiering in its configuration at the time no longer exists in Sierra Leone. 
Individuals, who were part of that community, are still present and often still active 
in child protection work broadly. However, as international organisations are not 
working with former child soldiers anymore, there are no meetings, initiatives, or 
projects to observe directly. Second, while the work of international actors with the 
Myanmar military in terms of their child soldiering practices is ongoing, it is a highly 
sensitive topic with very restricted access, making any direct participation as a 
researcher in negotiations or military training impossible. Third, focusing on 
                                                




interviews rather than ethnography enabled me to work across two case study 
contexts as well as conducting interviews in New York.  
 
In light of these considerations, during my fieldwork, I mainly conducted interviews 
about the work different international actors have done and are doing in Sierra Leone 
and Myanmar in relation to child soldiers. Trying to understand daily activities 
through second hand accounts, such as interviews, rather than observing them 
directly requires, according to Kuus, the slowing down of established qualitative 
research methods, to look for ‘dirt’, which gives depth to material gathered for 
example through interviews and allowing the stories that make up the big pictures to 
unfold.115 Keeping these considerations in mind, the case study part builds on 
interviews in which my interview partners were asked to describe the work they have 
done and still do with child combatants, their recruiters, and decision makers on child 
recruitment policies, such as military personnel. Later parts of this chapter go into 
more detail about the interview participant selection and setting.  
3.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
 
The historical part of the analysis in the next chapter largely builds on secondary 
sources outside of International Relations literature, mostly from history, sociology, 
anthropology, and childhood studies. There is a large body of literature in childhood 
studies that critically investigates the change in the meaning and perception of 
childhood and traces the emergence of modern childhood in the West while 
contrasting it with alternative conceptions of childhood around the world.116 This 
forms the baseline for showing how changes in conceptualisations of childhood in 
the West have become entrenched in the expression of the international norm against 
child soldiering today. 
 
The more contemporary section of this part of the analysis traces the diffusion and 
institutionalisation of the norm against child soldiering on the international stage, 
through international law and the practices of advocacy networks across various 
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arenas. This analysis is for the most part based on text analysis of international 
treaties, documents, and reports of various UN agencies as well as human rights and 
child protection NGOs. I trace the development of binding international legal 
instruments, such as UN treaties and resolutions and the specific policies they 
recommend as well as mechanisms they implement, such as the establishment of the 
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and 
Armed Conflict (SRSG) or the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism. This account 
is complemented by interviews conducted in 2017 in New York with current and 
former staff of the SRSG office, diplomats of interested member states at the UN, 
such as Sweden and Canada, as well as NGOs and think tanks who work in and 
around the issue of child soldiering and engage with the UN.  
 
The two case studies build on a range of source material. The starting point for the 
analysis of the work of international actors on child soldiering in both Sierra Leone 
and Myanmar is a range of policy documents and material published by the UN and 
its agencies on the work they have done in each context. These include the Secretary-
General Annual Reports on Children and Armed Conflict, which detail the situation 
of children and child soldiers in each conflict on the Security Council (SC) agenda, 
and a number of UNICEF and DPKO evaluation reports. These reports are 
complemented by reports from other UN agencies, child protection NGOs, such as 
Save the Children and World Vision, as well as advocacy groups such as Watchlist 
on Children and Armed Conflict or Human Rights Watch.117  
 
Especially in Sierra Leone, since the civil war ended over 15 years ago and many of 
the projects relating to child ex-combatants have also ended soon after, there is a 
plethora of evaluation documents and follow-up studies to consider. These reports 
are largely compiled by international or local NGOs or UN agencies with occasional 
independent reports. These documents are particularly useful for assessing the 
perceived success of various strategies and programmes according to their own 
standards. Furthermore, the report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
published in 2004, is an immensely comprehensive and detailed account of the 
reasons for the outbreak of the conflict in 1991 and includes a chapter dedicated to 
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the role of children in the armed conflict.118 Newspaper articles, both local and 
international, were useful in both cases. In Sierra Leone, I mostly relied on 
international news coverage whereas in Myanmar, in addition, I also relied on the 
Myanmar Times and the Irrawaddy.119  
 
Compared to Sierra Leone, the history and practice of child soldiering in Myanmar is 
a very under-researched topic. To my knowledge, as of the writing of this thesis, 
there is no comprehensive academic account of the recruitment and use of child 
soldiers in the Tatmadaw or the ethnic armed groups in Myanmar and only very few 
policy reports—the main exceptions being a 2002 Human Rights Watch report.120 
Thus, the Myanmar case study of this thesis relies mainly on primary data collection, 
primarily interviews and NGO and UN documentation.  
 
These policy and evaluation documents are not only used to establish basic facts 
about international actors’ engagement in these countries but also to ascertain how 
they choose to portray the context, the conflict, the children within it as well as their 
own role and policy decisions.  
 
A second category of sources used for both cases is English-language newspaper 
articles, both international and from the respective countries. The case studies also 
draw on secondary literature if possible. Much has been written about the civil war in 
Sierra Leone, about the atrocities committed by all factions, the blurred lines 
between government and rebel forces, and the use of young children as fighters. This 
extensive literature is used to trace the historical background of this case and 
importantly, it can inform us about how the use of children and the international 
response to it has been framed by academics and practitioners alike. Apart from the 
plethora of academic accounts on child soldiering, there are works of fiction and 
cinema, such as Blood Diamond (2006) or Beasts of No Nation (2015) that explore 
the topic.121 There is basically no academic literature on child soldiers in Myanmar 
although there are some works on the transition and the Myanmar military, which are 
relevant for this study.  
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Thirdly, this analysis, and especially the Myanmar case study, relies heavily on the 
data gathered through qualitative interviews during eight months of fieldwork in 
Freetown in Sierra Leone, Yangon in Myanmar, and New York in the US with brief 
stints in Makeni (Sierra Leone) Bangkok (Thailand) and Singapore. I spent 2.5 
months in Sierra Leone in spring 2017, 2.5 months in Myanmar during summer 2016 
and 3 months in New York in summer 2017. I conducted 48 interviews with former 
and current staff of international organisations and NGOs working on children and 
armed conflict, government and military personnel, journalists, academics, activists, 
as well as two former child soldiers. The aim in selecting interview participants was 
to get a complete picture of all international actors working with child soldiers or on 
the topic of child soldiering in Sierra Leone after the end of the conflict and currently 
in Myanmar. To start with, relevant organisations were identified through official 
documentation, for example relating to the child section of the DDR programme in 
Sierra Leone or the Country Task Force in Myanmar in documents or on official 
websites. As a second step, during the first interviews that were conducted, I 
collected additional information regarding the most important organisations that were 
working on the issue outside of the official mechanisms.  
 
Once the most important organisations were selected, I contacted them largely over 
their official email accounts to identify the most relevant individuals that could speak 
to my research interest. In Myanmar, this was for the most part successful. In Sierra 
Leone however, since it has been 16 years since the war ended and about 10 years 
since the last ex-child-combatant programmes concluded, almost all former staff of 
international NGOs and UN agencies working on these issues have refocused their 
work or moved on to other organisations. Regarding Sierra Leonean staff, many still 
work in the child protection field but have changed organisations, with some having 
moved on to other contexts such as DRC, Afghanistan, or Sudan.122 Thus, I spent the 
first weeks of my fieldwork in Freetown tracing people who had worked for these 
organisations in the past through old newspaper reports and their former colleagues. 
 
Trying to access former or current military personnel in Myanmar proved very 
difficult since the issue of underage recruitment is a highly sensitive one and only 
two individuals, high-ranking but no longer in active military service, agreed to 
                                                




speak to me. While child protection concerns more broadly have remained on the 
agenda, cooperation with the Tatmadaw on releasing child soldiers has declined over 
the past two years.123 Thus, the timing of the first stint of the fieldwork for this study 
shines a light on a very specific moment in which the Tatmadaw’s cooperation with 
the international community on issues of child soldiering was at its peak. The first 
two months of the fieldwork were completed in summer 2016 in Yangon and 
Bangkok before the most recent outbreak of the Rohingya crisis that started after the 
attack on border guard posts in Rakhine state in October 2016 and lead to the 
deterioration of relationships between the government and the international 
community.124 This means that the recent criticism of the inactivity of Aung San Suu 
Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD) government regarding the anti-
Rohingya violence is not represented in the interviews conducted for this study. The 
main effect of the Rohingya crisis on the child soldier debates going on in Myanmar 
is that they have moved even further out of the spotlight. The speed with which 
international opinion has turned on Aung San Suu Kyi is remarkable and is a result 
both of the lack of understanding of the complexities of the situation in Myanmar, 
and of the nature of the transition—in December 2015, the UN publishes a video 
called ‘Myanmar: Democracy Wins’125—and the shortening international attention 
span, moving different advocacy concerns in and out of the spotlight in rapid 
succession. While child soldiering was one of the key issues at the top of the 
international agenda in the late 2000s, the democratic transition and return of Aung 
San Su Kyi became the dominant discourse from 2012 onwards—at times glossing 
over continued human rights violations—to the Rohingya crisis now, which has 
diverted attention away other issues.  
  
Interviews were for the most part semi-structured. I started with a basic set of 
questions, which were consistent across both cases and the interviews in New York, 
about the role my interview partner has or had relating to working with child soldiers 
in their context. I asked them to describe their daily work to me, their reasons for 
pursuing certain activities and not others, the challenges they encountered, and their 
interaction with other local and international actors. I continued with more specific 
context-dependent questions. In Sierra Leone, these questions were largely about the 
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workings and evaluation of the DDR programme whereas in Myanmar they focused 
on the military’s role and willingness to implement the international norm against 
child soldiering. In both cases I also asked about the perception of international 
actors working with child soldiers or advocating on their behalf as well as about the 
conceptions of childhood in each context and whether that seems to match the 
international normative framework they are working with. All but three interviews 
across both contexts were conducted in English, one in German and two in Burmese 
with a translator. Most interviewees were former or current staff members of 
international or local child protection or human rights NGOs. A number belong(ed) 
to various agencies of the UN, to country offices of UNICEF, the ILO, the Special 
Representative for Children and Armed Conflict and the Department for 
Peacekeeping operations.  
 
All but one interviewee in Sierra Leone were Sierra Leoneans and had spent the war 
years in different districts of the country. By now, the majority of people interviewed 
lived in and around Freetown on the peninsula. In Myanmar, just over half of my 
interview partners are from the country, and only few of them belong to the main 
Bamar ethnicity, with others being Mon, Chin, Shan, Karen, and Rohingya. Almost 
all of them reside in Yangon now, although many had returned from exile in 
Thailand and elsewhere after the regime change. Indicating which ethnic group they 
belong to seemed important to almost all Burmese people interviewed since most of 
them mentioned it in their introduction without being prompted by my interview 
questions. Almost all other interviewees in Myanmar were European or American 
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Type of Interview Participant Number 
NGO international 13 
NGO local 11 
UN agencies  9 
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and working for international organisations or human rights organisations.127 Overall, 
I only managed to interview four women for both of my case studies whereas in New 
York, over half of my interview partners were women. Although there are plenty of 
female child protection workers in both Sierra Leone and Myanmar, since I focused 
my interviews on higher-ranking positions, the absence of female voices might be 
less surprising. Despite the large majority of people interviewed in Sierra Leone 
being men, almost all raised the issue of girl soldiers in the interview by themselves 
and the failure of the international community to account for them (see chapter 6).  
 
As a next step, I transcribed the interviews I was able to record and coded them in 
MS Office Excel. I started with a number of broad concepts as overarching 
categories applicable to interviews from all contexts, such as ‘material incentive’, 
‘conception of childhood’, and ‘role of international actors’. At first, I created a 
rough coding guide, coded 3-4 interviews per case to test the relevance of the codes, 
before fine-tuning the concepts and returning to the transcribed text again. Finally, 
for both cases, I ordered the material based on the codes and created mind-maps with 
the emerging themes from the empirical data. This helped me to recognise 
developing patterns of recurring claims, such as the importance of self-perception of 
the military in Myanmar or the absence of girl soldiers in Sierra Leone.  
3.2.1 Interviewing Child Soldiers 
One important note to make is that starting my fieldwork for this study, I did not 
intend to build my case on interviewing child soldiers directly, active or recently 
demobilised. In Myanmar, the military continues to be strict about released child 
soldiers talking to journalists or international organisation staff. Some former child 
soldiers have been arrested and prosecuted for doing so.128 Hence, potentially 
causing a personal security risk to demobilised child soldiers and their families in 
that context is not justified by my research interest. In Sierra Leone, there continues 
to be a concern about the knowledge production system often associated with 
gathering data and/or interviewing child soldiers. Although just confirmed by 
anecdotal evidence during my own fieldwork, especially immediately after the end of 
the conflict, former child soldiers were selected according to the shock factor of their 
stories and presented to Western researchers who paid ‘fixers’ to hear their accounts. 
Since this thesis predominantly focuses on the work of international actors and their 
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understandings of child soldiers, getting an in-depth understanding of the perceptions 
of child soldiers themselves about the IOs they interacted with is outside the scope of 
this research. There is also some evidence that repeated interviewing and talking 
about the past, especially when done by someone who is not a trained professional, 
may lead to re-traumatisation.129 Without any psychological, counselling or trauma 
training and no experience of working with children or youth who have experienced 
conflict, accepting the risk of re-traumatisation seemed unjustifiable. Nonetheless, I 
do criticise international actors for not taking the agency of (former) child soldiers 
seriously while at the same time also not interviewing them myself. However, since I 
am not directly implementing any programmes affecting former child combatants 
and given the trade-off between potential re-traumatisation and missing the voices of 
children from my analysis, I chose not to seek out former child combatants to 
interview actively.  
 
Despite this original plan, during my time in Sierra Leone, I ended up spending some 
time with two former child combatants, one who used to be a member of the RUF 
and one of the SLA. The former was one of my first contacts in Freetown, introduced 
to me by a colleague from the UK as a point of contact. After hearing about my 
research and having visited his house and family twice, he decided that he wanted to 
share his story and give his opinions about my research. These conversations were 
especially enlightening regarding his perceptions of the agency of (some) former 
child soldiers in navigating the post-conflict landscape, participating in various 
reintegration programmes and trying to make a living as well as his perceptions of 
the research industry on child soldiers in Sierra Leone. The second former child 
combatant I talked to was my driver for a trip to Makeni where I wanted to meet 
former and current Caritas staff members who were in charge of receiving 
demobilised child combatants at the end of the conflict. During the drive, unaware of 
his past, I told him about my project and on the last day of our trip he invited me to 
his house, showed me pictures from the war and shared his experiences as well. Both 
of them approached me after having heard a lot about my research and actively 
wanted to contribute. Thus I included their stories in the Sierra Leone case study.   
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3.2.2 Implications of Participant Selection 
Qualitative interviews are social situations—relational undertakings between the 
researcher and her interview participants.130 The setting of the interviews influences 
the data gathered in a number of ways: (1) the location of the interview, e.g. an 
office, the home, a café; (2) the individual context, e.g. does the person interviewed 
still work in the capacity they are being interviewed in; (3) the political context—is 
the topic of conversation sensitive? Finally, (4) the positionality of the interviewer, 
whose gender, race, class, age, and profession might significantly affect the access to 
interview partners but more importantly also the dynamics of the interview itself. 
The power dynamic between interviewer and interviewee will shape which 
information, experiences, and opinions are shared in which way.131 Thus, researchers 
should approach interviews actively with a reflexive attitude, trying to be aware and 
account for one’s own biases and positionality.132      
 
Regarding the location of the interviews, 85% of my interview participants are 
currently based in capital cities, in Yangon and Freetown, which is likely to influence 
their perspective on the role of international actors and their engagement regarding 
child soldiers. We would expect the international community to be much more 
present in the urban centres where their offices are located and their staff resides than 
in more rural parts of the country. However, child recruitment in Sierra Leone largely 
occurred near the hotspots of the conflict in the East of the country towards the 
Liberian border and in Myanmar, although there are cases of children being recruited 
from bus stops and train stations in Yangon, most families of affected children are 
from outside the capital. This might have several implications for the data collected 
through these interviews. On the one hand, the work of international actors might be 
overestimated in its relevance regarding child soldiering and they may be perceived 
as having a larger impact and importance. Child reintegration programmes in Sierra 
Leone had limited reach beyond the main cities and all the main child protection 
actors in Myanmar are based in Yangon. On the other hand, this increased visibility 
might also result in a more critical assessment of their work, making the flaws in 
design and implementation of programmes more apparent. Especially in Myanmar, 
Yangon-based staff reported a lack of reliable information both about the number of 
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child soldiers in the military as well as their efforts to reduce it since access to 
military facilities was often not given.  
 
Most interviews were conducted in the offices of the participants. In Sierra Leone, 
participants often still worked with NGOs, international organisations or the 
government and they spoke to me in their professional capacity. We would expect 
this relatively formal setting to influence the answers that were given in those 
interviews. As the focus of these interviews was indeed the work the people in these 
organisations did/do, this should give us a good impression about how they choose to 
represent their work to an outsider. Most other interviews took place in cafés or 
restaurants, either because people had new work places unrelated to their previous 
work on child soldiers, because they currently did not have offices or because they 
wanted to be interviewed off the record without their colleagues or employers 
knowing. I was able to record 30 out of 48 interviews and took extensive notes 
during 14 more and wrote down any additional observations immediately after. 
Three of the remaining interviews were conducted on the move while walking from 
one meeting to the next or while taking a walk around the neighbourhood. One 
interviewee in Myanmar originally agreed to be recorded but after around 30 
minutes, I decided to stop the recording and note taking since it seemed to cause a 
level of discomfort. Most interviews lasted between 45 minutes and one hour, with 
the shortest one being around 25 minutes and the longest just over 2.5 hours.    
 
In terms of political contexts, issues relating to child soldiers in Sierra Leone, their 
recruitment, their experiences in the conflict, and their reintegration have received a 
lot of attention by practitioners, activists, and academics alike. Generally, it was not 
difficult to find people willing to talk to me, although some expressed fatigue 
regarding having to tell the same stories to innumerable researchers over and over 
again—for example about the atrocities of the war. At times, interview partners in 
Sierra Leone seemed to have ready-made answers to the questions they anticipated I 
would ask like many researchers before me. However, most of the time it was 
possible to redirect the conversation to focus on the specific issues of interest to me. 
My overall impression in Sierra Leone was that my interview partners were generally 
open in sharing their opinions and critique but that the issue of child soldiering and 
reintegration was not at the top of their agenda anymore although child protection 





In Myanmar, my interest in international actors and their work with child soldiers in 
the Tatmadaw was surprising to many people I interviewed. In contrast to Sierra 
Leone and many other contexts, there has been hardly any academic work on child 
soldiers in Myanmar and a few of my interview partners told me that they had never 
been approached to speak to a researcher about the child soldier aspect of their work. 
While I was asked on a couple of occasions whether I was gathering information for 
the British government, overall, once people agreed to meet me, they were generally 
curious about my work and forthcoming with their opinions. Former opposition 
groups, as well as human rights and child rights activists in summer 2016, were 
overall cautiously optimistic about the improvements in the regime, although some—
especially independent journalists—remained sceptical about the changes. 
International actors in Myanmar confirmed the official narrative that the Tatmadaw 
was indeed releasing child soldiers from their ranks although they were generally 
aware of the often superficial nature of these concessions and their limited influence 
on the military. In Myanmar, the main challenge was to convince people to meet me 
in the first place, reassuring them that I was not interested in sensitive information 
such as child soldier or prosecution numbers, individual names or stories, or internal 
military affairs. 
 
Before commencing any interview, I summarised the purpose of my research project 
and explained how I would use the information given to me during the interview. 
Informed consent was obtained orally regarding participating in the interview and 
separately regarding the audio recording. Remaining anonymous in the interview was 
offered to every participant and some chose this option, others chose to be identified 
only by their position, i.e. ‘child protection worker in Myanmar’ and others wanted 
to be identified by their name. Some participants only wanted to contribute to 
background information without being cited directly in the text. Questions around 
consent, regarding recording and identification are particularly relevant in a fast-
changing conflict context such as Myanmar. At the time most of my interviews were 
conducted, in summer 2016, the security situation in the country was still relatively 
stable and most people who agreed to be interviewed were comfortable giving 
critical opinions on the military’s (lack of) progress regarding child recruitment. 
However, soon after completing that stint of my fieldwork, the security situation 




about the military and some being arrested. Therefore, I chose to redact the names of 
two of my interview partners in Myanmar retrospectively.  
 
The interview situation is not only influenced by the context and setting in which it 
takes places but also by the characteristics of the people involved, the interview 
participants and myself as a researcher. My status as a white western PhD student 
from a UK university often gave me privileged access to international actors in Sierra 
Leone and Myanmar. I mostly interviewed individuals in positions of power who 
were either working in relatively well-paying jobs for an international organisation, 
leading such an organisation or local NGO, or who were members of governments or 
the military. As a young woman, I was perceived as neither a threat nor a challenge 
nor in a position of power and thus could benefit from relatively open conversations. 
Given my positionality, it would have been difficult to get a nuanced understanding 
of the intricacies of local conceptions of childhood, especially given the limited 
timeframe of my visits and the method of interviewing. However, since I am mainly 
interested in strategies of norm implementation by international actors and the 
reaction to it, the fact that I am from Western Europe should work in my favour since 
it is more likely that I might be perceived as ‘one of them’, both by international 
organisation representatives and local counterparts.  
3.3 Case Selection 
Overall, this thesis tells the story of the emergence and development of the 
international norm against child soldiering, promoted by a community of practice 
both on the international level and in two specific conflict contexts. Crucial to 
understanding how international norms operate in these different contexts is not just 
to compare and contrast different variables that may make a norm more or less 
effective in a given context but to understand them as part of international practice. 
As chapter two shows, the practice of international norm promotion is not static; 
actors change and adapt their strategies, improvise and learn in every new context 
they find themselves in. Thus, two cases are chosen to illustrate the development and 
change of strategies and practices of norm implementation. They vary significantly 
in terms of their temporal and spatial location: One case is one of the earliest cases of 
large-scale international activity on child soldiering, the other a contemporary, still 
on-going case that had initially received little international attention; one case is in 




recruitment in the state military, the other with all actors in the conflict, state and 
non-state. These cases serve to demonstrate the variety of activities of the network 
but most of all, that in order to understand how international norms operate on the 
ground, we must develop a deep understanding of the contexts in which they are 
promoted.   
 
Since this study does not employ a comparative case study design, the cases are not 
chosen according to a most similar or most different case design. Rather than testing 
a research hypothesis with a set of specific variables in both cases, this study traces 
the development of the responses of international actors from the establishment of 
the norm against child soldiering on the international level, to its application in one 
of its most prominent and influential cases, Sierra Leone, and finally to a 
contemporary case in which child recruitment is still ongoing, Myanmar. Sierra 
Leone and Myanmar are selected as case studies to shed light on the changing nature 
of the work international actors engage in when combating the use of child soldiers. 
Sierra Leone and Myanmar occupy specific positions within different important 
categories that affect their relationship with the international community such as (1) 
the salience and contestation of the norm at the time in which child recruitment takes 
place, (2) the geopolitical context, (3) as a result of both, the level of international 
attention that is attributed to the country situation, and finally, (4) in how far child 
soldiering in that context seems to match the international image of the issue. These 
factors are not only important in the case selection but also feature in the analysis of 
the case studies themselves.  
3.3.1 Sierra Leone 
The end of the civil war in Sierra Leone in 2002 coincided with an important 
development on the international stage regarding the regulation of child soldiering. 
After years of awareness raising and lobbying work, the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention of the Rights of the Child (OPAC), which was originally adopted in 
2000, entered into force, creating binding international law for its signatories that 
increased the minimum age for recruiting soldiers into militaries of the signatory 
states from 15 to 18 years. The issue of child recruitment was one of the key focus 
points of the children and armed conflict agenda at the UN at the time. Although 
international actors, especially NGOs but also UNICEF, have been working with 




contexts where numerous initiatives specifically tailored towards child soldiers were 
implemented.  
 
Sierra Leone was the first post-conflict context in which a UN peacekeeping mission 
employed a child protection advisor, one of the first times there was a designated 
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programme for children 
(earlier cases include Angola and Mozambique), and the first time the international 
network came together with the involvement of all major actors to implement a 
child-combatant reintegration programme of this magnitude. Rosen describes Sierra 
Leone as ‘the poster-child case of the modern child-soldier crisis’ and it has 
somewhat also become the poster child for international engagement on the issue.133 
Wells claims that ‘[t]he brutality of the conflict and the extensive involvement of 
children have made the Sierra Leone war synonymous with child soldiers.’134 
Academics, practitioners, and UN documents alike share the impression that Sierra 
Leone is one of the most influential cases of child soldier use for the development of 
the contemporary advocacy network against child soldiering and that possible 
strategies and interventions that followed, were often modelled after the Sierra Leone 
example.135 Sierra Leone thus stands at the beginning of the ‘era of application’ of 
the international norm against child soldiering.  
 
In terms of its geopolitical importance, West Africa in the early 2000s was not of 
immediate strategic importance to major international powers. However, two points 
are worth drawing out. Firstly, there was significant economic interest in the 
abundant resources of Sierra Leone, particularly in the diamond mines in the east of 
the country for the protection of which the Sierra Leone government commissioned 
private military force Executive Operations (EO) during the war. Secondly, and 
importantly for this study, internationally, African civil wars in the post-Cold War 
era have often been portrayed as characterised by ‘anomic, chaotic, and barbaric 
warfare’136—lacking any political or ideological motivations, and being driven by 
criminal incentives and economic gain. They are difficult to regulate under 
international law as there is rarely a clearly defined battlefield nor a clear distinction 
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between combatants and civilians. Part of the barbaric nature of these conflicts then 
is the recruitment and use of child soldiers. This evaluation of the conflict context 
and the phenomenon of child recruitment influences how international actors interact 
with child soldiers in a context like this, rendering them innocent victims that have to 
be protected and saved from their barbaric surroundings.  
 
Tracing the development of the international norm against child soldiering 
throughout the 1990s and the image of the child soldier that has come to dominate it, 
it becomes clear that Sierra Leone, at first glance, seems to match this narrative very 
well. As chapter four will demonstrate, the image of the child soldier as it is 
portrayed in international law and international advocacy networks is that of a very 
young boy, often under 10 years old, black, carrying a weapon, and forced to engage 
in active combat. In fact, this is largely what we see in Sierra Leone. Especially the 
RUF but almost equally the Sierra Leone Armed Forces and the Civil Defense Forces 
abducted and forcibly recruited children under the age of 15, often as young as eight 
who often participated actively in combat. After the end of the war, a significant 
international effort was made to first disarm and demobilise and then reintegrate 
former combatants. The case study will unpack this narrative and question whether it 
is indeed a ‘typical’ case of child soldiering.  
 
Image 1 Snapshot from Human Rights Watch website on child soldiers, picture and copyright 
by Marcus Bleasdale/VII for Human Rights Watch, 2013137 
                                                




An important analytical step takes place between the two case studies. After some 
lessons have been learned in Sierra Leone (and to some extent in Angola and 
Mozambique), how are these fed up to the international level? How are they 
incorporated into the governance structure of future interventions? In order to answer 
these questions, I look at UN and NGO evaluation documents of the Sierra Leone 
case and how the mandate has changed in the subsequent years. Which policies have 
been changed and how? Are any generalizable conclusions drawn or is there an 
awareness of the context specificity of Sierra Leone? Tracing this development from 
the few years between the end of the civil war in Sierra Leone in 2002 and the end of 
most international programmes on child soldiering in 2004 to the first engagement in 
Myanmar allows me to observe continuity and change in the practice of norm 
implementation against child soldiering across time and space. 
3.3.2 Myanmar 
The case of child soldiering in Burma first prominently came to the attention of the 
international community at the same time that the civil war in Sierra Leone ended. In 
2002, Human Rights Watch published a report investigating the child recruitment 
practices of the Myanmar state military, the Tatmadaw.138 In it, it is outlined that of 
all states that recruit and use children in their official militaries, Myanmar is the 
worst offender with the highest number of underage soldiers in absolute terms. 
However, due to severe restrictions in accessing the country and especially military 
personnel, the influence of international actors at that time was very limited. 
Nonetheless, for the first time, international NGOs criticised the regime in Myanmar 
explicitly for their systematic and widespread child recruitment practices on an 
international stage.139 In time with the issue gaining traction and importance in 
international advocacy cycles and the move from establishing a norm, which chapter 
four shows happened largely in the 1990s up to 2002, to its ‘era of application’ from 
2002 onwards, child soldiering in Myanmar also comes into focus.  
 
In contrast to Sierra Leone, which has received large amounts of aid and 
development assistance for decades, the situation in Myanmar is somewhat different 
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in that the Burmese economy was dominated by international economic sanctions 
until fairly recently. After decades of isolation through trade and military embargoes, 
the Myanmar military intended for the country to slowly transition to a more 
democratic system without losing control over its government entirely. Part of this 
transition from around 2012 involved the opening the country to international 
influence, both economically and diplomatically. One of the intended results of this 
move is a shift away from economic and military dependence on China and a turn 
towards the West.  
 
International engagement with Myanmar on the issue of releasing child soldiers from 
the military did not start, even unofficially, until 2006/07. However, since the 
dissolution of the military junta in 2011 and the lifting of most sanctions, there has 
been a large increase in international aid flows and NGO activity as well as 
international attention. Child recruitment has been and still is a widespread practice 
within the Tatmadaw as well as some of the ethnic armed groups. Despite the 
Burmese government having made commitments to the international community to 
change their recruitment practices, Myanmar is still the state actor with the highest 
number of underage recruits in its armed forces worldwide.140 Although not initially 
a focus of international actors implementing the norm against child soldiering, 
Myanmar has increasingly come into focus and by now receives a lot of negative 
attention about its state military’s child recruitment practices. However, while 
Myanmar might now be a prominent case within the community of practice around 
child soldiers, the broader international normative agenda has shifted its focus away 
from child soldiering as its main advocacy target. Child soldiering as an issue has 
lost its prominence both within Myanmar, where the debate focused on the 
democratic transition and now on the Rohingya crisis, and within the international 
child rights framework, where children on the move and attacks on schools have 
gained importance.  
 
Despite being the state military with the highest number of underage recruits within 
its ranks, the issue of child soldiering in Myanmar does not seem to match the 
prominent image of the child soldier as outlined above. In fact, most of what under 
international law are labelled as ‘child soldiers’ are between the age of 16 and 18. 
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They rarely directly participate in combat—although there are reports of underage 
soldiers fighting in Northern Shan state—but mostly carry out cleaning, cooking, and 
maintenance duties on military bases. By 2018, the international advocacy network 
against child soldiering has been active around the world for over 15 years and this 
study is contributing to analysing the extent to which institutional learning has taken 
place and whether there are more nuanced approaches and strategies being used 
today, tailored to the specific situation at hand.  
 
As a side note before delving into the analysis, is important to note that for decades 
now, it has become a political point of contention whether to use Burma or Myanmar 
when referring to this country. In 1989 the Union of Burma—which was the Socialist 
Republic of the Union of Burma since 1974—was officially renamed into the ‘Union 
of Myanmar’ by the military government, along with changes of specific place 
names that were still in use from the British colonial era.141 Oftentimes, the debate 
around which name to use is depicted rather crudely, implying on one side that using 
‘Myanmar’ would identify one as a supporter of the military junta regime and using 
‘Burma’ would indicate one is a supporter of the democracy movement. The other 
side argues that using ‘Burma’ would indicate the speaker as a supporter of British 
colonial rule, which re-introduced the term, as well as only representing the majority 
Bamar population with ‘Myanmar’ being the more inclusive and also preferred term 
by the current, democratically-elected government under Aung San Suu Kyi. A note 
here that throughout this thesis ‘Burmese’ will be used to describe the entire 
population of Burma/Myanmar and ‘Bamar’ to describe the ethnic majority in the 
country. Until recently, international organisations and foreign governments fell on 
either side of the debate. Unsurprisingly, the UK sticks fairly consistently to ‘Burma’ 
and so does the United States, even though ‘Myanmar’ seems to be used when 
directly interacting with the Myanmar/Burmese government.142 Most international 
organisations use ‘Myanmar’ for most of their communication. The debate extends to 
whether to use Anglicised names for cities (Rangoon or Yangon) and whether to use 
Burmese or non-Burmese spellings for territories (Rakhine or Arakan, Kayin or 
Karen). In this thesis, I will use ‘Myanmar’ and ‘Burma’ interchangeably when 
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referring to the state and its institutions, such as the military, government, or 
ministries, and local spellings when referring to specific territories.  
3.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has specified the methodological approach of this study, discussed the 
methods of data collection and analysis as well as outlined the rationale for selecting 
Sierra Leone and Myanmar as case studies. The two steps of the empirical analysis, 
first tracing the emergence and development of the international norm against child 
soldiering and second, studying its implementation in two different contexts, draw on 
different empirical material. I have discussed the selection of interview participants 
in detail, with a special emphasis on the decision of not interviewing (former) child 
combatants. 
 
I highlighted the limitations of the chosen approach regarding each case study, such 
as the sensitivity of the issue limiting access in Myanmar, as well as how the 
selection of participants affects the outcome of the interviews. Before delving into 
the two case studies, the following chapter unpacks the historical shift in the 
conception of childhood that has become the basis for the international norm against 





Chapter 4: Child Soldiers  
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has argued that in order to understand the operation of 
international norms we have to pay attention to their histories and the broader 
normative structures they are embedded in, which are upheld by rules and regulations 
on the international level as well as practices of actors in different contexts. This 
chapter provides the foundations for the later two case studies in three ways: First, I 
trace the emergence of the international norm against child soldiering historically. 
Second, I set out how the legal context of the norm against the use of child soldiers 
developed and third, I show how the ways in which child soldiers are represented on 
the international stage today are a result of the previous two developments. The 
modern idea of the ‘child soldier’ largely describes a child that is male, African, very 
young, abducted by non-state armed groups, engaged in active combat, and 
traumatised by his experience in the conflict. 
 
I start with a brief historical exploration not of how the use of child soldiers has 
developed historically, but of how child soldiers were imagined and represented 
since the Middle Ages. A distinctive shift can be observed with the rise of human 
rights discourse in the second half of the 20th century. Institutionally, child 
recruitment first became regulated on an international level in the Additional 
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in 1977, setting 15 as the minimum age of 
recruitment into state armed forces. Since then, several international treaties and 
conventions, both regionally and internationally, have clarified the legal regulations 
on the issue, culminating in the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (OPAC) in 2002 and the Rome Statute (1998), which established the ICC 
in 2002 and stipulated recruiting under 15-year olds as combatants as a war crime.143  
 
These legal provisions have further implications for the work international actors can 
do on this issue, both on an advocacy level regarding international organisations and 
governments, as well as directly by implementing rehabilitation and development 
programmes in affected countries.  Especially, since the ratification of the Child 
Rights Convention in 1989 and the publication of the Machel Report on the situation 
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of children in armed conflict in 1996, the international community has become 
increasingly active in campaigning for an end to the recruitment and use of child 
soldiers by state militaries and non-state armed groups.144 Alongside the expansion 
of peacekeeping in the 1990s came a focus on post-conflict reconstruction, including 
Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Reintegration Programmes (DDR), which 
became one of the most commonly used tools by international actors to deal with ex-
combatants, adult and underage alike.  
 
Based on these aspects, the historical development of the norm against child 
soldiering and its legal context today, I discuss and unpack a number empirical 
‘facts’ about child soldiers that have dominated the discourse and influenced the 
practices of the international advocacy network. This chapter sets the international 
stage for the following studies of Sierra Leone and Myanmar by introducing the 
background of the international norm, how it is expressed in international law, as 
well as how, as a result of both, the ‘universal child soldier’ is (re-)presented within 
the community of practice against child soldiering today.  
 
At first glance, the term ‘child soldier’ combines two terms with contradictory 
associations—children, who are thought of as innocent, playful, but also immature 
and irrational; and soldiers, who are associated with toughness and calculated 
decision making in situations of crisis. Some may question the use of this term in 
describing the young people and children who come to bear arms under a wide 
variety of circumstances in vastly different situations. It also glosses over the 
difficulty of determining the boundaries between childhood, youth, and adolescence. 
Many NGOs take issue with the seemingly narrow definition of the term ‘soldier’ 
and instead use the phrase ‘children associated with armed groups or armed forces’ 
to account for the variety of tasks performed by children in these situations which 
goes beyond the direct involvement in hostilities or combat situations.145 This thesis 
follows the definition of child soldiers, here referred to as children associated with 
armed forces or groups, as stated in article 2.1 of the Paris Principles of 2007, which 
is considered to be the most widely accepted and used definition: ‘“A child 
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associated with an armed force or armed group” refers to any person below 18 years 
of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in 
any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys, and girls used as fighters, 
cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a 
child who is taking or has taken a direct part in hostilities.’146 I use the term ‘child 
combatants’ when child soldiers participate actively in hostility. This is not to imply 
that using these terms in this way is unproblematic and I will instead attempt to 
highlight the issues arising from trying to simplify such a complex issue in this way. 
4.2 The History, Study and Storytelling of the Use of Child Soldiers 
Often, in media reports, advocacy efforts and policy papers alike, the participation of 
children in armed conflict is presented as a new phenomenon. According to Singer, 
‘warfare always has been an almost exclusively adult domain.’147 He also recounts 
how he first became interested in the topic while working on private military 
companies: ‘As these new soldiers of the private market discussed their experiences, 
I was amazed to learn that their adversaries in combat repeatedly included young 
children. I quickly discovered that this was a growing and global phenomenon 
[…].148 Honwana, focusing on the use of child soldiers in Africa claims that ‘the 
recruitment of children into the military in war represents a real rupture of historical 
continuity, a profound disruption of social order, and a violation of moral norms.’149 
In the policy realm, a 2002 report from the American Centre for Emerging Threats 
and Opportunities (CETO), an internal Marine Corps think thank, starts with the 
following sentence: ‘The Child Soldier Phenomenon has become a post-Cold War 
epidemic that has proliferated to every continent with the exception of Antarctica and 
Australia.’150  
 
Today, even though the issue is often framed as a contemporary phenomenon, it is 
important to keep the historical context in mind. In fact, the following paragraphs 
will show that children have been part of militaries for as long as we know, that it is 
not a new occurrence—what is relatively new though, is the way we think about 
these children. Especially when evaluating claims made by Western humanitarian 
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actors who construct the child soldier as a foreign category, predominantly a result of 
postcolonial conflict in Africa, a historical perspective helps to reconceptualise the 
use of child soldiers as a continuing practice. 
 
Historically, armies around the world in a variety of functions have used children in 
warfare. While the stories of boys participating in wars in Ancient Greece or the 
Children’s Crusade of the 13th century sometimes appear in opening statements of 
NGO or development agency reports, more recent accounts often remain untold.151 
One notable exception is Rosen’s 2015 publication ‘Child Soldiers in the Western 
Imagination: From Patriots to Victims’ in which he goes through some length of 
tracing the participation of young people in warfare in Europe since the Middle Ages 
and up until the National Liberation Movements during the period of decolonisation 
in Africa and Asia.152  
 
Moving beyond the Middle Ages, we can still find a wide range of examples of 
children participating in warfare in the modern world, which are still seen as simply 
contributing work to their communities and are at times even portrayed as brave 
heroes. Looking specifically at the Western context, one example is the practice of 
the British military over centuries, which has routinely been training and recruiting 
‘boy soldiers’ for active military service and which institutionalised this practice by 
the late 19th century through the establishments of military schools and military 
training academies.153 The Napoleonic wars saw the participation of children on all 
sides, most commonly as so-called ‘powder monkeys’, who were responsible for 
distributing gunpowder during navy battles. Some of them were awarded military 
medals of honour for their courage in battle. For example, George James Perceval, an 
11-year old British soldier in the Battle of Trafalgar, was awarded the Naval General 
Service Medal in 1805 and eventually became Admiral and an MP in his later 
career.154 Combatants of a young age were also a significant part of the American 
Revolutionary War (1775-1783). Most prominently among them was later US 
President Andrew Jackson whose revolutionary wartime story of how he, as a 13-
year old, refused to obey a British General’s order to clean his boots, became part of 
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his presidential campaigns in 1824 and 1828.155 The American Civil War (1861-
1865) is another example regarding the widespread participation of children in armed 
conflict in the Western hemisphere in modern times—reliable estimates of the 
number of child combatants are difficult to obtain but recent accounts assume that 
circa 20% of the roughly 3 million fighters were under the age of 17 when they first 
enlisted.156 There are numerous accounts of individual children from the age of eight 
who joined both the Confederate and Union Armies, mostly starting in support roles 
and subsequently advancing to active participation in battle.157 Historical reports do 
not tend to mention procedures which would be described as ‘forcible recruitment’ 
today but instead tell stories about children wanting to defend their villages or 
revenge violence committed by the other side and thus enlisted through attempting to 
look older, lying about their age or, in some cases making their parents sign them up, 
etc.158  
 
Even in the 20th century, there are plenty of historical examples of children fighting 
and being commended for it by their contemporaries. Further examples include the 
two World Wars as well as anti-colonial conflict throughout the empires. Knopp 
explores the role of children in the German Reichswehr in the Second World War 
where children entered military training at a young age and were used on the front 
lines especially towards the end of the war.159 The ‘Sons of the Regiment’, which 
also included many girls, was a programme by the Red Army to enlist orphaned 
children in World War II.160  
 
It becomes clear that the practice of child soldiering, although not conceived of in 
those terms by actors at the time, is by no means novel. What is novel is the 
perception of the child soldier as a problem. Thus, establishing that the use of child 
soldiers has been a continuous practice and in the global north as well as the global 
south is only the first half of the story—we also need to pay attention to how stories 
about the participation of children in war are told. The use of child soldiers today is 
portrayed as a morally reprehensible practice by international organisations and 
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NGOs alike, but this narrative has only developed fairly recently. Post-war stories of 
children participating in warfare, as recent as World War II in Europe, were 
predominantly emphasising their heroic nature and noble sacrifice for the greater 
good.161 Susan Hull collected testimonials about boy soldiers in the American Civil 
War in 1905 and finds that, apart from their nobility and bravery, their physical and 
mental attributes, such as a smaller physique, impulsivity and immaturity, are 
acknowledged but painted in a positive light. They are seen as assets in battle. 
Subsequently, their participation in war does in no way preclude them from full 
participation and contribution to post-war society. In fact, having fought honourably 
in this and prior wars and having survived them would enhance the societal standing 
of a young man, as exemplified by Andrew Jackson’s fighting in the American 
Revolutionary War—there is no notion of a ‘stolen childhood’ or psychological 
trauma that would render him a risk.162 Several military awards and decorations have 
been awarded to children and youth for their noble and patriotic service, for example 
William Johnston, a musician in the Vermont Infantry during the Civil War, who 
received the Congressional Medal of Honor in 1863 at the age of 12 for bravery 
under fire.163 
 
Even about 50 years later, young fighters were still celebrated for their contribution 
to the war effort. Katharine Tynan, an Irish writer and poet published Late Songs in 
1917 about World War I, in which two of her sons were serving. The first verse 
reads:  
This is the Children’s War, because 
The victory’s to the young and clean. 
Up to the Dragon’s ravening jaws 
Run dear Eighteen and Seventeen. 
 
Of course, accounts like this might suffer from an omission of the brutality and 
suffering experienced by both children and adults in war. Nevertheless, the way these 
stories are told, both by former boy soldiers and commentators, gives us a crucial 
insight into how the participation of children in war was perceived and portrayed 
then. Patriotic tales of boys heroically fighting for their country and even sacrificing 
their life has been part of creating a national identity for example in Poland, where 
the discourse around the role of the Gray Ranks, a group of boy scouts who were part 
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of the Polish resistance and played an important role in the Warsaw Uprising, has 
become part of national identity building.164 Another example is Italy’s storytelling 
about the Unification process, for example in the story ‘Little Lombard’ in De 
Amici’s 1895 ‘Cuore: The Heart of a Boy’, in which a young farmer sacrifices 
himself on the lookout during the battle of Solferino in 1859 during the Risorgimento 
or the stories around the Neapolitan Scugnizzi (street children), who played a major 
part in driving the Germans out of the city in September 1943 during the Quattro 
Giornate di Napoli and who are, until today, revered and commemorated with several 
statues in the city.165  
 
Modern day, Western attitudes towards childhood have their origin during the 
Middle Ages and spread throughout the industrial revolution. Musgrove’s much-
quoted sentence “Adolescence was invented with the steam engine,”166 describes this 
development very well. In pre-industrial society, children lived alongside adults 
without a clear distinction between childhood, youth, adolescence, and adulthood. 
Being a child was not associated with a state of separation from adults, education 
was not formalised into schools but happened mostly through apprenticeships, and 
children were expected to perform certain duties instead of having playtime. With the 
emergence of formalised and institutionalised schooling during the Industrial 
Revolution came an increasing separation between child- and adulthood and the 
perception that childhood is a stage of life to be protected, a stage of study and 
play.167 This was by no means a uniform development within the Western context 
and we must pay attention to how the ‘unevenness of the shift to protected or 
sheltered childhoods draws attention to the need for multiple histories that describe 
and illuminate how the experience of childhood has been shaped by race, class, 
gender and region.’ 168 The military was one of the last institutions to accept 
formalised schooling, but eventually, the traditional apprenticeship system developed 
into military academies, which became an important part of the schooling system in 
many European countries. This changed conception of childhood in the West is what 
becomes entrenched in the formulation of international law, as the next section of 
this chapter will show.  
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This now established conception of childhood differs quite significantly from the 
understandings of childhood in other parts of the world. Having given a rough 
account of the development of this concept in the West, it should come as no surprise 
that childhood in industrialising or predominantly agricultural societies is conceived 
of rather differently. There is a good awareness of this in the field of Childhood 
Studies, informed by ethnographic research.169 Wells maintains that an important 
criticism both of the sociology of childhood and also more recent participatory 
approaches of studying conceptions of childhood often suffer from the same 
problem, ‘that it emphasizes the common age-based and generational experience of 
being a child over the way that experience is shaped by children’s raced and classed 
identities and locations.’170 Seabrook, for example, draws a comparison between 
child labour in factories in 19th-century Britain and contemporary Bangladesh to 
elucidate both the global economic dimensions of the phenomenon as well as the 
changing nature of conceptions of childhood both through time and space.171 The 
later empirical chapters will go into detail about different perceptions of childhood in 
Sierra Leone and Myanmar and how they map onto or conflict with international 
regulations and representations of child soldiers.  
 
Thus, two elements are coming together to make the modern idea of the child soldier 
possible. The first is a shift in the perception of childhood from the industrial 
revolution until the 19th century, where childhood is no longer seen as simply a 
precursor to adult life but a separate stage of development, which requires particular 
care and protection. The second is the development of a global interventionism, 
which transforms from a mostly religiously motivated missionary movement to 
humanitarianism by the late 19th century. 172  Early combinations of both 
developments are for example the ‘Child Saver’ Movement in the 19th century, 
attempting to rescue children from working class upbringings in the United Kingdom 
and later in the US. It also finds expression in colonial policies of taking children 
away from their parents to protect them.173 Combined with an emergence of the 
human rights discourse after World War Two and its increasing prominence in the 
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1970s, the stage was set for a changing perception of children serving in militaries 
from the heroic warrior to the innocent traumatised victim.174  
 
The next section picks up from the 1970s and explores how the modern image of the 
child soldier has developed further through international activism and international 
law up until the late 1990s. It introduces the legal framework, which regulates the 
international norm against child soldiering as well as the community of practice of 
international organisations, human rights and child protection NGOs, which uphold, 
develop and implement the norm both on an international and local level.  
4.3 The Universal Child in International Law 
The idea of the ‘universal child’ underlies most of the legal regulations on children’s 
rights in general—the idea of childhood as a protected space, which will allow 
children to become individual, autonomous beings, inheritors of liberal, humanist 
ideals of the Enlightenment.175 Apart from constructing this image and assembling its 
constituent parts, children who do not conform to this idea, who are not innocent but 
who live on the streets, are prostitutes, or soldiers are often judged as deviant or 
problematic. These problematic childhoods are then increasingly tied to the need to 
act on behalf of children. Thus, the ‘universal child’ is not just a discourse between 
international lawyers and activists but has real and tangible implications for state 
policymaking, development programming and child protection interventions. For 
example, McMullin argues that in the case of post-conflict reintegration efforts in 
Angola, the increased emphasis on this idea of child protection has not encouraged 
context- or age-sensitive support systems but ‘instead produced a series of generic 
assumptions and template programmes based on children as uniquely vulnerable’.176 
Furthermore, both discourse and practice do not develop on their own, they are 
promoted and enacted by a variety of actors on the international and domestic level. 
A diplomat at the UN in New York who is responsible for the children and armed 
conflict agenda describes his work: ‘These norms do not operate on their own but 
you have to constantly push them. Member states need to be pushed by civil society 
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and both need to push the UN to move.’177  Tracing the development of the 
international legal provisions—both in international humanitarian law (IHL) and 
international human rights law (IHRL)—as well as the framing of the issue in 
advocacy terms shows how this issue ‘arrived’ on the international agenda, who 
pushed for certain measures, and how they became institutionalised.  
 
The first direct prohibition of child recruitment in IHL and international law in 
general is to be found in the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in 1977 
on the protection of civilians in international and internal armed conflict. According 
to article 77.II of Optional Protocol I, conflicting parties shall take ‘all feasible 
measures’ to ensure that children under the age of fifteen do not take ‘a direct part in 
hostilities’ and ‘in particular, they shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed 
forces’.178 Waschefort traces the development of IHL regarding the use of child 
soldiers and sees this as a relatively late expression of the ‘humanization of 
humanitarian law,’179 reacting to wider developments in the regulation of warfare 
from military necessity/efficiency concerns to a stronger focus on 
humanitarianism.180 There has been much debate among international lawyers on the 
interpretation of these provisions to date181 but until the publication of the Machel 
Report in 1996, there have been few attempts to increase the impact of this 
prohibition in practice. The Machel report then, commissioned in 1994 by the UN 
Secretary-General after a recommendation by the General Assembly and published 
in 1996, shaped the debate to come as it points powerfully to the recruitment of 
children into armed forces as one of the main risks faced by children growing up in 
conflict contexts.182 It further distinguishes between ‘traditional warfare’183, i.e. clear 
battlefields, clear distinctions between combatants and civilians, and ‘postcolonial 
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warfare’ as rule-less, chaotic conflict, including scorched-earth policies, rape as a 
tool of warfare and also the recruitment of child soldiers.184 
 
The Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC), which came into force in 
September 1990, is the first international human rights treaty that deals specifically 
with the rights of children. Ennew traces the professionalization of the ‘child 
business’ throughout the late 1980s and 1990s. She describes a shift in NGO and UN 
approaches to working with children during that time, similar to the one in 
development policy more broadly from perceiving recipients of aid as ‘just in need’ 
to ‘significant social actors’.185 The CRC is one of the early institutionalised steps of 
this development, introducing the rights rhetoric to the area of child protection. 
UNICEF states that the ‘Convention changed the way children are viewed and 
treated—in other words, as human beings with a distinct set of rights instead of as 
passive objects of care and charity’.186 Tomás argues that the CRC marks the 
‘transnationalisation of the judicial field’ meaning that child rights issues, including 
the use of child soldiers, from this point onwards are no longer within the exclusive 
realm of the state but subject to international legal and public scrutiny.187 It was also 
the only international human rights treaty that explicitly tasked NGOs with a role in 
monitoring its implementation.188 By August 2018, all UN member states, apart from 
the US, have signed and ratified the CRC, with South Sudan and Somalia being the 
latest ratifying states in May and October 2015 respectively.189 
 
Tracing back the ten-year long drafting process of the Convention throughout the 
1980s, Veerman finds that of the developing countries, only Argentina, Brazil, the 
Central African Empire, the Dominican Republic and India sent delegates to attend 
all meetings of the Open-Ended Working Group. NGO participation in the early 
stages of the drafting process was negligible and uncoordinated. However, after the 
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establishment of the Ad-Hoc Group on the drafting of the Convention in 1985, NGO 
input became more targeted. 190  
 
While there were significant debates in the drafting process of the Convention, the 
final document is nevertheless influenced by a Western, individualist notion of 
childhood which emphasises the rights to protection and development of the 
individual child. It privileges ‘education over work, family over street life and 
consumerism over productivity.’191 Since the convention bases its rights claims on 
children’s ‘inherent dignity and […] the equal and inalienable rights,’192 these rights 
are not negotiable at the local level and differences between cultures are not relevant. 
According to Montgomery, who works on the anthropology of childhood, the 
‘boundaries of childhood have become fixed and the parameters of a “normal” or 
acceptable childhood have been set.’193 This means a childhood without the need to 
work, earn money, and support the family actively, which has rarely been how 
children in countries like Sierra Leone or Myanmar and many other parts of the 
developing world have lived their lives. This particular situatedness of the 
conception of childhood underlying the CRC becomes especially obvious when 
comparing its stipulations to other instruments of children’s rights like the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. The Charter states in Article 31 that 
‘Children have a responsibility to work for the cohesion of the family and to respect 
parents and elders at all times and to assist them in cases of need’194, allowing for a 
tension between children’s rights and responsibilities and giving ‘equal weight to the 
concurrent responsibilities of the community towards the child.’195 
 
Furthermore, the CRC stipulates a number of rights for every child in the abstract; it 
is up to states, often lobbied by humanitarian organisations and local NGOs to 
implement these provisions. Article 38 finally deals with the issue of child soldiers 
and sets the age limit for recruitment into armed forces or armed groups to fifteen 
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years and prohibits the direct participation of children under this age in direct 
hostilities.196 
 
The low age limit in Article 38 was met with resistance by most NGOs and by 1998, 
a formal coalition had formed to campaign for an increased minimum age for 
participation in hostilities from 15 to 18 years.197 The Coalition to Stop the Use of 
Child Soldiers spearheaded the ‘Straight 18’ campaign to lobby governments and the 
UN to change the regulation.198 The Coalition was the focal point from the late 1990s 
onwards for most non-governmental activism and the push for 18 as the minimum 
recruitment age. It was a UK-based organisation founded by Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch, International Save the Children Alliance, Jesuit Refugee 
Centre, Quaker United Nations Office and Terre des Hommes. The Coalition lobbied 
member states and the UN working group on the Optional Protocol on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict extensively by producing additional 
research on child recruitment and mobilising public support for their aim.  
 
Apart from the Coalition, international organisations, primarily the United Nations, 
are crucial in the anti-child recruitment network. UNICEF is at the forefront of 
working with child soldiers directly and providing services on the ground. On the 
international stage, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
for Children and Armed Conflict (SRSG), which was created after the publication of 
the Machel Report in 1996 was central in raising awareness of the situation of 
children in armed conflict and coming up with a variety of measures to improve 
this.199 The mandate of UN organisations in dealing with child soldiers was clarified 
in Security Council Resolution 1261 in 1999, which placed children affected by war 
on the agenda of the council and identified a number of ‘grave violations’ against 
children in conflict; child recruitment and use being one of them.200  
 
The SRSG’s role since then is mainly to ‘strengthen the protection of children, raise 
awareness, promote the collection of information, […] and foster international 
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cooperation […]’.201 Since Security Council Resolution 1379 in 2001, the office of 
the SRSG also publishes the ‘List of Shame’ in the annex of their annual report to the 
Security Council; naming states in situations on the agenda of the SC who are in 
violations of their international obligations. Resolution 1612 in 2005 furthermore 
established the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on grave violations 
committed against children in times of armed conflict, clarifying the exact violations 
to be measured and responsibilities of various parts of the UN architecture.202 In the 
last almost 20 years, the SRSG has continued to engage states and non-state actors in 
extended dialogues with the aim to have them sign so-called action plans, binding 
offending parties to releasing all child soldiers and changing their recruitment 
practices. The Office of the SRSG works closely with the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations in the field as peacekeepers are often closest to the action.  
 
After extensive lobbying throughout the 1990s, the UN General Assembly finally 
adopted the Optional Protocol to the Convention of the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OPAC) in 2000. It was ratified in 2002 
and raised the age limit for forcible recruitment and direct participation in hostilities 
to 18 years for signatory parties. As of April 2018, the OPAC has 167 parties.203 This 
means that for these 167 states, 18 years is the legally binding age restriction for 
compulsory conscription and direct participation in hostilities. As of 2018, 18 
countries have neither signed nor ratified the optional protocol (including countries 
such as South Sudan, the UAE, and a number of Pacific island states) and 12 
countries have signed, but not ratified the protocol (such as Myanmar, Iran, Lebanon, 
Liberia, Somalia, Zambia, etc.).204 Regarding voluntary recruitment into the state 
armed forces, OPAC allows the enlistment of 16-year-olds as long as they do not 
participate in combat. The rules for non-state armed groups are stricter, prohibiting 
the use of under 18-year-olds in any form, including voluntary enlistment (Art. 
4(I)).205 It remains the ‘host state’s’ responsibility to enforce this rule, which is 
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unlikely to happen during a conflict but often happens afterwards in the form of 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programmes or during the 
integration of former rebel factions into the state military. The provisions described 
in the paragraph above denote the regulations under International Human Rights Law 
(IHRL).  
 
However, the legal framework surrounding the prohibition of the use of child 
soldiers extends beyond IHL and IHRL to International Criminal Law, International 
Labour Law and legally binding conventions of regional organisations.206 Among the 
other instruments are the Paris Commitments and Principles, which were formally 
endorsed by 58 states in 2007 and lay out guidelines for protecting children 
associated with armed forces or groups, including the release and reintegration of 
child soldiers. Although not legally binding, they are referred to and cited for 
example by the ICC Chamber I in the Lubanga reparations decision.207 There are also 
ILO provisions, clarifying that child soldiering counts as one of the worst forms of 
child labour. The ILO Convention No. 182 concerning the Prohibition and 
Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (1999) 
lists ‘forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict’ as a 
worst form of child labour (Art.3). This commits all states which ratify the 
convention to ‘take immediate and effective measures to secure the prohibition and 
elimination’ of the listed worst forms of child labour (Art.1). Legally, we are now 
dealing with two age limits. Fifteen years has been set as the boundary by the CRC, 
the Additional Protocol I and II to the Geneva Convention and the Rome Statute, 
whereas the OPAC and the ILO convention 182 set the limit to 18 years.  
 
Finally, the Rome Statute, which entered into force in 2002, regulates individual 
criminal accountability regarding the use of child soldiers (Art. 8.2b)xxvi). It 
stipulates that it is a war crime to conscript or enlist children under fifteen both in 
international and internal conflicts into armed forces or to use them actively in 
hostilities. On the other hand, Article 26 states that the ICC has no jurisdiction over 
anyone under the age of 18, leading some observers to believe that this might create 
an incentive to recruit soldiers between the ages of 15 and 18 since they (1) cannot 
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be held accountable for any potential war crimes committed and (2) do not result in 
their recruiters being tried for conscripting child soldiers.208 
 
The first individual tried by the ICC, the head of the Union des Patriotes 
Congolais/Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
was charged with enlisting and conscripting children under the age of fifteen and 
using them to participate actively in hostilities.209 He was found guilty and sentenced 
to fourteen years imprisonment in July 2012. Drumbl claims that ‘the Lubanga 
proceedings reinforce, and curry, a stylized portrayal of the child soldier as a 
faultless passive victim, psychologically devastated, and irreparably damaged.’210 
Drumbl further argues that the legal dichotomies of right/wrong; innocent/guilty; 
victim/perpetrator do not account for the ‘much coarser reality’ of child soldiers’ 
lives in which in which the lines between those categories are all but clear and in 
which the child soldier experience continues.211  
 
Although the Lubanga case is the first for the ICC, it is not the first time an 
internationalized court has convicted an individual for child soldier related crimes. 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone in fact tried and convicted Liberia’s former head 
of state Charles Taylor just a few months earlier, in April/May 2012 for aiding and 
abetting war crimes during the Sierra Leone Civil War.212 The timing of the Lubanga 
and Taylor cases coincided with the Kony 2012 campaign, which brought 
international attention to child soldiers in Uganda. The American NGO Invisible 
Children produced a short film and subsequent international social media campaign 
pushing for the arrest of LRA leader Joseph Kony, which became the most viral 
video to date with over 100 million views after 6 days.213 The campaign quickly 
faced criticism for its one-dimensional representation of child soldiers, 
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misrepresentation of the conflict in Uganda, and simplistic proposed solution214, 
ultimately contributing to stabilising the tropes that this chapter will draw out in the 
following section: that child soldiers are predominantly found in African contexts, 
that they are very young, abducted and abused by rebel groups, and necessarily 
traumatised unless rescued and counselled by international child protection agencies. 
 
All these regulations and mechanisms share a common conception of the child and 
the child soldier based on the cultural and social shifts outlined at the beginning of 
this chapter. The change in perception of the young heroic fighter to the innocent 
victim of adult brutality finds expression in most international legal rules as well as 
programmes ran by humanitarian and child protection agencies in the field.  
According to Rosen, this leaves ‘little to no room for diversity or pluralism in this 
model, rendering all child soldiers victims and all recruiters as deviant and criminal 
abusers of children.215 Child rights activism, international humanitarian and human 
rights law are largely based on this idea of the ‘universal child’, which exists 
independently of cultural, historical, or geographical context. Wells claims that 
‘[i]nternational children’s rights law, news reporting on children and how NGOs 
frame their work with children are each inscribed with these same ethical premises 
that the child is a universal subject who should everywhere be enabled to be a free, 
autonomous, choosing and rational individual.’216 Thus, the label of ‘child soldier’ is 
often used to describe young people who, in their specific historical or cultural 
context, would not be regarded as children in the first place.  
 
Ultimately, the category of the child soldier is not a historical or analytical term but a 
moral and legal concept used by politicians, international lawyers and activists for 
‘directed social change that seeks the universal transformation of age categories and 
with it the reformulation of rights and duties of adults and children.’217 However, 
maintaining a strict binary between ‘local’ and ‘Western’ conceptions of childhood is 
not necessarily analytically or politically useful. Firstly, Western ideas of childhood 
are not static or internally coherent 218  and secondly, throughout a history of 
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colonialism, globalisation, development programming and cultural exchange, ‘pure’ 
conceptions of social categories, which have remained untouched by these processes, 
do not exist.219  
 
The empirical part of this study examines this interaction between local and 
globalized ideas about the child and the child soldier in particular and looks at the 
construction and change of these categories. For now, the next section takes a closer 
look at how this idea of the ‘universal child’ that forms the basis for international 
legal regulations influences how international actors interpret the empirical reality of 
child soldiering. 
4.4 Representation of Child Soldiers Today 
The international norm against the recruitment and use of child soldiers is fairly 
clearly defined. While there is some disagreement about the exact minimum age for 
recruitment (15 vs. 18), the norm as promoted by international law, international 
organisations, NGOs and the media is largely unambiguous in that child soldiers are 
innocent children who have been stolen away from their families and forced to 
commit atrocities. If, following former Special Representative of the Secretary-
General for Children and Armed Conflict Olara Otunnu, we are now in an ‘era of 
application’ and changing state behaviour by appealing to normative commitments 
and International Law works, according to this popular narrative, abolishing the 
recruitment and use of child soldiers should be an obvious case. An advocacy office 
for Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict confirms this view: ‘We’re at a place 
in the agenda where we all feel collectively that we have a very strong normative 
framework to address the issue. The conversation has really moved on to 
implementation.’220 
 
On the international stage, the legitimacy of the norm against child soldiering is not 
contested anymore. All member states in principle agree on the absolute prohibition 
of child soldiering. Ann Makome, Child Protection Specialist for DPKO agrees: 
‘There is so much consensus around it, coming from 2000 to today, the consensus 
around the fact that children should not be carrying guns is so high. It really is this 
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global consensus now.’221 However, applicability contestations are commonplace. 
Whether a certain norm violation has occurred based on the data gathered is up for 
debate.222 ‘They won’t disagree outright on the principle because who can disagree 
with the principles. But they will question fervently the veracity of our claims,’ 
according to a senior policy advisor for World Vision in New York.223 Although 
most member states that question the accuracy of the data collected will do so for 
their own strategic benefit, there are a number of issues to keep in mind about the 
way in which data about the use of child soldiers is gathered. 
 
The knowledge produced by NGOs, international organisation’s monitoring and 
reporting mechanisms as well as journalists, both about the prevalence of child 
recruitment and the effectiveness of international efforts to curtail the practice, is in a 
second step interpreted and disseminated in light of a particular image of the child 
soldier.  
 
Partly as a result of the categories outlined in the international legal framework 
above and partly as a response to what is perceived to resonate with Western donors 
and audiences, the international norm against child soldiering is dominated by the 
idea of ‘the universal child soldier’ as young, mostly male, mostly African, carrying 
weapons, having been abducted from his family, being held against his will and 
forced to commit atrocities. The following section first looks at problems of data 
collection before unpacking these tropes embedded in the norm today. 
                                                
221 Makome, Interview, New York, 15th June 2017. 
222 Diplomat, Interview, New York, 21st June 2017. 





Image 2 Screenshot of 'Child Soldiers' page on World Vision website224 
First, the main issue is a lack of reliable data. This is not only due to the nature of the 
subject matter, i.e. the impossibility to observe a soldier’s age, but also due to the 
fact that policy researchers gather data with a particular angle in mind. It could be 
geared towards lobbying a specific government or international organisation. Most 
commonly, however, it is geared towards a Western public audience, trying to raise 
awareness or funds for a specific project.225 In this case, what ‘sells’ best is 
personalised and dramatized data—individual stories that either trigger shock or pity 
but rarely give a comprehensive account of the complex conflict context. Brooten 
further argues that the emphasis on individual children’s stories helps to divert 
attention away from potential implications of the West in the particular conflicts that 
produce child soldiers in the first place. In this way, the (largely Western) audience 
does not have to contemplate their own complicity in these conflicts but can rather 
marvel at the horrifying experiences of child soldiers elsewhere while maintaining 
their moral superiority.226 
 
Therefore, there might be an incentive to exaggerate numbers or provide skewed 
accounts in order to be able to tell a certain story.227 Similarly to how most policy 
and academic papers start with a list of roles taken on by children in armed conflict, 
most of them also start with citing the number of child soldiers worldwide which 
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used to be given as 300,000 and more recently 250,000.228 Although unverified, 
some scholars argue that ‘the figure of 300,000 was calculated by a number of NGO 
representatives looking for a convenient number to use in their public campaigns 
over a decade ago.’229 According to Rachel Brett, a Human Rights representative at 
the Quaker UN Office, who first came up with it, this number was ‘based on her best 
estimate’ which leaves unclear whether it is at least rooted in any actual calculation 
or measurement or whether it was picked for dramatic effect.230 Brett and McCallin 
actually retracted their estimate in 1998, stating that ‘the total number of child 
soldiers in each country, let alone the global figure, is not only unknown but also 
unknowable.’231  
 
A second issue in trying to measure or even estimate the number of child soldiers 
used in any conflict is the wide variety in usage of the terms ‘child soldier’ and 
‘armed conflict’. For example, a much-cited study by Achvarina and Reich makes 
confident statements about the number of child soldiers who participated in 12 
African civil wars, going back to the Angolan Civil War starting in 1975.232 They 
claim that 25% of soldiers that participated in the conflict in Sierra Leone between 
1991 and 2000 were below 18; whereas over 50% of soldiers in Liberia (2000-2002) 
were below 18. Note that they did not obtain these numbers through fieldwork or 
direct data gathering but by relying on UN and NGO reports.233 Their adopted 
definition of ‘child soldier’ as under 18-year olds with a wide variety of roles, neither 
matches the current provisions in international law nor the standards at the time of 
the writing of the reports they rely on. To date, there has been no systematic, 
comprehensive collection of data on past or contemporary child soldier numbers—
most probably due to the acute methodological difficulty of this task.  
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A particularly striking example of interpreting data in this particular way can be 
found in a CETO report from 2002 titled ‘Child Soldiers: Implications for U.S. 
Forces’ which has been developed as an internal guide for US marines on how to 
deal with child soldiers in the field and was published in the context of the war in 
Afghanistan and a looming war in Iraq. This report, which describes the use of child 
soldiers as a ‘post-Cold War epidemic’ as cited above, uses a table to illustrate the 
gravity of the situation, which puts young age at the centre of the problem. Selective 
statistics are presented that make it appear so that most child soldiers are under the 
age of 15 and even under the age of 12. For example, it emphasises that 80% of 
conflicts where child soldiers are used include fighters under the age of 15 or that 
23% of armed organisations use children under the age of 15 in combat roles. 
However, not a single concrete number is given, no a single child was actually 
counted. There is no mention of what percentage of fighters were under the age of 
15, whether it was it most of them or only individual cases.234  
 
Image 3 Chart from CETO report 'Child Soldiers: Implications for U.S. Forces'235 
Often, qualitative data on child soldiering is as questionable as the quantitative data, 
due to the problem of ‘overinterviewing’.236 Especially prevalent in Liberia after the 
end of the civil war in 2003 but also in Northern Uganda is the way former child 
soldiers are interviewed. There are accounts of groups of children being presented to 
interviewer after interviewer, leading to the same stories by the same group of ex-
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combatants being told multiple times.237 Aggregating this data will then not lead to a 
more representative picture but rather a re-creating of the experience of a few chosen 
former child soldiers. The same problem of overrepresentation happens if particular, 
individual accounts of child soldier experiences, such as Ishmael Beah’s 
autobiographical account ‘A Long Way Gone’, become popularised and 
representative for child soldier experiences regardless of context.238 It still remains 
possible to gain a broad understanding of which actors in a conflict are using child 
soldiers and on which scale (individual cases or large scale recruitment) based on 
data gathered by international organisations and NGOs. In fact, the following section 
of this chapter discerns what we know about the state of the ‘child soldier problem’ 
given the problematic data we have. All of this is not to claim that there is no 
widespread use of child soldiers, both under 15 and 18 years of age in militaries and 
non-state armed groups in several regions around the world—it is simply to caution 
against unfounded claims and the reliance of humanitarian and development actors 
on these numbers to plan and implement programmes. 
4.4.1 What Do We Know about Child Soldiers? 
The international norm against the use of child soldiers, as it is enacted by 
practitioners around the world, is mostly understood as referring to a specific kind of 
child soldier, who is male and very young, has been abducted by non-state armed 
groups, particularly in Africa, and is necessarily traumatised as a result of his 
participation in the conflict. Scholars from a range of disciplines, for example 
childhood studies, media studies, critical security studies and international law, have 
started to unpack these tropes and drawn attention to the homogenised and seemingly 
universal image of the child soldier still so prevalent in international discourse 
today.239 Drumbl labels this the ‘images of child soldiers’, which ‘communicate 
easily with the public’.240 
 
The following paragraphs, by drawing on this existing literature, first unpack a 
number of empirical claims inherent in the representation of child soldiers and the 
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international norm around it: (1) Child soldiers are a particularly African problem; 
(2) most child soldiers are abducted and forced to fight; (3) they are carrying 
weapons and participating in active hostilities as part of rebel groups and (4) they are 
very young and male. It becomes clear that child soldiers are a heterogeneous group, 
which does not match their perception and presentation in the media and NGO 
publications very well. They contribute to a simplifying presentation of child 
soldiers, what McMullin calls a ‘template child’241, as a homogenous group with 
similar characteristics, problems and trajectories, which are assumed to behave in 
similar ways. Thus, potential interventions by international actors can operate based 
on the idea of the ‘universal child’ and follow similar programme designs regardless 
of context, potentially hindering successful reintegration.242 
4.4.1.1 Not Just Africa 
 
Image 4 Results of Google Image search 'child soldier'243 
A simple survey of photographs used in NGO and state publications on child soldiers 
shows that the large majority of pictures used depict very young African children 
holding weapons. 51 out of 91 Human Rights Watch reports on child soldiers 
between 2002 and 2018 cover sub-Sahara Africa with the rest being predominantly 
about Burma (9) and Sri Lanka (7). 244 Many media reports and civil society 
publications equate child soldiers with African conflicts. Tassava mirrors this finding 
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in her analysis of 10 documentary and Hollywood films on child soldiers, 9 of which 
take place in Africa.245 
 
For now, it is important to note that while currently the majority of state and non-
state actors who use and recruit child soldiers are based in Africa, the phenomenon of 
child soldiers is by no means an exclusively African one. Gates and Reich open their 
2010 edited volume with the statement that ‘using child soldiers is not […] “an 
African thing”’ and emphasise that there is no historical or cultural thread that links 
the proliferation of the use of child soldiers to a specific set of historical experiences 
or local cultures.246 In the 2018 report of the Secretary-General on children and 
armed conflict, seven out of fourteen country contexts that are listed there are not in 
Africa.247 The Secretary-General reports only include situations of armed conflict, so 
countries like the UK or the US do not feature in these reports even though the 
British Army continues to recruit soldiers from the age of 16 into their armed forces, 
which would dilute the impression even more that this is predominantly something 
that occurs on the African continent.248    
4.4.1.2 Not Just Abducted 
Most child soldier experiences that are frequently re-told in NGO publications and 
reports start with the abduction of a child from his or her family. Either being 
captured while playing outside or taken from their family homes at gunpoint, these 
children are then forced to join the armed group or armed forces.249 This definitely 
describes the experience of some child soldiers, especially in Sierra Leone, Northern 
Uganda and more recently in South Sudan. However, despite the prevalence of these 
abduction stories, the majority of children become part of military forces because 
they enlist themselves.250 Enlistment used in this sense does not cover forcible 
conscription whereby children are not technically abducted from their families but 
handed over under threat. Indeed, volunteerism as a phenomenon is still under-
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researched at this point, possibly as a result of the focus on abduction. Drumbl 
emphasises that children, at times, show considerable initiative to be recruited such 
as lying to recruiters or forging school or birth certificates.251 Legally, the possibility 
to volunteer under the age of 15 for state armed forces and 18 for armed groups does 
not exist; children simply do not have the capacity in international law to sign up to 
armed forces.  
4.4.1.3 Not Just Fighters 
The most horrifying, and also most prominent images of child soldiers are those 
depicting very young children carrying heavy weapons, in Denov’s words: ‘images 
of boys armed with AK47s appear ubiquitous, providing a cautionary tale of innocent 
childhood gone awry.’252 While there are conflicts, including Sierra Leone and 
Myanmar, in which children are participating in active combat, according to the 
office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed 
Conflict, the most common roles for children in militaries are those of porters 
(carrying supplies, ammunition, injured soldiers), lookouts, messengers, cooks or 
other routine duties.253 They fulfil a variety of roles in armed forces, which go 
beyond active participation in combat. Despite a focus on children participating 
actively in combat operations, by now, there is an acknowledgement of the different 
roles children have as part of armed forces and almost all policy documents and 
academic texts alike start with a list similar to the one by the SRSG.254 Nonetheless, 
analysing the visual representation of child soldiers, the boy with the gun is still the 
overwhelmingly present image.255  
4.4.1.4 Not Just Young Boys 
As detailed above, UN and ILO provisions previously established 15 as the minimum 
age for recruitment, which has been heavily criticised throughout the 1990s, 
especially by NGOs who were pushing for a higher limit. Most visual representations 
of child soldiers and individual stories told focus on very young children, possibly to 
increase the alienating and shocking effect for Western observers.256 In fact, there are 
children under the age of 15 and even under the age of 10 who are fighting in several 
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conflicts around the world. Sierra Leone is one of those contexts where children as 
young as 8 were abducted by the RUF.257  
 
However, the large majority of underage soldiers are between 15 and 18 years old.258 
The age by which adulthood is reached is largely a result of social and cultural 
norms. The legal age of majority is 18 in most countries, however other markers of 
adulthood, e.g. the age at which a person is legally allowed to work, marry, get a 
driving license, vote, drink alcohol, is criminally culpable, etc. vary quite 
significantly depending on the country, generally somewhere between 14 and 21.259 
McMullin further points out, that with a life expectancy of 49-60 years in many sub-
Sahara African countries, 18 as an age marker of adulthood seems particularly ill-
suited.260 
 
Different markers of adulthood might become relevant for children growing up in 
conflict situations. One variable, which is measured for conflict and post-conflict 
societies, is the number of child-headed households for example due to the death of 
both parents. In the development community, this is often taken as an indicator that 
children might be ‘mature beyond their age’ as the responsibilities they fulfil and 
roles they take on are those of adults.261 This perception of maturity or adulthood, 
which goes beyond a purely legal definition, reflects a broader range of what is 
associated with being ‘grown up’. It becomes difficult to justify why an 18-year-old 
British ‘man’ who just finished school, who lives with his parents, has never had a 
job or taken care of anyone can join an army and go to war whereas a 17 year old 
Burmese ‘boy’ who has been the sole breadwinner of his family for some time and 
helped raise his younger siblings decides to join the army to increase their family 
income has to be rescued by a child protection NGO and makes his employer a war 
criminal. This raises questions of agency, which will be discussed at the end of the 
thesis.  
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Apart from being imagined as very young, ‘the universal child soldier’ is also a boy 
with girl soldiers largely absent from Western media depictions. 262  Again, 
calculating any exact number of child soldiers or details about their demographic will 
necessarily be inaccurate. However, estimates of girl soldiers globally vary, 
depending on region, from about 10-30% of all combatants on average.263 More 
recent estimates of civil wars in Africa are said to have around 30-40% of girl 
soldiers and increasingly, scholars are paying attention to the particularities of being 
a member of an armed group or military as a girl child.264 While also providing 
labour similar to male child soldiers, such as active combat but also cooking or 
delivering messages, they are often used to provide sexual services. This is not an 
exclusively female phenomenon but nevertheless, sexual violence predominantly 
affects girl soldiers.265 There are broader issues to consider in the portrayal of girl 
soldiers if they are talked about in the first place. Victimisation narratives, which are 
very prominent in the discourse on child soldiers in general, become the almost 
exclusive focus when talking about girl soldiers. The case study of Sierra Leone will 
show how the lack of visibility of girl soldiers and the emphasis on their status as 
‘bush wives’ complicated their post-conflict life even more.   
4.5 Conclusion  
The chapter has explored the emergence and development of the international norm 
against the use of child soldiers. I have traced the change in perception of child 
soldiers in the West from being portrayed as heroic warriors, for example in the 
American Civil War, to today, where child soldiers are associated with being 
innocent, passive, and traumatised victims. This shift has informed the 
institutionalisation of the international norm against child soldiering as it was pushed 
for by international activists, organisations, and some states. I have shown how the 
international legal regulations codify a particular type of ‘universal child soldier’ 
who dominates international discourse about children fighting today and also 
influences the ‘empirical reality’ most international interventions on this issue build 
on. 
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The activism of the 1990s on behalf of raising the minimum age of recruitment to 18 
finally culminated in the ratification of the OPAC in 2002, fulfilling the main 
advocacy goal of child protection activists. This is the point at which the norm has 
basically assumed its most clearly defined form (although there is still internal 
contestation regarding the minimum age of recruitment for state vs. non-state actors). 
The civil war in Sierra Leone officially also ended in 2002 and thus coincided with 
the international developments that brought child soldiering to the forefront of 
international attention both in the humanitarian and human rights communities at that 
time. By 2002, various the community of practice against the recruitment and use of 
child soldiers, consisting of international, advocacy, and implementing organisations, 
had come together for the first time and pushed for targeted intervention on behalf of 
child combatants in post-conflict reconstruction. The ‘child soldier problem’ in 
Sierra Leone thus, at first glance, seemed to match the narrative embedded in the 
international norm against child soldiering very well. Indeed, this is an African 
conflict in which large numbers of children who were often under the age of 15 have 
been abducted by rebel forces. They fought, committed horrible atrocities, and were 
ultimately successfully demobilised and reintegrated thanks to the intervention of the 
international community as represented first by the peacekeeping mission 
UNAMSIL, and then by UNICEF and its associated NGOs such as Save the 
Children, World Vision or Caritas. The following chapters will examine whether this 
reading of the child soldier problem in Sierra Leone holds up and how it has 
informed the work of international actors in that context and contributed to 
developing the international ‘toolkit’ for interventions on behalf of child soldiers 
around the world. After analysing the practices of international actors in Sierra 
Leone, the following chapters turn to Myanmar, which to date is still presumed to 









Image 5 Map of Sierra Leone266 
5.1 Introduction 
The Sierra Leonean civil war officially ended just as the Optional Protocol (OPAC) 
was ratified in 2002. The conflict, and the extensive use of child soldiers by all sides 
was one of the most prominent examples used by the international advocacy 
campaign to argue for increasing the minimum age of recruitment from 15 to 18. 
Rosen describes the civil war in Sierra Leone as ‘the poster-child case of the modern 
                                                




child-soldier crisis’267 and pictures, as well as stories, of very young fighters and the 
atrocities they committed in that conflict have been used extensively in subsequent 
campaigns to combat child recruitment globally. International involvement, both in 
the conflict and in addressing the ‘child soldier crisis’ has been high, with significant 
UN peacekeeping forces deployed from 1999 onwards and British troops remaining 
in the country until today.268 Sierra Leone has been seen as one of the most 
influential cases for putting child soldiers on the international agenda and possible 
strategies and interventions in later contexts, such as Liberia, Sri Lanka, or DRC, are 
often modelled after the Sierra Leone experience.269  
 
This chapter shows that Sierra Leone is one of the first cases where the international 
network around combating child soldiering, consisting of several UN agencies, most 
prominently UNICEF and DPKO, international NGOs, like Save the Children and 
Caritas, and their local partners come together. I first investigate the development of 
child soldiering in the Sierra Leone civil war into the ‘poster child’ Rosen and some 
international actors proclaim it to be. Hailed as a major success by activists and UN 
agencies alike, I draw on existing literature on reintegration and post-conflict 
reconstruction in Sierra Leone and interviews with practitioners in country to 
question the established narratives about the work of international actors regarding 
child combatants in Sierra Leone. This chapter follows the theoretical approach set 
out earlier by, first contextualising the emergence of child recruitment as embedded 
within power hierarchies in Sierra Leone before mapping out the international 
community of practice around child soldiering, which was active in this particular 
context. Its focus is to identify the key actors who are implementing the norm against 
child soldiering in Sierra Leone. 
 
The following chapter then explores whether and how specific strategies and 
practices around dealing with former child soldiers were adopted and adapted from 
other contexts, whether they resonated with local populations and whether they were 
seen as successful. It shows how the community of practice in Sierra Leone produces 
knowledge about child soldiers and the success of international interventions in this 
context. Furthermore, the following chapter investigates the practices of norm 
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implementation in Sierra Leone as well as how they have changed and what 
international actors have learned within this particular context. 
 
Based on interviewing activists, UN officials, government representatives and former 
child soldiers the following two chapters shed light on the unique features of this 
particular context: The politicization of youth and the prevalence of generational 
conflict before the outbreak of the war, the perceived failure of reintegration efforts 
of former child combatants by affected communities as well as the continued and re-
emerging marginalization of youth in post-conflict Sierra Leone makes its use as a 
‘poster child’ and template for international activity on child soldiers internationally 
problematic.  
5.2 Context of Child Soldiering in Sierra Leone 
The history of child recruitment in Sierra Leone is inextricably linked with the 11-
year long civil war between 1991 and 2002. Specifically, the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) gained notoriety for abducting and recruiting extremely young children, 
often under the age of 10, and using them to commit atrocities against the civilian 
population and government forces.270 However, the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and 
the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), large parts of which consisted of the Kamajors271, 
were equally ruthless in recruiting children to fill the ever-expanding need for 
personnel to continue fighting. Contrary to what is often written about civil wars in 
Africa, the conflict in Sierra Leone was not a result of ethnic or religious cleavages. 
The following section gives a short background to the conflict, its main parties and 
their child recruitment practices before focusing on the response of the international 
community, mainly from the Lomé Agreement in 1999 onwards, to demobilize and 
reintegrate all child soldiers who had been part of the war. The Demobilisation, 
Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) programme in Sierra Leone was the key 
intervention by international actors in response to encountering child soldiers in the 
conflict. Although originally framed as very successful by the UN and other 
implementing actors, it has faced increasing critique by academics and practitioners 
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alike. 272  The practices surrounding this programme, how it is created, which 
background knowledge it relies on, how it is adapted to the specificities of the local 
context, and how it resonates with its supposed beneficiaries is the focus of this 
analysis. Practices and actors outside the DDR feature as well, mostly to show 
alternative ways of understanding and working with child soldiers, which might be 
less clearly informed by international conceptions of childhood as enshrined in the 
CRC and held by all relevant international organisations and NGOs.   
5.2.1 Pre-Colonial and Colonial Times: Establishing Power Relationships 
Sierra Leone, and the port city of Freetown had been a focal point of the transatlantic 
slave trade from the late 15th century onwards. Until the late 18th century, Africans 
living in the coastal areas were either kidnapped or sold to Portuguese, Dutch, 
French, and British slave traders by local chiefs. According to historians such as 
Walter Rodney or Rosalind Shaw, from the late 18th century onwards, local chiefs 
adopted the practice of owning domestic slaves some time after European slave 
traders started operating in West Africa.273 Denov, in trying to understand the civil 
war and the child recruitment practices of the RUF, rightly emphasises the need to 
look at the histories of slavery, colonial rule, oppression, and patrimonial order in 
Sierra Leone in order to understand the roots of the conflict.274  
 
Some trace the legacies of the power relationships established during the slave trade 
to the structure of Sierra Leonean society until today. Domestic slavery in the 1700s 
largely meant local chiefs having servants perpetually indebted to them, either 
working the land or providing domestic labour. It was rare to trade and sell slaves, 
they were thought of as part of the household and often enjoyed limited rights.275 
Today still, it is fairly common for example, that a poor family who lives in a rural 
area sends some of their children to live with wealthier relatives or people they know 
in the cities, known as the ‘mehn pikin’ system.276 The understanding being, that in 
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return for accommodation and food, that child will work in the wealthy family’s 
household, often indefinitely, without pay or with very minimal pay.277  
 
In the late 18th century, freed slaves from America were returning to West African 
shores. They had fought on the side of the British during the American War of 
independence, and after briefly settling in Nova Scotia, Canada, (which had a rather 
inhospitable climate) were promised better lands for new settlements in Sierra Leone. 
Supported by British abolitionists, a small number of Black settlers founded the 
Freetown Colony in 1792. Jamaican Maroons, escaped slaves who had formed their 
own settlements in the Caribbean and across the Americas, joined them after having 
been deported to Nova Scotia in the 1790s. After Britain officially abolished slavery 
in 1807, they stationed a navy contingent at the coast of Sierra Leone to capture slave 
ships and free the people on board. Many freed slaves settled in Freetown for fear or 
falling into the hands of slavers in the surrounding territories again—Portugal, 
France, Spain, and others were still engaged in the slave trade at this point. However, 
the independent settlement of Freetown as a refuge for freed slaves from several 
parts of the world and the continent did not last long.  
 
Faced with food shortages, disease and attacks from mostly Temne people who had 
owned the land of the settlement before, the British declared the settlement a Crown 
Colony in 1808 and after consolidating control over the rest of the territory of what 
constitutes Sierra Leone today in 1896, this was declared a Protectorate. British 
colonial tradition did not require extensive engagement with local power structures 
and instead relied on controlling the army and police as well as Paramount Chiefs, 
who ruled over small areas of the country and were accountable to the colonisers. 
British colonial administration handled the Crown Colony and the Protectorate quite 
differently. For example, inhabitants of the Protectorate were referred to as ‘natives’ 
and classified as ‘protected subjects’ whereas the Crown Colony was directly 
governed by the British monarch and regarded as part of the British Empire. Apart 
from differences in labelling and administrative control, this division also contributed 
to significantly different developments in terms of political, social, and economic 
                                                
277 Bledsoe, “‘No Success Without Struggle’”; Shepler, The Social and Cultural Context of Child 




changes, including for example land ownership rights, governance of resources and 
educational opportunities.278 
 
Prior to British colonial control, chiefs in Sierra Leone had governed their people 
directly. ‘[T]hese rulers had derived their legitimacy through a process of selection in 
accordance with the customs and traditions of their people. They represented the 
interests of their people and served as symbols of unity.’279 Under British rule, 
Paramount Chiefs were selected from a small group of ‘taxpayers’ and their positions 
were hereditary and for life, therefore consolidating power in the hands of a few 
families in each chiefdom, which were accountable to the colonial administration.280 
This practice deliberately excluded women, young people and the poor from the 
possibility of ever participating in local government.281 Berman describes the system: 
‘The colonial state allowed chiefs, headmen and elders to define a customary law 
that asserted and legitimated their power and control over the allocation of resources 
against the interests of juniors, women and migrants’.282 After the Hut Tax War of 
1898, in which Temne and Mende chiefs rebelled against the attempt by the British 
to collect housing taxes but were defeated after months of intense fighting, there 
were no more large-scale, organised, military uprisings against the rule of the British 
Empire although there were many small-scale riots and uprisings.283 These were 
often directed against the rule of the chiefs who were perceived as British 
functionaries, aiding them in suppressing their own people. The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, in their final report, which tries to 
establish the reasons for the outbreak of the civil war, claims that some of the power 
that chiefs were given by the British, ‘such as the ability to impose fines or other 
punishments for errant behaviour, were retained long into the post-colonial period 
and permanently defined the negative perceptions of Chiefs among many of their 
subjects.’284 This might, in turn, explain the high involvement of youth in the conflict 
later and the sometimes extreme violence towards figures of authority, especially 
chiefs.  
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Finally, Sierra Leone gained independence from British colonial rule in 1961 but 
many of the systems of governance established during colonialism changed little. 285 
The two main parties that formed after independence are still the main political 
contenders today, the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) and the All People’s 
Congress (APC). The SLPP dominated Sierra Leone politics pre-independence and 
also provided the first Prime Minister of independent Sierra Leone, Sir Milton 
Margai, who was succeeded by his brother Sir Albert Margai before suffering defeat 
in the elections six years later. The highly contested 1967 elections resulted in a 
narrow APC win and Siaka Stevens becoming Prime Minister.  
 
Threatened by repeated attempted and successful military coups, Siaka Stevens’ rule 
developed into a largely autocratic one-party-state by the mid-1970s. He ousted, 
imprisoned, and executed political competitors and opponents and under his rule, 
corruption and cronyism became a defining feature of his government, leading to 
rising frustration among the population. Stevens retired in 1985, naming General 
Momoh, who had been the head of the Sierra Leone military for fifteen years, as his 
successor. Despite announcements of reforming the system, Momoh kept Stevens’ 
cabinet largely in place and he did not manage to end or improve on corruption or the 
failing economy. The power of Paramount Chiefs and their families remained largely 
untouched in the post-colonial period. Briefly established legislative councils after 
independence were quickly abandoned with direct links of accountability established 
between the central government and the chiefs. This system remained in place 
basically until post-war governance reform in 2004, which saw the introduction of 
democratically elected local councils to liaise with the central government in 
questions of health, education, and agriculture.286  
 
The grave disparities in the country’s education system also have their roots in the 
division between the Crown Colony and the Protectorate under British colonial rule.  
One example is the establishment of one of the oldest university in sub-Saharan 
Africa in 1827, Fourah Bay College in Freetown, which was basically only 
accessible for the ruling Krio elite that resided in the capital.287 After independence, 
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although nominally free, many Sierra Leoneans could not afford school uniforms and 
materials and only attended school for less than 4 years for males and less than 2 on 
average for females.288 As a result, the rate of youth underemployment is estimated at 
roughly 80% for under 25-year olds before the outbreak of the civil war. 289 Labelling 
these youth as ‘unemployed’ is not really useful since everyone has to have some 
sort of income or occupation to merely survive, although very few are formally 
employed.290 The lack of educational opportunity and the very high rate of youth 
underemployment, combined with a demographic structure of over 40% of Sierra 
Leoneans being under 15 years old, created a base of young people that were 
disillusioned with their government, lacking educational opportunity, who see the 
profits of their resource-rich country going to international business and rent-seeking 
domestic elites.291  
 
The Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) was another institution that 
suffered under the saw largely inefficient leadership of the Stevens and Momoh 
regimes. Immediately after independence from the British in 1961, most officers in 
the Sierra Leone security forces were British. Under Albert Margai, the military went 
through a period of ‘Africanisation’, resulting in the recruitment and promotion of 
predominantly Mende senior officers from the South and the East of the country. 
Siaka Stevens, from 1968 onwards, played on the already existing ethnic and 
regional rift in the military by further politicising recruitment patterns. A so-called 
‘Tribal Returns Policy’ was instituted, meaning a scan of all ranks according to their 
ethnic composition, leading to the release of many Mende soldiers regardless of their 
qualifications. Somewhat random recruitment assessments, like being able to lift a 
bag of rice over your head, were established in 1969.292 The resulting lack of 
professionalism and discipline among new recruits were not remedied in the next 20 
years preceding the outbreak of the civil war. Furthermore, Stevens strategically 
underfunded the already poorly equipped military to minimise the risk of a coup 
d’états.293 After years of underfunding, lacking discipline, arbitrary recruitment 
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criteria and using the military to crush political opponents, faced with an armed 
rebellion in 1991, they had little to put up against the RUF. 
 
Increasing frustrations with the patrimonial and corrupt system, which did not deliver 
the expected and promised improvements after independence, especially among 
young people in the country, would sow the seeds for the roots of the civil war in the 
1990s.294 The domestic economic conditions in Sierra Leone are inextricably related 
to, and oftentimes caused by international developments. For example, by 
independence in 1961, minerals accounted for 87% of all exports, 70% of which 
were diamonds, which made the country’s economy vulnerable to fluctuations in the 
international market. Furthermore, since diamonds were only mined in Sierra Leone 
but not transformed, the revenue from this most profitable value-adding process did 
not stay in the country but almost exclusively benefited the international diamond 
industry.295 All throughout the 1970s and 1980s, extremely high levels of foreign 
debt, as well as worsening terms of trade jeopardised the country’s limited export 
commodities.296 Structural adjustment policies attached to loans and enforced by the 
World Bank and the IMF, including strict regulations of public spending and market 
liberalisation, only exacerbated economic inequality and instability rather than 
promoting growth.  
 
The absence of educational and economic opportunities for regular Sierra Leoneans, 
the exploitation of the countries’ resources by international diamond businesses 
without benefiting the local population, stringent structural adjustment policies that 
stifled any economic growth and did not contribute to reducing the over 80% of 
people living under the poverty line but instead even widened the extremely unequal 
income distribution297, and the role of the military were some of the factors that 
encouraged a growing frustration, especially among the younger, rural population of 
Sierra Leone.  
5.2.3 Civil War  
Apart from understanding the power structures within Sierra Leone that had been 
established in the past centuries and decades, paying attention to the history of the 
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civil war is also crucial to make sense of the international intervention that followed. 
In 1989, civil war had broken out in neighbouring Liberia. Inspired by Charles 
Taylor’s advances—he managed to lay siege on Monrovia within 6 months of 
entering the country—and trained by Qaddafi’s forces in Libya in the late 1980s, a 
group of Sierra Leoneans, led by Foday Sankoh, who had been detained for 
participating in a mutiny against Siaka Stevens years earlier, entered Sierra Leone via 
the Liberian border in the Southeast.298 A child protection worker from Kailahun 
province, where the war started, describes the sentiment in the early stages of the 
conflict:  
The war was not religious or by region, it was the war against the 
government. Along the war, the ideology changed. It was not about saying 
you are from this village, you are from that—we did not have a problem with 
that. People initially believed that the war was a necessity because they were 
always saying: “With the struggle in this country, we need war! We need 
something to change!” War was going to be the answer to our plight and so 
many people wanted war, especially in the beginning.299 
 
The group around Foday Sankoh and later Sam Bockarie, Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, 
and Augustine Gbao300, called itself the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and 
vowed to overthrow the Sierra Leone government, the Freetown elite, and to fight for 
the Sierra Leonean people.301 Within months, the RUF had gained control over the 
diamond mines in Kono in Eastern Sierra Leone and by the end of 1991, they held 
about two-thirds of the country. At this point, Freetown still felt like a world away 
with news from the provinces coming slowly and life on the peninsula continuing 
without much disturbance.302 By 1994, the RUF leadership largely abandoned their 
revolutionary rhetoric, which had been prolific until then, and started to shift its 
tactics to guerrilla warfare.303  
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The main opponent of the RUF in these early stages of the war was the small, 
undisciplined, untrained, and heavily underfunded Sierra Leone Army (SLA). In 
April 1992, a group of young SLA officers, including now President Julius Maada 
Bio, ousted General Momoh’s regime and installed the 25-year old Valentine 
Strasser as the head of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), putting 
Sierra Leone effectively under military rule. Faced with rapid RUF advances across 
large swathes of the country, the SLA started an intense recruitment drive without 
paying much attention to the potential qualifications of their recruits. As described 
above, discipline was already lacking in the troops and many of the new recruits 
were unemployed young people from around the big cities, mainly Freetown, who 
were largely illiterate and not necessarily committed to defending the Sierra Leonean 
government.304 As established in the previous chapter, exact numbers of child 
soldiers serving in any of the armed factions are difficult to obtain. Nonetheless, 
McKay and Mazurana estimate that there were up to 3,500 children within the SLA 
during the conflict.305 Until today, government representatives officially ascribe any 
children that were found serving in the SLA at the time as ‘accidental recruits.’306 
However, it seems to have been the case that recruiters at the time were deliberately 
ignoring the age of their newest conscripts.307  
 
Despite some early successes of the NPRC regime, the RUF again seemed close to 
victory in early 1995: They were benefiting from extensive informant networks 
throughout the country, the frustration of rural communities with the central 
government and finally, the lack of discipline in the SLA. Much has been written 
about the ‘sobel’ phenomenon in Sierra Leone and other contexts, referring to 
soldiers of the regular state army who leave their uniforms behind to join the rebel 
forces at night: Soldier by day, rebel by night.308 The spreading awareness about this 
phenomenon led to further demoralisation of the committed SLA soldiers who would 
be unfairly accused of betraying their country.309  
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Faced with the rapid RUF advances, the Strasser government hired the South African 
Executive Outcomes (EO) security firm in 1995 to support the government forces.310 
A few months later it looked like the RUF could potentially be defeated as they 
retreated as far as Kailahun, where their headquarters were located. Meanwhile, in 
spring 1996, the central government agreed to host the first free and democratic 
elections since 1977—without having previously negotiated a peace settlement with 
the RUF. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, from the SLPP won the election, which was carried 
out despite massive voter intimidation and terror by the RUF, ending APC rule after 
over 25 years.311  
 
Around the time of the elections in 1996, the RUF had completed their change their 
tactics, shifting from fairly conventional warfare to guerrilla tactics. The RUF did not 
only boycott the elections, but they also engaged in a campaign of terror to 
discourage civilians from voting. Most infamously, the rebels took the SLPP 
campaign slogan ‘The Future is in Your Hands’ as cause to amputate many civilian’s 
hands—literally making it impossible for them to vote since voter identification by 
fingerprint was the norm.312 Along with its tactics, the RUF also updated its 
recruitment practices. Before entering Sierra Leone and in the early years of the 
conflict, the RUF largely relied on voluntary conscripts. ‘Sankoh systematically 
recruited largely uneducated, unemployed and unemployable youth to join a 
“movement” against the government’, argues Denov.313 The first recruitment drive 
did not specifically focus on children, although there are reports of a number of 
children joining the RUF voluntarily around this time. However, from the mid-1990s 
onwards, the use of very young children, as young as 7, in combat roles became part 
of the strategy of the RUF.314 Many scholars have written about the recruitment 
practices of the RUF and the reasons for their heavy reliance on child soldiers—some 
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estimates go up to a suspected 80% of RUF fighters being under the age of 18.315 The 
following chapter discusses child soldier numbers in greater detail.    
 
In terms of conflict dynamics, the government and its allied forces, EO, CDF and the 
Kamajors, controlled the large cities and roads while the RUF largely controlled 
backcountry roads and small villages. Seemingly having the upper hand thanks to EO 
and the Kamajors, Kabbah’s new government managed to negotiate the Abidjan 
Peace Agreement with Sankoh in November 1996.316 This deal would require EO to 
leave within 5 weeks and allow for the RUF fighters to be integrated into the SLA 
and the RUF to be transformed into a political party. After being unable to pay for 
EO until their scheduled departure and without any large-scale peacekeeping forces 
in place, the agreement quickly broke down when it became clear that neither 
Sankoh nor the rest of the RUF leadership had any real intention of honouring the 
agreement. The arrest of Sankoh in Nigeria in March 1997 and the military coup in 
Freetown two months later heralded the start of a new period in the conflict. Lead by 
Major Johnny Paul Koroma, disgruntled SLA officers who disapproved both of EO 
and the role the Kamajors played under the Kabbah government, formed the Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and announced that they had joined forces 
with the RUF—the very rebel force the Sierra Leone military had been fighting for 
the previous six years. The looting, destruction and violence that erupted in Freetown 
in the days after the coup d’états lead to over 400,000 refugees and finally attracted 
regional and international attention to the conflict.317 
 
In order to restore democratically elected President Kabbah, who had fled to Guinea, 
ECOWAS deployed up to 13,000 Nigerian-led ECOMOG troops318 who took on the 
AFRC/RUF and freed Freetown after nine months.319 Fighting again intensified with 
violence against civilians and war crimes committed by all sides. One date that is 
etched into the memory of all Freetowners is the 6th of January 1999. On this date, 
the RUF, with the help of former SLA soldiers, took the capital again, ‘resulting in 
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weeks of arson, terror, rape, murder and dismemberment.’320 Over 6,000 people died 
in Freetown alone with thousands of children reported missing—presumably 
abducted by RUF commanders to serve as new recruits. Kabbah, realising that the 
Sierra Leone military alone could not defeat the rebels, also knew that the UN would 
only deploy peacekeepers to the country after a peace agreement had been signed and 
thus reluctantly started negotiations on a peace deal in Lomé, Togo.321 
5.2.4 On the Way to Peace: Lomé and Beyond  
The Lomé Peace Agreement, signed by Sankoh and Kabbah in July 1999, is 
significant for a number of reasons: First, it officially ended hostilities and opened 
the door for a UN peacekeeping mission to be deployed to monitor the peace accord. 
In October 1999 the UNOMSIL observer mission changed into an active 
peacekeeping mission (UNAMSIL) with initially 6,000 troops being deployed. After 
initial struggles to deal with RUF aggression, the mission was gradually increased in 
size up to 17,500 troops in March 2001.322 Second, with a peace agreement signed 
and a peacekeeping mission deployed, efforts to start disarming the rebels and state-
allied non-governmental groups like the CDF and Kamajors could start (see later 
parts of this and the next chapter for more details on the DDR programme). Thirdly, 
the Lomé Peace Accord was the first peace agreement that explicitly included a 
stipulation about the demobilisation of any child combatants who participated in the 
war (see Article XXX: Child Combatants).323 Including provisions about child 
soldiers in peace agreements has since become a tool often used by UN actors in 
peace negotiations, for example in South Sudan, DRC, and Colombia.324 Disarming 
and reintegrating children is an issue on which warring parties can often agree on and 
can thus be used as a trust-building measure for more controversial negotiation 
points.  
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After Lomé, it took roughly another year before the fighting would actually stop. In 
spring 2000, the British government deployed roughly 1000 Special Forces to 
Freetown—first to evacuate UK citizens, then to assist UNAMSIL peacekeepers and 
secure the airport in Lungi, and finally to train SLA soldiers and oversee security 
sector reform (SSR).325 By the end of 2000, the RUF looked once again almost 
defeated. They were facing opposition from all sides at this point: Guinean forces 
from the North, international sanctions on Liberia limiting their weapons supply, a 
huge UNAMSIL force with a robust mandate, the British, increasing international 
attention on the ‘blood diamond’ trading and finally, a fighting force tired and 
disillusioned, who after 11 years of war, was ready to go home.326 President Kabbah 
declared the war officially over in January 2002 by which time the initial phase of 
the disarmament and demobilisation of combatants was concluded. 
 
A general election followed in May 2002, which solidified Kabbah’s majority. The 
RUF candidate Alimamy Bangura did not even win 2% of the vote. Up until today, 
Kabbah’s SLLP, who won the most recent elections in 2018 with Maada Bio as the 
presidential candidate, and the APC, who was in power between 2007 and 2018, are 
still the two main political parties. The following section will first briefly discuss the 
reasons for the extensive use of underage soldiers by almost all parties to the conflict 
in Sierra Leone before turning to the impact on children of the Disarmament 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process, which ran simultaneously to the 
peace process from 1998-2002. 
5.3 Child Soldiers and International Actors in Sierra Leone  
The extensive use of children by almost all parties to the conflict has a number of 
reasons and enabling factors. Disentangling these is not the focus of this thesis but 
based on the historical overview before, it becomes clear how generational power 
structures and disenfranchisement since the colonial age have contributed to creating 
a situation where the large-scale involvement of young people in a war ‘against the 
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establishment’ is not surprising. The main approaches in the literature are presented 
in the following paragraphs. 
 
Although problematic in his homogenising and generalising accounts of child 
soldiers internationally and even more so in his portrayal of ‘barbaric’ warfare in 
Africa, Rosen in his 2005 book ‘Armies of the Young’ gives a basic overview of the 
structural factors which enabled the use of child soldiers in Sierra Leone. His 
arguments have to be critically examined: He claims that young soldiers, roughly 
between 15-18, were part of militaries in ‘virtually every anticolonial war of 
liberation on the African continent’.327 While this might be the case, Sierra Leone did 
not fight a war for its independence in 1961 and neither was the recruitment of 
children a standard practice in the Sierra Leone Army prior to the civil war. Without 
making an argument for shared mechanisms or dynamics, it remains unclear why the 
histories of other places on the continent, for their geographical proximity and shared 
colonial history alone, should apply to Sierra Leone in the early 1990s.  
 
His other two points are more convincing but remain on a macro level: demographics 
and the conception of childhood. As mentioned before, over 50% of Sierra Leoneans 
were under the age of 18 when the war broke out, and still are today. He further 
refers to the boundaries between childhood and adulthood being drawn differently 
than in a Western context, potentially making military service a logical extension of 
the types of roles children were occupying in Sierra Leone before the war.328 Other 
authors, like Susan Shepler, argue along similar lines. She identifies youth practices 
in Sierra Leone, which were continued through child soldiering: Child labour, child 
fosterage, apprenticeship, and secret society initiation.329 Take the example of child 
labour: According to Shepler, some tasks, such as fetching water, cleaning, carrying, 
and buying things, were part of children’s’ lives in peacetime and it would not seem 
unusual that this labour is continued when part of an armed group.330 Similar 
continuities can be found when comparing practices the RUF or CDF employed 
when recruiting children: ‘asking’ parents to take their children (although at 
gunpoint), training them as fighters, or administering elaborate initiation rituals 
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similar to secret society rituals to mark the beginning of their time in the bush. While 
some of the ways child soldiering was structured during the war might bear similarity 
to how youth was governed in civilian life, these continuities do not help explain the 
extreme violence committed by some children and the complete upheaval of social 
hierarchies. When designing reintegration programmes post-conflict, taking only one 
perspective limits the understanding of the children’s experience. 
 
Championed by authors like Paul Richards and Krijn Peters, the ‘crisis of youth’ 
thesis has become a popular explanation both for the outbreak of the war and the 
high number of children and youth fighting in it.331 Relating back to the hierarchical 
and patrimonial structures solidified by colonialism and the failing educational 
system in the years post-independence, according to Richards, Peters, et al. young 
combatants participated in the war to fight for education, jobs and against ‘big men’, 
be it village elders or the government, taking advantage of them.332 When talking to 
recruiters directly, some of the common justifications and reasons for child 
recruitment as outlined in chapter four are mentioned: Children are believed to be 
more malleable, while at the same time more capable of committing atrocities since 
their moral compass has not been formed.333 The final section of this chapter gives a 
brief outline of the structure of the DDR programme before identifying the 
community of practice around it. 
5.3.1 The DDR Programme 
As early as 1993, the Sierra Leone Army released underage combatants to UNICEF, 
from 1996 UNICEF formalised this process by opening a few so-called Interim Care 
Centres in which released minors received shelter and basic services (medical care, 
clothing, food) while their families were traced for unification.334 At this stage, there 
was no comprehensive planning. Children were released from the army, briefly held 
by UNICEF until, ideally, their families could be found. There were no plans for any 
follow-up reintegration programmes after this initial unification. One former child 
combatant interviewed remembers being released from the army and put into a camp 
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managed by Save the Children in the North, towards the beginning of the war in the 
early 1990s. According to his own recollection of events, he decided to join the 
military after he managed to escape the rebels who had abducted him in Kailahun, 
his home district, several months before. After staying with Save the Children for a 
few weeks and attending some classes, he decided to return to the battlefield.335 
According to Brooks, this mirrors the experience of about 26% of children who were 
released in the early stages of the war and left the programme on their own volition 
without returning to their families.336  
 
Once the Lomé Peace Agreement was signed in 1999, more formal release and 
reintegration programmes started. The main way in which the international 
community was active in Sierra Leone with regards to child soldiers was through the 
organisation, planning, and implementation of the child section of the Disarmament, 
Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) programme, which ran in three phases 
from 1998-2002. Over 72,000 fighters were disarmed and demobilized and the 
lessons learned from the implementation of the programme in Sierra Leone were 
used to design similar programmes in Liberia, Burundi, and Haiti.337 
 
Although the DDR programme officially already started in February 1998, it proved 
largely ineffective even after the Lomé Peace Accord had been signed in 1999. 
Neither ECOMOG, nor the SLA, was able or willing to provide adequate protection 
for any disarmament camps and heavy fighting was still going on in the countryside. 
UNAMSIL was not sufficiently funded, the administrative processes not set up and 
effectively, there was no comprehensive programme in place until 2001. At that 
point finally, the RUF agreed to work with the government and international actors 
on disarmament and this is when large numbers of combatants were coming out of 
the bush to hand in their weapons.338  
 
Disarmament was commenced in reception centres for adult and child combatants 
alike. Here, fighters would hand in their weapons, register, and be processed. 
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Afterwards, adult ex-combatants were transferred to demobilisation centres to 
receive basic benefits, whereas children were transferred to the Interim Care 
Centres.339 Demobilised child soldiers were supposed to stay in the Interim Care 
Centres for a maximum of six weeks. During this time, child protection staff tried to 
locate family members of the children in their care to reunify them as soon as 
possible. When asking child protection workers in Sierra Leone what successful 
reintegration of a former child combatant ideally looks like, the emphasis lies on the 
return of the child to his or her home community and to resume living with their 
biological or extended family. A child protection worker who did psychosocial 
counselling and family tracing in the Interim Care Centre in Makeni at the end of the 
war summarises: ‘We don’t want to keep them [former child soldiers] in the ICC 
[Interim Care Centre] or orphanage homes. The best place for children to grow up is 
if they’re with family.’340 This logic assumes that there are functioning social 
systems, families and communities, for the child to return to—often not the case in 
post-conflict contexts—which we will return to in the following chapter.  
 
The Interim Care Centres were supposed to be a stopover on the children’s return to 
normal village life. A structured timetable, including classes, regular activities, group 
and individual counselling were meant to prepare the ex-combatants for submitting 
themselves to village hierarchies and structures again. Araphan, a child protection 
worker from Caritas Makeni, explains the approach: ‘[We tell them] you belong to 
that community no matter what. You still have to contribute to the development of 
that community. Those who took you to the bush did that against your wish. But you 
should realise that is your place where you came from and you should go back.’341 
The final step is the reunification with the family—biological or foster—and a plan 
for what follows after the release from the Interim Care Centre. Children could 
choose whether to return to school, start skills training, or receive some agricultural 
tools and return to their family farm.342  
5.3.2 The Community of Practice around Child Soldiering  
The next chapter goes into more detail about the strategies and practices of 
international actors in post-war Sierra Leone, especially around the implementation 
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and evaluation of the DDR programme but also around institutional learning and 
knowledge production. However, before delving into the details of the child 
combatant aspect of the DDR programme, which formed the basis of international 
activity regarding child soldiers in Sierra Leone, we first need to understand the 
different actors that make up the community of practice, which was involved in 
dealing with child combatants during and after the war. The crucial distinction is 
between those organisations, governmental, international, and local, that were 
officially associated with planning and implementing the DDR, thus directly 
associated with UNICEF, and those that operated on the margins or outside this 
process.  
 
Already throughout the conflict, some international and local NGOs, most notably 
UNICEF and organisations associated with the Catholic Church, had already been 
working on child protection issues.343 While access to children in rebel-held areas 
was often difficult to obtain, they did manage to work with the Sierra Leone Army 
and lobbied them to release child combatants from their ranks as the fighting was 
still ongoing. 
 
The key governmental organisation that officially oversaw the DDR process is the 
National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (NCDDR), 
established in 1998 and acting as a locally staffed Executive Secretariat and 
interagency coordinating committee. 344  This committee hosted the Technical 
Coordination Committee on a weekly basis, which brought all actors who were 
responsible for different parts of the DDR process together to share information and 
planning. This was a space where information and experiences were shared and new 
strategies developed in a volatile and fast-changing environment. UNICEF was part 
of this committee, however, the Ministry of Social Welfare (MSWGCA), which is 
the ministry responsible for child protection issues in Sierra Leone, did not 
participate in it. 345  As mentioned previously, the bulk of demobilisation only 
commenced from 2001 onwards. A Tripartite Commission, consisting of the 
Government of Sierra Leone, the RUF, and UNAMSIL officially took over the 
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planning and implementation of the entire DDR programme at this point, child and 
adult combatants alike. International actors regarded the participation of the 
government and the RUF in the same commission as a major success. 
 
Within the Tripartite Commission, the UNAMSIL Child Protection Advisor—the 
first of this kind to be deployed as part of a peacekeeping mission—often 
collaborated closely with child protection agencies that had good relationships with 
the different factions.346 This helped identify child combatants eligible for the 
programme but also encourage the use of releasing child combatants as ‘positive 
publicity for the factions and the political negotiators.’347 
 
The Child Protection Network, which was established in 1996 and lead by the 
MSWGCA, was funded and also mostly managed by UNICEF. This network was 
meant to bring together child protection agencies in the country and was responsible 
for setting up and maintaining the Interim Care Centres, to which disarmed and 
demobilised child combatants would be sent to receive counselling and wait for 
family reunification. Within the network, a Core Management Group emerged to 
deal with specific DDR related issues and difficulties arising in the Interim Care 
Centres. This Core Management Group met every two weeks but suffered from high 
staff turnover and a lack of direct lines of communication from the meeting to the 
implementing agencies in the Centres. There were seven main Interim Care Centres 
around the country which were run by Family Homes Movement (FHM) and COOPI 
in the Western Area around Freetown, by Caritas Makeni in the North, Christian 
Brothers and IRC in the South, and KDDO/Caritas Kenema, IRC, and Save the 
Children UK in the East.348 FHM, Caritas Makeni and Kenema, as well as Christian 
Brothers are Sierra Leonean organisations, COOPI is an Italian NGO, and IRC and 
Save the Children UK are international NGOs. These organisations were chosen 
since they already had capacity and a reputation to build on in the areas they were 
operating in. 
 
Outside of the official DDR process, a range of local child protection NGOs had 
already been active throughout the late phases of the civil war in the late 1990s. 
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These are often Sierra Leonean missionary or development agencies with a focus on 
children, such as Children Associated with War (CAW) or HANCI349, that have local 
expertise on the context and conditions in which children affected by the conflict 
have grown up, how they are placed in community structures, and therefore also how 
community reintegration strategies need to be set up to work. Shepler argues that 
these organisations largely based their work on Sierra Leonean models of child 
protection, such as fosterage.350 Even though these organisations largely continued 
operating in parallel to the UN structure, they were outspent by international donors 
and their partner organisations and their staff was often headhunted by UN-
associated NGOs.351 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided historical context to understand the background for the 
prevalence of child soldiers in the Sierra Leone civil war as well as introduced the 
relevant community of practice and the main set-up of the DDR programme. The 
next chapter unpacks the practices that make up the DDR programme and asks where 
these practices originated, who introduced them to Sierra Leone, and whether and 
how they were adapted to the specificities of the context at hand. It further explores 
how the child soldier was conceptualised in Sierra Leone as well as how the potential 
success of international activity was evaluated. Through highlighting these processes 
of knowledge production and institutional learning, we will start to understand how 
the international community of practice around combating child soldiering has (not) 
learned from the experience in Sierra Leone and how this will affect future cases in 
which they are active, such as Myanmar.  
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Chapter 6: Child Soldiering and International Actors in 
Sierra Leone: ‘The Best Practice Example Throughout the 
World’  
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I explore how the international norm against child soldiering is 
applied and implemented in Sierra Leone by contrasting the strategies and practices 
of international actors relating to child combatants in Sierra Leone as seen by the 
actors themselves and by domestic voices. The UN and other international actors 
largely saw the DDR programme in Sierra Leone as a huge success.352 As quoted 
proudly in an OCHA report, a World Bank official described the programme as ‘the 
best practice example throughout the world of a successful disarmament, 
demobilisation, reintegration programme.’353 Scholarly voices have been much more 
critical of DDR programmes in general, and of Sierra Leone and the child-centred 
aspects of them in particular.354 Domestic opinions in Sierra Leone also sounds quite 
dramatically different, for example: 
With the UN, they always want to have something to pinpoint as a success 
story. But you don’t need to be a rocket scientist to look at the situation in 
Sierra Leone and talk to a few combatants to understand that what happened 
here was a scandal. It’s a scandal! It’s a scandal, not a success. You talk to 
most of the combatants, they’ll tell you that their current status is worse off 
now than before the war.355 
 
Shedding light on the different markers of success, processes of institutional learning 
within the community of practice while in the country, the different timelines, as well 
as the perceived failure of reintegration efforts, this chapter is primarily focused on 
the DDR programme, since it was the most immediate, far-reaching, and 
comprehensive response by the international community regarding child soldiers in 
Sierra Leone. It also shows that underlying the planning and implementation of the 
DDR programme is the idea of the ‘universal child soldier’ embedded within the 
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international norm, which has lead to a reliance on preconceived notions about child 
soldiers as traumatised victims and thus missed to recognise potential agency child 
combatants have exercised in the war in post-conflict reconciliation efforts. 
 
The following section focuses on a number of different issues of the programme as it 
relates to child ex-combatants: First, drawing on existing literature and my fieldwork, 
I look at the continued and newly created practices that make up the DDR 
programme in Sierra Leone, focusing on whether and how international actors 
continued to use practices based on their experience in previous conflicts, whether 
they were adapted to the specific context and how they resonated with the 
participants and supposed beneficiaries. Second, I investigate processes of 
knowledge production both regarding the creation of a child soldier identity based on 
victimhood and also how success is measured regarding the activity of international 
actors. Third, I highlight the issue of girl soldiers as a particularly apt example of 
how institutional learning has taken place among international actors within the 
context of Sierra Leone. This shows how and why practices of norm implementation 
can change within one country context.  
6.2 Child Combatants and the DDR Programme 
How international actors assess the success of their norm-implementing practices is 
important for two reasons: First, if the lessons learned and measures of success 
suggest that a particular practice was successful and brought about the desired 
effects, the process of institutional learning that takes place on an international level 
afterwards is likely to result in that practice being implemented again in similar 
ways. Second, a stark difference between how beneficiaries and implementing actors 
evaluate the success of a given measure or programme might lead both to differing 
expectations about the goals of the intervention and whether they have been 
achieved, as well as to a potential decrease in legitimacy of the international actor if 
they are seen as having understandings of success that are not suitable or relevant for 
the context in question. 
 
The long-term aim of the DDR programme, and especially of the reintegration part, 




enable them to have a ‘normal’ life again.356 As we will see by the end of this case 
study, this long-term goal of international child protection actors rests on the 
assumption that childhood is a protected and innocent space, a time for play and 
education, which children can return to. However, this Western conception of 
childhood that I have shown to be embedded in the international norm against child 
soldiering, does often not match the lived reality of the children affected, thus 
making the framing of Sierra Leone as a ‘best practice example’ problematic.  
 
The main markers of success employed by the UN to evaluate the success of the 
DDR programme include the number of fighters completing all three steps of the 
programme, the number of guns collected from combatants and finally, the continued 
maintenance of peace. According to all of these markers, the DDR programme in 
Sierra Leone, indeed, counts as a major success. Over 72,000 combatants, among 
whom there were roughly 6500 underage combatants, started the programme, with 
circa 63,500 completing the final ‘reintegration’ stage. For adult combatants, the UN 
implemented a system where combatants could hand in their weapons in return for 
cash, access to the demobilisation programme, and support for post-conflict 
employment.357 This, along with several EU-funded projects focused on collecting 
any remaining guns after the completion of the DDR programme, led to one of the 
lowest rates of gun ownership in West Africa and worldwide.358 Lastly, despite some 
bouts of violence around the elections in 2007, 2012, and less so in 2018, Sierra 
Leone, in contrast to many post-conflict countries such as neighbouring Liberia, has 
not seen a return to war to date (2018).  
 
Regarding the demobilisation of child soldiers, there are more specific measurements 
of success. A widely cited number is from a 2004 UNICEF report, which claims that 
98% of all children who went through the DDR programme were successfully 
reunited with their parents, relatives, or siblings.359 International actors largely 
evaluate the DDR programme as a whole, citing the continued peace without a return 
to violence, the high number of participants and the cooperation of the RUF as 
contributors to success. While it is often acknowledged that programmes were 
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lacking in funding or less far-reaching than they were originally designed to be, the 
implementing parties rarely questioned the overall effectiveness of the programme. 
 
More critical scholarly voices emerged once the programme has been concluded and 
first evaluations were published, which superficially presented a successful picture of 
creating conditions for a democratic and prosperous future of Sierra Leone but 
ultimately showed that ‘the same old men are back in power, and women and young 
men are sidelined from the political process.’ 360  Most child rights and child 
protection officers who have continued working in the country after the DDR 
programme officially ended in 2002 concur with these critical voices about the 
alleged success of the programme. They differentiate between the disarmament and 
demobilisation elements and the reintegration part of the programme, evaluating 
them separately. That the programme overall produced some positive outcomes is 
attributed to ad hoc updates—the actors adapted and learned based on the situation 
they found themselves in—rather than systematic lessons learned from previous 
cases, such as Angola and Mozambique. In fact, although the child-focused DDR 
programme in Sierra Leone was differently designed in a number of ways, it still 
suffered from many of the same problems that both DDR and child protection 
interventions suffered from in previous cases.  
 
The second set of issues concern the goals of the programme, both in terms of 
content and in terms of timeline. The lack of long-term planning was often 
mentioned as the main problem with the DDR programme, both by beneficiaries as 
well as child protection specialists implementing it. As mentioned above, the main 
measure of success seemed to be the complete removal of guns from the hands of the 
people. While it is generally acknowledged that this is an important step, it cannot be 
seen as the most important indicator. ‘Disarmament was a success in terms of arms 
being taken away from everybody. In terms of looking after those that were 
combatants, I don’t think it was much of a success,’ according to Sierra Leonean 
journalist Umaru Fofana.361 McMullin in his 2013 book Ex-Combatants and the 
Post-Conflict State convincingly argues that DDR programmes inadvertently aim to 
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reintegrate ex-combatants into ‘poverty and socio-political marginalization that 
preceded and perhaps even provoked conflict.’362  
 
The director of Transition International Sierra Leone, a Dutch consultancy 
specialising in managing post-conflict societies, Ibrahim Bangura describes the 
outlook of the international community at the time:  
What the international community normally wants to see is the gun out of the 
hands of the combatants. For them, that’s a success. They look at very 
immediate approaches, rather than longer-term approaches. That’s why you 
see that most reintegration programmes are unsuccessful. You base the 
success of any particular case on the silence of the guns, that is why 15 years 
after [the end of the conflict] Sierra Leone is still contending with issues that 
we were contending with before the war.363 
 
Apart from the focus on collecting guns from children as the most important first 
step, the rest of the programme was clearly set out—in theory. As outlined above, 
after disarmament and demobilisation, the reintegration phase was supposed to 
guarantee a smooth transition between military and normal civilian life, as outlined 
in the previous chapter. International actors assume here that there is a ‘normal life’ 
within a family and a community with functioning social structures for the child to 
return to. As Peters in his study of young Sierra Leonean ex-combatants notes that 
the concept of reintegration suggests ‘re-entry to peaceful society, but does not ask if 
there is still something into which to reintegrate.’364 
 
It becomes increasingly clear that the measures of success for the reintegration of 
combatants, especially child combatants, differ significantly between international 
actors—who seem to mainly focus on disarmament and maintenance of peace—and 
child protection specialists who emphasise the opportunities children and young 
people have after going through a programme that they did not have before. Looking 
at how the DDR programme performed according to these different measures helps 
to understand how it can be perceived so differently. Mohammed Sannoh, who ran 
the Interim Care Centre in the Eastern province on behalf of Save the Children 
evaluates the success of the programme: ‘I think I would say, the DDR process was 
successful in the sense that we were able to disarm all of the children. But we did 
have a major problem of reintegration in the sense that families [were] rejecting their 
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children entirely.’365 Apart from long-term effects, scholars and practitioners have 
outlined the immediate problems with planning and implementation, such as the low 
number of children even participating in DDR or the mismanagement of expectations 
of the outcomes of the programme.  
6.2.1 Where are the Children? Low Participation of Child Soldiers in 
DDR 
To start with, estimates of the number of child soldiers who took part in the Sierra 
Leone civil war vary quite significantly. Many publications cite an approximate 
number of 10,000 children involved in the conflict overall, which originally stems 
from a UNAMSIL estimate.366 UN and NGO reports, as well as academics, agree 
that all parties to the conflict used significant numbers of children in their armies. 
There is further agreement that the RUF were among the most prolific users of 
children with estimates between 40% and 80% of their fighting forces consisting of 
underage recruits.367 Regarding children in the AFRC and the government-allied 
forces (SLA and CDF), the reported numbers are equally varied, ranging from a few 
hundred to up to a fifth of the 25,000 strong CDF alone.368 Taking the number of 
children who went through the DDR programme as the absolute minimum, estimates 
range from 6800 up to 15,000 child soldiers during the Sierra Leone civil war on all 
sides. Now, there are a few important notes to keep in mind regarding these numbers, 
echoing concerns raised in chapter four.   
 
Some of the discrepancies in numbers is caused by varying understandings of who 
qualifies as a child soldier according to the international norm in this context. 
Participating in the DDR programme required children to be active combatants. In 
the first stages of the DDR, having children assemble and clean a weapon was meant 
to prove their combatant status.369 As Mazurana and McKay note, even though this 
requirement was lifted soon after, implementing NGOs continued asking for 
weapons and demonstrated knowledge before being admitted to the programme.370 
Among the ex-combatants, and especially among child and female soldiers, this 
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prevented them from accessing or even considering participating in the DDR 
programme.  
 
Several NGOs, operating on the margins of DDR or outside of it, adopted broader 
definitions. Many children associated with armed forces did not bear arms or engage 
in combat directly. Instead, they were porters, messengers, lookouts, or cooks. 
Sometimes, their parents were fighters and they either followed their parents into the 
bush or were born into the group. Finally, girl soldiers largely went unaccounted in 
any statistic—only 8% of all children who went through DDR were female.371 
Firstly, due to a lack of awareness and misinformation that they, too, could be active 
combatants and secondly, due to the fact that they were often used as sex slaves or 
‘bush wives’. Finally, with fatality rates being high, especially for badly trained 
children in combat, the exact number of children who were fighters and died in 
combat is unknowable. Colonel Simeon Sheriff of the RSLAF, who was part of the 
military reintegration team for the Sierra Leone Army, comments on the numbers 
released by the UN: ‘That number [of child soldiers going through DDR] should not 
be a figure to rely on. They only wanted to report something.’372 So apart from 
diverging definitions about who ‘counts’ as a child soldier as a result of different 
understandings of the international norm, what were the reasons for the relatively 
low numbers of child soldiers participating in the DDR programme compared to 
adult combatants?   
 
First, there was a lack of incentive for underage soldiers to participate. While the 
DDR programme in Liberia offered cash rewards for adults and children alike who 
would hand in their weapons and demobilise, the NCDDR in Sierra Leone did not 
match this policy and only offered cash payments to adult combatants.373 Many of 
the children who were still associated with the RUF at the end of the conflict had 
retreated to rebel strongholds along the Liberian border in the South and East of the 
country. They were well aware of the deal their colleagues were getting in Liberia 
and saw little need to hand in their weapon without being compensated. Mohamed 
Sannoh, who ran the Interim Care Centre in Kailahun district in the Eastern Province 
on behalf of Save the Children, summarises the children’s rationale: ‘When money 
was taken away from the equation, the ex-combatant children were giving their 
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weapons to the adults—in fact, people who were never part of the fighting forces 
[…]. They would share the money. Some said if they’re not being given the money, 
why do they have to go through this process? They get nothing out of it!’374 
According to the former child reintegration officer of the NCDDR, some older 
children also disarmed as adults in order to still qualify for the cash benefits.375 
 
A second factor, which discouraged child combatants to turn to DDR, is the fear of 
potential negative consequences—both the fear of prosecution and the fear of stigma. 
There was no direct linkage between the Special Court of Sierra Leone, instituted in 
2002 to try war crimes perpetrated during the civil war, and the DDR process. 
However, in the eyes of combatants, there was often little distinction made between 
different interventions by international actors, be it the organisation of the DDR 
process, the Special Court or the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. McMullin 
argues that the creation of the Special Court contributed to the marginalization of ex-
combatants in post-conflict Sierra Leone as they tried to evade prosecution, driving 
them into the underground and preventing them from participating in reintegration 
programmes.376 Even though the Special Court of Sierra Leone explicitly did not 
prosecute underage perpetrators, it still exerted a deterrent effect for child soldiers to 
come forward and officially declare themselves. At times, this was due to a lack of 
information about the court or a distrust of the information that was available. There 
was uncertainty about whether underage combatants could be tried and even though 
they might not be tried now, it was unclear whether that might change in the future. 
Likewise, adult commanders were reluctant to present child soldiers as combatants 
and release them into the hands of international actors for fear that they might be 
prosecuted for the recruitment of minors.377 Instead, many child soldiers entered the 
system as ‘dependents’, evading being registered as combatants altogether. 
 
According to the head of the Interim Care Centre in Kailahun, Mohammed Sannoh, 
all these factors played a role in discouraging child soldiers to demobilise through the 
official channels. 
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They will take them to the Save the Children camp in Daru, and then what? 
Feed them three times a day and there is a big stigma that you have disarmed 
and apart from that? Nothing. So to them, that was not really useful anymore. 
Some had lived with their family in there. Like this one guy, his father was 
also a member. And so they just gave up the weapons and he said to his son: 
“Don’t go through that process because there will be stigma, they will come, 
they will have your name, they will call me, just go as a civilian!378 
 
Furthermore, ‘spontaneous reintegration’—a catchall term largely used by NGOs to 
describe all those who did not go through any formal programmes—was especially 
prevalent among children who had only been with the armed group/forces for a short 
period of time and those who had been associated with the CDF. Once the war was 
over, these children made their way back to their communities on their own, either 
because they have been released from their unit or they managed to sneak away. 
CDF fighters, as a community defence force, rarely moved far from their home 
villages, making a return to their families much easier than for RUF fighters who had 
often spent years in the bush and moved around the entire country. However, this 
also meant that CDF child combatants largely stayed within the patrimonial systems 
of power they grew accustomed to during the war and did not have access to any 
resources associated with the DDR or other local programmes, be it schooling, skills 
training, or psychosocial counselling.379 
6.2.2 Inter-agency Cooperation  
This case study focuses largely on ground-level practice, such as the difficulty in 
implementing the child DDR programme, which was the core activity of 
international actors relating to child soldiers in Sierra Leone. The level of inter-
agency coordination and cooperation is one aspect that affected how norm-
implementing measures, such as the DDR programme in Sierra Leone, were 
delivered and how they were perceived by local government actors and beneficiaries. 
 
A lack of coordination between different actors managing different parts of the 
process was one aspect—UNAMSIL, the government of Sierra Leone, and the RUF 
were largely responsible for overall planning, guaranteeing buy-in and cooperation 
from the rebel group; UN peacekeepers were largely responsible for receiving 
combatants; child protection and humanitarian agencies were responsible for running 
the Interim Care Centres; development and government agencies mostly did follow 
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up.380 With hap-hazard planning and a lot of improvisation in the early stages of the 
DDR, the first point of contact for disarming child soldiers was often non-specialised 
military personnel whose main intention was to direct the incoming combatants to 
the appropriate programmes and services. The advice they gave to underage recruits 
sometimes did not match the actual provisions and possibilities of the child section of 
the DDR.  
 
As a result of this lack of coordination between different parts of the community of 
practice, managing expectations among demobilising child soldiers became a 
problem. Hanlon speaks of a ‘crisis of expectations’ among ex-combatants in Sierra 
Leone, who anticipated jobs and opportunities to follow from their skills and 
vocational trainings but were repeatedly disappointed.381 This became especially 
relevant regarding underage soldiers who had taken up higher-level posts during the 
conflict, some even commanding their own units. These positions usually came with 
a very different lifestyle to their pre-conflict life: Commanders had cars, houses, 
often multiple girlfriends, and almost unlimited control over their subordinates. 
Convincing combatants, underage or adult, to hand in their weapons after the 
ceasefire, required international actors to create incentives—or at least create the 
appearance of incentives. Andrew Lavali, who worked as a counsellor for COOPI 
recounts:  
The biggest difficulty we had, from disarmament to the reception centre to the 
reintegration office, where we actually did the counselling, was that there 
was a big expectation. For him to disarm, as an ex-soldier, you need to give 
him big expectations about the role he is going to see. And offer him 
something. So we had exceptional allowances given to them. So later on they 
said: “Just go to Freetown, just go to Bo, just go to the reintegration centre 
and tell them what you want!” So a lot of them came saying they want tools, 
they want cars. They were told that if you go, if you chose a skill that you 
want to train in, the tool will be given to you. So if someone wanted to do 
driving, they’d ask: “Where is my car?” The programme itself did not 
manage expectations right.382 
 
There are several related aspects to the management and implementation of the 
reintegration component of the DDR programme as it relates to child combatants that 
have been flagged up by various authors: the type of skills training offered, the 
length of them, the lack of follow-up, and finally the role of girl soldiers. These are 
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examples of how institutional learning has taken place during the activity of 
international actors within the context of Sierra Leone. Moving beyond Sierra Leone 
in subsequent chapters will further investigate to what extent the supposed lessons 
learned have been transferred to later engagement with child combatants in other 
conflict contexts. 
6.3 Reintegration without Background Knowledge 
At the time, there was a lack of local expertise regarding child soldiers from a child 
protection perspective. This is not to say that there was no, or too little knowledge 
about child protection practices in Sierra Leone or that child protection was not 
practiced in families and communities but that it was not expressed in human rights 
or child rights or developmental language before the arrival of the international 
NGOs and UNICEF in the late stages of the civil war—this is the international 
community of practice around child protection that was mapped out in the previous 
chapter. These organisations came with staff, mostly from Europe or North America 
who have implemented development and post-conflict programmes in other 
countries, like Mozambique or Uganda, before and will move to other crisis 
situations after, like Liberia or Sri Lanka.383 Based on this practical knowledge from 
other contexts and confronted with a seemingly similar situation, they set out to plan 
reintegration projects and hire and train local staff.  
 
As outlined above, former child soldiers who had handed in their weapons and spent 
time in the Interim Care Centre could choose whether they wished to return to 
school, enrol in skills training or receive support to do agricultural work, i.e. return to 
their families’ farms with some additional tools or money. The most popular option 
was to enrol in skills training and learn a trade, such as gara tie-dying, carpentry, or 
masonry.  
 
It has been well documented that insufficient and diminishing funding affected the 
length and quality of the programmes and training offered.384 In its original planning, 
the different skills trainings were meant to last for at least nine months and result in 
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placing ex-combatants who had completed their training in jobs, provided by the 
National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA).385 These were jobs in sectors that 
were supposed to help the reconstruction of the country after the war, such as 
construction work. What actually ended up happening was a reduction in the length 
of training from one year to six months and finally to only about 3 months.386 
Colonel Sheriff from the Sierra Leone Armed Forces points out the inadequacy of 
these trainings, both because they were too short to adequately deliver the intended 
outcome and also because the trainees were not prepared to focus on learning a trade 
so shortly after leaving armed combat. He talks about the increased rate of serious 
car accidents in the years after the war: ‘Those are people they call DDR trainees. 
These drivers come from DDR, so people were not surprised. Sufficient training did 
not happen.’387 
 
There was a concern among people working on implementing these programmes as 
well as observers, that the kind of skills that were taught were inappropriate for the 
economic situation of Sierra Leone. Most cite the lack of opportunity mapping and 
market assessment prior to deciding which programmes to run as the main reason for 
this.388 The lack of market assessment to determine which skills could lead to future 
gainful employment is a well-known challenge of DDR programmes and has been 
well documented, for example by McMullin who finds similar dynamics in Sierra 
Leone and Mozambique.389 Ibrahim Bangura, who has consulted on post-conflict 
reintegration processes across several contexts in Africa, argues: 
The thing with international actors [is]: Sometimes they come in with 
preconceived notions and there’s an arrogance with that. Instead of trying to 
understand, they pretend they know. So you see a lot of copy and paste from 
Mozambique and Angola to the case of Sierra Leone. And again, one of the 
failures in terms of the programme in Sierra Leone, in Liberia, Mozambique, 
Angola, it was not based on assessments, it was based on assumptions. […] 
So, context-specific approaches [are needed], but that was not the case for 
Sierra Leone. They came in with preconceived notions and conclusions as to 
that which was needed.390  
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Child protection worker Kelfa Kargbo, who at the time worked for HANCI but is 
now the country director of Street Child in Sierra Leone, echoes this assessment 
about the skills training component of the DDR:  
I didn’t think they did any market analysis. That was one thing that was 
absent in the whole process. They came with ready-made ideas. “Oh we can 
train them in gara tie-dying, we can train them in soup making.” They didn’t 
look at how many people would need this, what is the market. Most of what 
the UN normally comes out with in most response programmes is mainly 
copy and paste. They don’t look at the local situation.391 
 
One story, which is repeatedly told by many of my interviewees, helps understand 
the mindset of many trainees who went through the DDR trainings: Depending on 
which training was attended, upon completion of the course, most trainees were 
given a set of tools, which were supposed to either enable them to start their own 
business or make them more attractive to potential employers. However, most young 
people who had been given these tools ended up selling them at the next street corner 
as soon as their training finished.392 ‘They sold everything and they came out three 
weeks later, they ended up becoming street boys and street girls,’ so Kargbo.393 
While this could be interpreted as short-sightedness and irresponsibility, it speaks 
more to the lack of hope and perceived opportunity on behalf of these young people 
as well as the potential unsuitability of the programmes offered. Some prominent 
examples include offering computer courses in a country with a barely functioning 
electricity network at the time and hardly any computers or offering driving training 
without providing any possibility to access vehicles.394 Due to the shortened skills 
trainings, the lack of market assessment, and the lack of coordination with the 
National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation, hardly 
any underage ex-combatants were placed in long-term gainful employment after the 
completion of their training.395  
 
With no families to go back to and no job prospects in an only very slowly 
recovering Sierra Leonean economy, many former child combatants ended up living 
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on the streets of Freetown, creating a previously unseen problem of street children.396  
Studies of the backgrounds of these street children show that most of them already 
experienced serious problems with their families and in their communities prior to 
becoming engaged with any armed group.397 This shows again that the presumption 
that children, who have been traumatised by their participation in conflict and gone 
through reintegration programmes, can return to their protected and innocent pre-
conflict lives with their families is often unfounded. Cubitt, in her study of youth in 
post-conflict Sierra Leone, has shown that trying to support a return to pre-conflict 
conditions does not address the marginalization of youth so prevalent in pre- and 
post-conflict Sierra Leone. Young people were and continue to be, partly due to the 
failed post-conflict efforts, perceived negatively, as lazy due to their unemployment 
and unreliable due to their uncertain living situation.398 
 
 
Thus far, there seems to be little indication for setting the groundwork for sustainable 
success of the programme. Another factor that complicated the long-term prospects 
was the limited follow-up after reintegration. Even though most government 
representatives until today emphasise the overwhelming success even of the 
reintegration part of the DDR, most practitioners lament the lack of funding and 
political will to ensure that former child combatants continue to receive support once 
they have returned to their communities. There is a mismatch here between the 
purported long-term goals of the child section of the DDR programme, especially the 
reintegration part, and the main measures of success of the programme.  
 
For example, the Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization 
and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) by the UN states that ‘child-specific 
reintegration shall allow a child to access education, a livelihood, life skills and a 
meaningful role in society. Successful reintegration requires long-term funding of 
child protection agencies and programmes to ensure continuous support for 
education and training for children, and essential follow-up/ monitoring once they 
return to civilian life.’399 On the other hand, many local child protection workers who 
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have worked within the DDR associated organisations had the impression that long-
term objectives were not at the forefront either of planning or implementation. In 
fact, McMullin argues that DDR was predominantly intended as a ‘cooling off 
period’ to provide short-term relief and not much else.400 According to Kelfa Kargbo: 
The UN will say it was a successful programme because they were looking at 
the short-term outcome rather than the long-term outcomes of their 
sustainable goals. It was more about “Yes, we’re going through this process 
and as soon as you get to this stage, you’re out.” And they count the number 
that go out of the programme, not really counting what is the transformation 
that has happened from the entry point to the exit point.401 
 
Similarly, child protection expert Mohammed Sannoh argues that ‘[…] the DDR 
process was seen more as an event rather than as a process. Particularly from the UN 
point of view, it was more about getting the arms out of the hands [of the 
combatants]. It was considered more of a security concern for the UN but then how 
do you manage that process? Not just as an event from the step of disarmament, but 
thinking about what goes into reintegration and ensuring that the process continues 
so that the children have what it takes to be responsible citizens.’402 However, former 
member of NCDDR and now head of the government’s National Commission for 
Children Olayinka Laggah explains that long-term development is not and should not 
be the goal of a DDR programme:  
The DDR programme is just basically to keep the combatants busy until the 
country develops the capacity to maintain them. A DDR programme is not a 
developmental programme; it’s an emergency programme. A programme to 
stop war until you are able to build and maintain the necessary infrastructure 
to maintain law and order and development. So people need to know that the 
DDR programme is not a development programme, I think that’s where 
people miss it.403  
Despite these diverging views, some measures were indeed taken to establish a 
structure within communities to provide points of contact for former child soldiers 
themselves and for their families. Child Welfare Committees (CWC) were set up at 
village level and child protection workers from various NGOs and UNICEF 
continued to visit specific children that had been reunited with their parents or foster 
families in the years immediately after the conflict ended.404 This capacity building 
was intended to provide child protection in the longer term. However, many of the 
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structures and institutions set up post-conflict were funded exclusively by 
international donor money. Immediately after the end of a civil war, that is not 
unusual or problematic as long as this influx of funds is used to set up sustainable 
structures and programmes.  
 
There was a general sense that this did not happen in Sierra Leone. Furthermore, 
there was a distinct lack of trained Sierra Leone personnel who were experts in 
trauma, counselling, or child protection. Without having invested in educating social 
workers, there was no sustainable base of experts to deal with the high number of 
children who needed longer-term support. 
 
This section has unpacked the core practices of international actors around child 
soldiering in Sierra Leone based on extensive secondary literature and interviews 
with former practitioners, mostly focusing on its core activity: planning and 
implementing the child section of the DDR programme. The rest of this chapter takes 
a closer look at how and why practices of norm implementation have changed within 
Sierra Leone as well as what the implications of this particular application of the 
norm are both on the former child combatants themselves and on the image of the 
child soldier more broadly. 
6.3.1 Inventing Practices – Healing Ceremonies 
As we have seen above, reintegration practices were often adopted by child 
protection workers from other contexts that they have worked in before, in the case 
of Sierra Leone especially from Mozambique and Uganda.405 One of the lessons 
learned there was that traditional healing ceremonies may often help the acceptance 
of former child combatants by their families and especially by their larger 
communities. NGOs and UN personnel thus started funding and encouraging these 
ceremonies, as a cheap and effective way to bring the community closer together and 
support the reintegration of demobilised child soldiers. As NGOs started to encounter 
difficulties in getting communities to accept their children back after the war, 
traditional healing ceremonies were one of the practices thought to be useful.406 Thus 
there was funding available both to find out about these practices and to implement 
them—a one-off healing ceremony for the entire village is definitely a more efficient 
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investment than say, funding psychosocial counselling for returning ex-combatants 
for months. However, ethnographic research shows that by and large, ‘in the case of 
Sierra Leone there was no such healing ritual […] but savvy local ‘healers’ were able 
to concoct a ritual that satisfied the international staff.’ 407  The underlying 
assumption, of course, being that all African post-conflict contexts must have similar 
‘local practices’, which can be easily transported from Mozambique to Sierra Leone, 
or to Darfur. This is particularly striking since it is indeed the international actors that 
teach ‘local practices’ back to Sierra Leonean communities—‘putting the 
“traditional” in its right place is an important part of its function.’408 When talking to 
representatives of these organisations now, e.g. UNICEF, years after their 
programmes have concluded, they still perceive these ceremonies as having been 
largely successful.409 
 
The previous section has shown how existing practices of reintegrating child soldiers 
have at times been unsuccessful in Sierra Leone either due to lack of sufficient 
funding and support as well as the failure to base or adapt to the local context for 
example in choosing which skills trainings to do. 
 
 
6.4 Institutional Learning: Encountering and Reintegrating Girl 
Soldiers 
Apart from adapting already existing practices to the Sierra Leonean context with 
varying success, international actors were also confronted with unexpected 
circumstances to which they had no ready-made response in their toolkit. According 
to Gross-Stein, it is precisely in these circumstances where existing solutions do not 
help in solving a newly encountered problem that institutional learning takes 
place.410 One particularly striking example to highlight the possibility of institutional 
learning within one country context is the case of female child combatants. In the 
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initial stages of the disarmament and demobilisation before 2002, hardly any women 
or female children went through the ex-combatant programme.411  
 
Although girls had been associated with fighting forces in many of the conflicts that 
international agency staff has previously been active in, their concerns were not 
incorporated into DDR and reintegration planning in Sierra Leone. 412  The 
participation of female fighters, adult and underage, in the liberation wars in 
Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Eritrea are interesting points of comparison.413 For 
example, Destacamento Feminino fighters in Mozambique largely joined the fighting 
on their own volition, motivated by liberation ideology, ‘a sense of freedom and 
camaraderie’.414 Some follow-up studies find that young women who had voluntarily 
participated in the conflicts in Angola and Mozambique report higher levels of life 
satisfaction, economic success, and feelings of empowerment post-conflict than 
women of similar backgrounds who were civilians throughout the war.415 Former girl 
soldiers in Ethiopia also reported feeling positively changed by their experience as 
fighters and none of the participants in Veale’s study regarded themselves as having 
been powerless or victimised.416 The situation for women and girls associated with 
fighting forces in Sierra Leone was arguably a lot less empowering, almost all 
women and girls experienced frequent sexual abuse by commanders and fellow 
soldiers. Nonetheless, given that many child protection workers who came to Sierra 
Leone had previously worked in contexts where they would have encountered female 
fighters, we might have expected this issue to feature in the programme planning to 
some extent. 
 
Indeed, most of the interviewees for this study, when asked about the key lessons 
that should be learned from the example of Sierra Leone, pointed to the situation of 
girls associated with armed forces and the lack of awareness and attention by 
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international and governmental actors in the beginning.417 The following section first 
shows the absence of planning for demobilising and reintegrating female child 
combatants, how the issue came to the attention of UNICEF and other organisations 
as well as how they adapted their programmes in turn as well as some of the 
problems they continued to encounter. Subsequent chapters will explore whether and 
how the lessons learned in Sierra Leone were incorporated into future programme 
planning. 
 
Mazurana and Carlson find that in Sierra Leone, only 506 girls were officially 
registered as disarmed by the NCDDR (of 6800 child soldiers going through DDR in 
total).418 Although many were recognised as children affected by war, which allowed 
them to receive support in refugee camps and access family reunification resources, 
they were hardly ever registered as ex-combatants but almost always as dependents. 
 
Many scholars have pointed out that the gendered dichotomy in conflict of ‘violent 
men and victimized women’ still largely applies.419 Women, and especially girls who 
participate in warfare as fighters thus ‘both disturb and complicate conventional 
notions of war’.420 Within humanitarian discourse as well as in parts of civilian 
society post-conflict, some of the themes I highlighted in chapter four become even 
more pronounced regarding girl soldiers: Even more so than male child soldiers, 
female child combatants are seen as innocent victims at the same time as being wild, 
‘bushlike’, and dangerous. The transgression of gender norms that prescribe women 
and girls to be passive and peaceful has at times lead to the presumption that female 
fighters are even more vicious and evil than men, possibly wanting to prove 
themselves by being more violent than their male counterparts.  
 
Often, as described before, accessing ex-combatant benefits required either the 
possession of a weapon or the ability to operate one. Araphan, a child protection 
worker for Caritas Makeni remembers the difficulties in identifying and reintegrating 
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girl soldiers: ‘Those girls, they couldn’t hand in their guns, they were not combatants 
officially, they were not actively participating. But if they [RUF] were moving from 
one point to another point, the girls would be there to carry arms, some foodstuff, 
cooking, washing, etc. So they were like that, and coming out to the community 
meant stigmatisation again. All of these things were challenges for them.’ 421 
However, it was not only the lack of attention from international actors but also the 
deliberate attempt by some rebel commanders to keep girls and women away from 
the official reintegration programmes and under their control. Sexual violence and 
rape were widespread within the RUF and other armed factions.422 Women and girls 
were often abused by various different soldiers or taken as ‘bush wives’ by higher-
ranking soldiers or commanders. Often, these women and girls had had children or 
became pregnant during their time in the bush and were closely associated with their 
commanders. This further complicated their access to resources dedicated to child 
combatants, since girls who had had a baby would largely be considered as women 
from that point onwards—without any resources specifically dedicated to adult 
female combatants, they were left without access to benefits.423 
 
All of these factors contributed to girls being largely unaccounted for in the formal 
DDR process. First of all, child protection workers setting up Interim Care Centres 
and designing reintegration programmes were not aware that there would be 
significant numbers of girls that were associated with armed groups but that they had 
also been fighting. 424  Girls were a significant part of child combatants in the 
government and especially the rebel forces, with estimates of up to 40% of RUF 
members being female.425 
 
Rosina Mahoi, who at the time was working for COOPI before later joining 
UNICEF, explains how the presence of girls in the armed forces slowly came to the 
attention of her organisation during their family tracing activities post-conflict:  
So whilst the DDR was going on, we were checking the database and we 
realised that a lot of children for whom parents were putting in tracing 
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requests, they were not coming through the system. So we started talking to 
children in the demobilisation centres and the ICCs [Interim Care Centres] 
and they told us they were girls, they were not boys. So we started where we 
had all the DDR centres, we started talking to people and doing some 
underground investigation and then we found out that there were girls that 
were left behind that were not brought forward. So we contacted the girls 
directly, we contacted them through children, through some of the 
commanders that were friendly to us and encourage them to come forward. 
Those were the girls that were referred to COOPI and to other agencies.426  
 
Outside of the official DDR programme, they were some ad-hoc projects emerging at 
the time, mostly in Freetown, run by religious initiatives, such as the Conforti Centre 
in East Freetown, which supported young mothers in reintegrating into their 
communities. The small number of girls who did participate in the DDR found 
themselves facing a number of unique issues, for example, the lack of safe sleeping 
accommodation separated from male soldiers and no access to appropriate medical 
care and female hygiene products.427 
 
Identifying girl soldiers who have been associated with armed forces required a 
special effort. The same can be said about the later stages of the process: 
reunification with their families and the reintegration into their communities. Several 
child protection experts agreed that the most difficult group of ex-combatants to 
reintegrate were women and girls who returned from the war with babies.428 It was 
not uncommon that families and communities were willing to accept their own child 
back but were unwilling to accept a grandchild conceived of rape or a relationship 
with a rebel commander. Community pressure led to young mothers having to move 
away from their community, often ending up involved in sex work in Freetown.429 
Mohammed Sannoh, based on his experience of running the Interim Care Centre in 
Kailahun and working with Save the Children for many years after, says about the 
problem of young mothers after the conflict that ‘the DDR process didn’t know that 
these things would come up and you have to plan for them.’430 
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Mazurana et al. highlight another dimension in the limited attention that is given to 
girl soldiers, both in discourse and practice. If there is any mention of female 
children being associated with armed groups, it is almost exclusively in the context 
of extreme sexual violence and abuse and in their role as ‘bush wives’.431 Even more 
so than with boy soldiers, their victimhood becomes the only marker of their identity. 
However, a number of studies on various armed conflicts around the world have 
shown the variety of roles women and girls occupy in armed groups, including active 
combat.432 The same applies to girl soldiers in the RUF (and to a lesser extent the 
CDF, AFRC and SLA). Ethnographic research shows that almost everyone received 
combat training upon joining the armed group, regardless of gender and many female 
members of the group were also active fighters.433  
 
While everyone who mentioned girl soldiers in the interviews for this thesis spoke 
about the trauma and abuse suffered by these girls and the difficulty of reintegrating 
them, no one mentioned that some of them had taken on these traditionally male-
dominated roles like taking up arms or leading a battalion. The reversal of traditional 
societal norms about age and seniority seems to have coincided, at least in some 
cases, with the potential to reverse traditional gender norms as well. This is not to say 
that women and girls were not victims of frequent rape and abuse but that, as Coulter 
argues, ‘the notion of victim has been appropriated by humanitarian agencies and 
quantitative conflict analyses in such a way as to make “victim” synonymous with 
“lack of agency”’, thus, although unintentionally, negating and concealing other roles 
these girls might have played or how they might be seen by their communities upon 
their return.434 
 
When asked about the crucial lessons learned from the Sierra Leone example with 
regards to the reintegration of child soldiers, paying attention to the girls associated 
with armed groups was among the most prominent issues mentioned. Reflecting on 
the lack of attention these issues have in other contexts, such as Myanmar, David 
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Lamin from UNICEF comments about Myanmar: ‘It will come up. It will definitely 
come up. [laughs] People were focusing on boys here, too.’435 
6.5 Knowledge Production: The Making of the Child Soldier in Sierra 
Leone  
International child protection agencies, when starting to work on the reintegration 
side of the DDR programme, soon realised that the ex-child combatants were often 
not welcomed back with open arms into their home communities as already 
mentioned in the previous section. While families were often willing and happy to 
accept their lost children back, other members of the community were often less 
welcoming.436 The role of stigma as a challenge regarding child soldier reintegration 
has been studied in various contexts, from Northern Uganda to Nepal.  
 
This was mostly due to atrocities those children had committed in their home 
communities. Part of the RUF strategy of ensuring that new recruits, especially 
abducted children, would not escape and run back to their villages was to force them 
to burn houses as well as kill, maim, or rape relatives and community members.437 
According to one former child soldier who now goes by the name of Lash and lives 
in Kroo Bay in Freetown, many of his neighbours in Kroo Bay are former child 
combatants who would like to go back to their communities. But since they had all 
committed atrocities in their hometowns, this was impossible.438 
 
Even if children did not perpetrate violence against their communities, there were 
still a number of factors hindering their reintegration. First, especially children who 
were fighting for the RUF were often in the bush for many years. Abducted or fallen 
into the hands of the rebels in their teenage years, some children grew up in the bush 
for often over 5 years. By the time the war ended, these young adults got used to an 
independent lifestyle, having their own money, cars, girlfriends, and subordinates. To 
reintegrate into village hierarchy meant giving all this up and subordinating 
themselves to the rule of the chief and the elders.  
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In the language used by child protection workers in local and international NGOs 
after the war ended, the perception of child soldiers within their communities was 
often described in terms of ‘stigma’. This relates both to what former child 
combatants did during the war and what can be expected of them in the future. 
Returning women and girls faced their own set of problems and trauma. Several 
child protection workers reiterated that the most difficult group of ex-combatants to 
reintegrate were women and girls who had become mothers during their time with 
the fighting forces as we have seen.439 Mazurana et al., among others, have shown 
that girls returning as mothers from their time with an armed movement are often the 
most stigmatised group.440 David Lamin, who has worked for UNICEF for over 20 
years explains:  
Stigma was attached for both sexes, boys and girls. First of all, they see the 
boys as murderers so people were afraid to associate with them. They also 
see the girls, some of them, as sexually exploited, some of them came with 
babies, some of them are pregnant. So that was also stigmatising for the girls 
and their families.441  
One former child soldier interviewed remembers that when he briefly returned to 
school after the end of the war, the other children and even the teachers were afraid 
of him.442 He also cautions:  
Sometimes we over-exaggerate the stigma. That is normal; people like to 
blame someone for everything. You have a small riot somewhere and then 
they say: “Oh it's these rebel children, DDR children.” Sometimes you check, 
none of them were even involved. Nationally, they became scapegoats for 
things that happened, quite strongly in most cases. But a good number of 
them did not even want to be associated with this anymore, they just wanted 
to live their lives.443  
As outlined above, the anticipation and in later stages also the experience of this 
mechanism, prevented some children from accessing resources or registering as 
combatants in the first place. 
6.5.1 Victim Narratives 
As a response to these reactions in the communities, child protection agencies, 
guided by international human rights language and child rights discourse, in 
particular, found that the most effective way of convincing families and communities 
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to accept former child combatants back into their community was to frame them 
exclusively as victims. This is not to say that many child combatants in Sierra Leone 
were not victims, of abduction, violence, and abuse, or that they did not experience 
trauma as a result. Instead, as Denov and others have pointed out, by framing them 
solely as victims, we might miss or silence instances of resilience, participation, and 
resistance, which describe a much more multifaceted and multi-layered 
experience. 444  One prominent example of how former child combatants have 
collectively exercised agency after the war, rather than conforming to a passive 
victim status, are so called Okada drivers, motorcycle taxis in the main cities of 
Sierra Leone. Through innovative job creation and organisation, former child 
combatants created a livelihood for themselves without interference by international 
actors.445 
 
Nonetheless, international actors predominantly brought forward the victim 
narrative, which in turn produced certain patterns, some of them lingering until 
today. A former organising member of the NCDDR who is now the head of the 
National Children’s Committee in Sierra Leone describes the situation of former 
child soldiers after the war:  
The child combatants were all vulnerable. The mere fact that they were 
abducted from their homes and they were used to fight, they were vulnerable 
automatically. They’ve been exposed to drugs, exposed to all sorts of things. 
The girls have been abused by so many men. They are so vulnerable, there’s 
no way you can say they’ve been using them and say they’re not victims. Of 
course they were victims! Of circumstance and victims of institutions they had 
no control over. Because their villages were overrun by rebels and the rebels 
abducted them. There was nothing they could do.446 
 
This quote highlights a number of issues outlined in chapter four that this thesis will 
return to in chapter nine. First, it is frequently mentioned that children are abducted 
and that this is the primary way they become associated with armed groups. Indeed, 
most underage soldiers became part of the RUF after the rebels had overrun their 
villages and separated them from their families. As mentioned before, as part of this 
initial abduction, children were sometimes forced to kill, mutilate, and rape members 
of their community or burn down houses to make sure they would be no longer 
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welcomed, even if they escaped.447 Sannoh describes how Save the Children used 
theatre in their community reintegration work to make parents, as well as community 
leaders, understand that the children did not choose to join the RUF but were 
abducted.448 While abduction was the main recruitment pattern for underage fighters 
in the RUF, it was not as common for the AFRC and government-allied forces, such 
as the CDF and the Sierra Leone military. The previous chapter has shed some light 
on the recruitment practices of these groups already. While the CDF and Kamajors, 
on the whole, did not abduct children, there was immense community pressure to 
join the defense of the villages for every able man—often including under 18-year-
olds.  
 
The second theme contributing to the victim narrative is the absence of responsibility 
for crimes committed by child soldiers. Many former fighters recount the continuous 
use of drugs throughout their time in the RUF, especially before combat. While often 
deliberate, to increase battle prowess, many children were administered drugs 
forcibly or without being aware of it.449 The main claim here is that while child 
soldiers may have committed atrocities, they did not know what they were doing. 
They did not choose to mutilate or kill civilians but were forced to do so in a drug-
fuelled rage.   
 
Thirdly, while most child combatants internationally are between the age of 16 and 
19, the Sierra Leone civil war was characterised by the use of very young fighters. It 
was not an unusual sight to have 9 or 10-year olds in active combat and some 14-
year-olds were commanding units of men much older than them. The argument 
brought forward by some RUF commanders for their use of children as young as this, 
who arguably lack certain physical attributes necessary for prevailing in combat is 
their malleability and that they become attached to their unit as if it were their 
family. Having lost their families as a result of the war or the rebels themselves, they 
have nowhere to return to. This attachment, combined with physical, mental and 
sexual abuse created a setting that normalised and even celebrated violence. Along 
with the drug abuse, the physical, mental, and sexual abuse many child combatants 
were exposed to contributed to the abdication of responsibility for any acts 
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committed by these abused children themselves. All of these aspects make sense 
within the victim narrative adopted by international actors.  
 
The focus on the child soldier status as victims was also largely reflected in the 
institutions that were set up post-conflict. After some debate, the Special Court did 
not consider any underage combatants as perpetrators. Somewhat of an exception, 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission invited children to give testimony, not just 
as victims but also as ‘child perpetrators’.450 Several child protection workers at the 
time remember advocating for the treatment of children as victims; by the 
government as well as UNAMSIL staff:  
There was advocacy when the Special Court was set up. They wanted to try 
children. So the child protection community mounted a strong campaign 
saying children are victims, we should not hold them accountable and try 
them. That was very successful. There was also advocacy for the design of the 
whole DDR itself so that children’s issues would stand out, separate from the 
adult issues. Within UNAMSIL itself, they had a child protection officer, who 
ensured that children’s issues were not hidden under the carpet but were also 
treated separately and with respect.451 
 
Victimhood as a narrative and assigned identity for child soldiers was thus a tool 
used by child protection workers and aid agencies to ensure that children had the 
possibility of being reintegrated into society. The emphasis on victimhood and not 
having acted on their own volition was made both towards the affected children and 
their communities. In his now famous account of his experience as a child soldier for 
the SLA, Ishmael Beah writes in his 2007 memoir A Long Way Gone about his time 
with a counsellor at the Interim Care Centre: ‘”None of these things are your fault,” 
she would always say sternly at the end of every conversation. Even though I had 
heard that phrase from every staff member—and frankly I had always hated it—I 
began that day to believe it.’452 A former HANCI and a UNICEF staff members 
reflect on this phenomenon: 
I know the victim syndrome cuts across. Generally, when I put on my hat of a 
child protection expert, then I would say yes the children are victims. But 
actually when I step back, I would say: “Hold on, are we sure every child 
was a victim?” That would be my position actually. I wouldn’t agree that 
everyone was a victim.453 
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They moved on, they didn’t want to be associated. Some of them were shy, 
they didn’t even want to talk about it. Some of them volunteered but most of 
them were forced into this. When you talk to them on a one-to-one basis, they 
want to speak without the elders; they want to speak their mind. You give 
them the opportunity to tell you. Some of them were proud of what they 
did!454 
 
These are not necessarily mutually exclusive accounts. Rather than assuming a fixed 
identity and set of emotions associated with their time with the armed forces, 
children adopted multiple ‘identity narratives’ depending on who they were 
interacting with. Ethnographic researchers have observed how some children very 
explicitly take on this victim role when interacting with NGO staff.455 They quickly 
learned the key aspects associated with this assumed identity and would respond 
within the expected parameters, i.e. emphasising that they were forced to fight, 
commit atrocities, or take drugs. These roles change depending on which context the 
children were interacting in: Around village elders and their parents, they largely 
avoided talking about their participation in the fighting at all, whereas when 
surrounded by other ex-combatants, they often boasted about their deeds.456 This 
‘social navigation’ among former child soldier communities has been studied for 
example by Denov and Buccitelli who find that ‘young people living in the context 
of war assess the changes within their socio-political environment, evaluate the 
emerging possibilities […] and accordingly, direct their lives in the most beneficial 
and advantageous way.’457  
 
The next section shows how the creation of the child soldier identity as a victim by 
the community of practice misses important parts of what childhood means in Sierra 
Leone, how communities perceive ex-combatant children, and how sustainable 
reintegration might be achieved. The implications of these omissions are a silencing 
of alternative conceptions of childhood and what post-conflict reintegration might 
look like in Sierra Leone as well as the justification for intervention by the 
community of practice since they hold the knowledge and expertise about the 
‘correct’ model of childhood. 
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6.5.2 Child Rights Convention meets Chiefs  
Returning to the starting point of this section, there are a number of inconsistencies 
in how the role of children is conceived in Sierra Leone and how this notion has 
changed from before the war to during and after. There is a certain agreement among 
researchers that generational conflict and disillusionment of the young generation 
was part of the list of grievances that led to the outbreak and spread of the war in the 
early 1990s.458 Sierra Leone was largely a gerontocracy at the time, characterised by 
the elevated role of chiefs, elders, and parents in the community. Children and young 
people are mainly in supportive roles around the house or the farm, having to pay 
respect to community leaders. They are at the bottom of the social hierarchy, which 
was solidified by British colonial rule, continued through decolonisation and the 
years of increasing corruption in the 1980s. Values of humility and hard work were 
praised and the youth’s contribution to the community was valued according to those 
markers. 
 
It is worth noting here how this role is significantly different to how children’s lives 
are imagined according to international human rights instruments, most prominently 
the Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC). The CRC, as described in more 
detail in chapter four, emphasises the rights of children vis-à-vis their parents, 
community, and society at large. However, the distinction between these two modes 
of understanding childhood is not as simple as it might seem at first—it is worth 
disentangling and exploring their relation a little more, especially in terms of what 
reintegration would look like for child soldiers. 
 
The CRC stipulates a set of children’s rights, stating the need of children for 
safeguarding and care. Most rights that are established in the convention are meant to 
enable a ‘full and harmonious development of [their] personality’, allowing children 
to become full members of society once they grow up.459 Childhood, as defined in 
international law as lasting until age 18, is conceptualised as a phase in life for 
playtime (Art. 31) and education (articles 28, 29). Underlying these stipulations is the 
idea that the protection of childhood is necessary to ensure children grow up to be 
responsible members of society. This further implies that at this time, they cannot be 
expected to make responsible decisions, be held accountable for their actions or 
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indeed have political agency. In fact, it is assumed that, in the present, the innocence 
of childhood must be protected to allow children to exercise agency in the future. 
Emphasising that children have rights must be followed up with the question: Rights 
to do what? From a Western/CRC point of view, the answer is the right to play, learn 
and be largely shielded from any political involvement—a distinctly apolitical 
conception of childhood.  
 
Part of the scepticism of some Sierra Leoneans of the CRC is the result of a different 
notion of childhood. Conceptions in Sierra Leone focus on the active role of children 
in the maintenance of the community, they have responsibilities towards their elders, 
which they are expected to fulfil.460 These include contributing to family income, 
paying respects to parents and chiefs as well as fulfilling these roles with humility 
and subordination. There is less of an emphasis on protecting the innocence of 
childhood and this opens up the potential of political agency, and even the possibility 
for political revolt. While children are expected to be humble and submissive, they 
are held responsible for their actions. The civil war thus signified a dramatic rupture 
in these established relationships. With Small Boy Units raiding villages, 14-year-
olds forcing village chiefs to run errands for them, humiliating and sometimes killing 
them, the decade-long power relationships were turned on their heads, despite 
seemingly continuous practices. The reactions of most communities to encountering 
child soldiers in the civil war were in line with previously held opinions about 
childhood and agency: Children joining and fighting for armed groups were thought 
to have chosen to do so. They could have equally chosen not to commit atrocities, 
leave the armed group or stayed out of trouble entirely. This attitude carried over to 
post-conflict perceptions of former child soldiers. They were often held accountable 
for their actions and condemned for the atrocities they committed, making it 
impossible to return to their home communities. Although this is what international 
actors tried to address with their emphasis on victimhood, neither communities nor 
former child soldiers themselves seemed to have universally accepted the 
international narrative.  
 
Nonetheless, both former child combatants and communities saw the opportunities 
that came with framing their war-time experiences in the language of the 
international norm against child soldiering, as we have seen before regarding 
                                                




traditional healing ceremonies and social navigation. In post-conflict Sierra Leone, 
the idea of returning to village life, for many young fighters, meant returning to a life 
where they had no agency, no influence, and no power.461 Having access to the 
victim narrative provided by international actors and using this identity strategically 
to access benefits and resources allowed them to control how they were perceived by 
their communities as well as improve their socioeconomic situation: They exercised 
agency in post-conflict society by claiming non-agency during wartime. This goes 
along with embracing, what Shepler calls ‘discourses of abdicated responsibility’462 
and reframing their experience as shaped by abduction, abuse, and trauma rendering 
them innocent regarding the crimes they may have committed.  
6.6 Conclusion 
The last two chapters have unpacked the myth of the successful response of the 
international community of practice to the recruitment and use of child soldiers in the 
Sierra Leone civil war as an ideal case to build future interventions on. Chapter five 
contextualised child soldiering and the Sierra Leone civil war from a historical 
perspective, remaining sceptical of any generalisations of this conflict as ‘typical’ 
and representative of post-Cold War civil wars in Africa as well as introducing the 
community of practice as the key implementing actor of the international norm 
against child soldiering.   
 
I have further shown that certain structures that enabled the outbreak and large 
participation of youth in the conflict in the first place have remained untouched or 
were even reinforced by post-conflict reintegration efforts, such as encouraging ex-
combatants to subordinate themselves again to the same village power structures they 
fought against or by not creating sustainable economic opportunities, fostering youth 
unemployment rates similar to pre-conflict levels. The inefficiency of the 
reintegration part of the DDR programme as it applied to children was highlighted by 
exploring the criticisms of scholarly literature and local child protection experts of 
the planning and execution of the programme in hindsight from lack of funding, to 
short-term planning and questionable framing of children’s agency (‘victim 
syndrome’). Relying on practices that were developed in other contexts, such as 
Mozambique or Uganda, and then transplanted into Sierra Leone, were shown to be 
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inadequate in responding to the specific situation in Sierra Leone. Nonetheless, this 
chapter has highlighted instances of change in norm implementation practices, where 
international actors realised that their established set of practices was insufficient or 
inadequate for the given context. Looking at the issue of girl soldiers and healing 
practices has drawn out these processes of (failed) institutional learning.  
 
Through the predominant framing of child combatants as innocent and traumatised 
victims, the community of practice around this issue in Sierra Leone has contributed 
to (re-)creating and reproducing the image of the universal child soldier as it is 
embedded in the international norm. Many child protection workers who are still 
working in the country—meaning mostly Sierra Leonean staff—emphasise the 
problem of perceiving all underage ex-combatants as a homogenous group: young, 
male, and victimised, which leads to the neglect of female children associated with 
armed groups and the silencing of the varied experiences child combatants had. 
Although many child soldiers were victims of their experience, by emphasising only 
this one aspect of their involvement, the international community created a specific 
child soldier identity, based on conceptions of childhood embedded in international 
law and human rights discourse, focused on their status as victims, which had to be 






Chapter 7: History and Child Soldiering in Myanmar  
 
 
Image 6 Map of Burma463 
7.1 Introduction 
As the previous two chapters have shown, Sierra Leone was one of the earliest cases 
in which the international norm against child soldiering, as it has become 
institutionalised on the international level, was applied. It was one of the most 
                                                




important cases for developing and advancing the strategies of implementing the 
norm against child soldiering by international actors. 
 
Despite the perception, as this thesis has shown so far, that child soldiers are 
primarily an ‘African problem’ and the overwhelming attention of most international 
actors regarding the recruitment of children is directed at African cases, as soon as 
we direct our gaze just a little further, the Burmese case comes into focus. The 
starting point for directing international attention towards Myanmar can be traced 
back to a report titled ‘My Gun was as Tall as Me: Child Soldiers in Burma’ by 
Human Rights Watch in 2002, which starts with the claim that ‘Burma is believed to 
have more child soldiers than any other country in the world’.464 Widely publicized 
and cited until today, this report points the finger at the Myanmar state army, the 
Tatmadaw, and claims that ‘Burma has a poor human rights record, but its record on 
child soldiers is the worst in the world’.465 It goes on to estimate the size of the 
Burmese Army at the point of writing at 350,000 active soldiers, having almost 
doubled since the 1988 uprisings, and based on the accounts of former child soldiers 
interviewed for the writing of said report, about 20 per cent or more of its members 
are estimated to be child soldiers.466  
 
This report unfortunately suffers from a number of significant shortcomings, which 
contributed to shaping the international discussion and knowledge production about 
child soldier use in Myanmar, and specifically the Tatmadaw, for years.467 To start 
with, the estimates in the report are based on interviews with twenty deserted 
Tatmadaw soldiers about the size of their battalions and the prevalence of children 
within them, most of which had been recruited as children, as well as more than 35 
former or active soldiers and politicians.468 Current Human Rights Watch staff 
admits that this report provided an unhelpful start for much of the international 
attention directed at child soldiers in the Tatmadaw and great care has to be taken not 
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to generalise from these findings.469 Nonetheless, it is undisputed that recruiting and 
using underage soldiers has been and still is a widespread practice within the 
Tatmadaw as well as some of the ethnic armed groups.470  Despite the Burmese 
government having made commitments to the international community to change 
their recruitment practices, international efforts have had only limited effects so far.  
 
This chapter introduces the context of child soldiering in Myanmar, which requires a 
look at the history of the Tatmadaw, its founding moment and its importance in 
Burmese society until today. It further looks at the drivers of child recruitment as 
well as Burmese understandings of child soldiers. The subsequent chapter moves on 
to introducing key actors of norm implementation in Myanmar. It investigates the 
strategies of the two most important international actors promoting the norm against 
child soldering in Myanmar, UNICEF and the ILO, and analyses their interaction 
with the Tatmadaw on the issue to show how practices of norm implementation 
differ and change as well as what the implications of the different applications of the 
norm are. 
7.2 Methodology and Sources 
Compared to Sierra Leone, the history and practice of child soldiering in Myanmar is 
a very under-researched topic. To my knowledge, as of the writing of this thesis, 
there is no comprehensive academic account of the recruitment and use of child 
soldiers in the Tatmadaw or the ethnic armed groups in Myanmar. Thus, the 
Myanmar case study of this thesis relies mainly on primary data collection, primarily 
interviews and NGO and UN documentation. 
 
Large parts of the empirical material for the Myanmar case study has been gathered 
through interviewing local and international UN and NGO staff, local and 
international activists, journalists, researchers, former government employees and ex-
military staff during two fieldwork trips of 2.5 months in total to Myanmar as well as 
brief stints in Bangkok, Thailand and Singapore. More than half of the people 
interviewed are from Myanmar, and few of them belong to the main Bamar ethnicity, 
with others being Mon, Chin, Shan, Karen, and Rohingya. The first two months of 
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the fieldwork were completed in summer 2016 in Yangon and Bangkok before the 
most recent outbreak of the Rohingya crisis that started after the attack on border 
police force in Rakhine state in October 2016.471 This means that the recent criticism 
of the inactivity of Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy 
(NLD) government regarding the anti-Rohingya violence is not represented in the 
interviews conducted for this study. The main effect of the Rohingya crisis on the 
child soldier debates going on in Myanmar is that they have moved even further out 
of the spotlight. The speed with which international opinion has turned on Aung San 
Suu Kyi is remarkable and is a result both of the lack of understanding of the 
complexities of the situation in Myanmar, and of the nature of the transition—in 
December 2015, the UN publishes a video called ‘Myanmar: Democracy Wins’472—
and the shortening international attention span, moving different advocacy concerns 
in and out of the spotlight in rapid succession. While child soldiering was one of the 
key issues at the top of the international agenda in the late 2000s, the democratic 
transition and return of Aung San Su Kyi became the dominant discourse from 2012 
onwards—at times glossing over continued human rights violations—to the 
Rohingya crisis now, which has diverted attention away other issues.  
 
While child protection concerns more broadly have remained on the agenda, 
cooperation with the Tatmadaw on releasing child soldiers has declined over the past 
two years. Thus, the timing of the first stint of the fieldwork for this study shines a 
light on a very specific moment in which the Tatmadaw’s cooperation with the 
international community on issues of child soldiering was at its peak. A second short 
trip to Myanmar was completed in November 2017. All but three interviews were 
conducted in English, one in German and two in Burmese with a translator. Most 
interviewees were contacted either through their official positions within IOs or 
NGOs or through local contacts.  
 
Apart from interviews, the next two chapters further rely on reports and press 
releases from international organisations, non-governmental organisations, 
independent think tanks, local and international media, as well as secondary 
academic and non-academic sources. Specifically, amongst others, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Children and Armed Conflict’s annual reports, UNICEF and ILO 
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reports and press releases, both at headquarter and local level, Human Rights Watch, 
Save the Children and World Vision reports and news, newspaper articles from local 
newspapers, the Myanmar Times and the Irrawaddy, Western newspaper articles, as 
well as reports from the Asia Foundation and Child Soldiers International.  
 
It is important to note that for decades now, it has become a political point of 
contention whether to use Burma or Myanmar when referring to this country. In 
1989 the Union of Burma—which was the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma 
since 1974—was officially renamed into the ‘Union of Myanmar’ by the military 
government, along with changes of specific place names that were still in use from 
the British colonial era.473 Oftentimes, the debate around which name to use is 
depicted rather crudely, implying on one side that using ‘Myanmar’ would identify 
one as a supporter of the military junta regime and using ‘Burma’ would indicate one 
is a supporter of the democracy movement. The other side argues that using ‘Burma’ 
would indicate the speaker as a supporter of British colonial rule, which re-
introduced the term, as well as only representing the majority Bamar population with 
‘Myanmar’ being the more inclusive and also preferred term by the current, 
democratically-elected government under Aung San Suu Kyi. A note here that 
throughout this thesis ‘Burmese’ will be used to describe the entire population of 
Burma/Myanmar and ‘Bamar’ to describe the ethnic majority in the country. Until 
recently, international organisations and foreign governments fell on either side of 
the debate. Unsurprisingly, the UK sticks fairly consistently to ‘Burma’ and so does 
the United States, even though ‘Myanmar’ seems to be used when directly 
interacting with the Myanmar/Burmese government. 474  Most international 
organisations use ‘Myanmar’ for most of their communication. The debate extends to 
whether to use Anglicised names for cities (Rangoon or Yangon) and whether to use 
Burmese or non-Burmese spellings for territories (Rakhine or Arakan, Kayin or 
Karen). In this thesis, I will use ‘Myanmar’ and ‘Burma’ interchangeably when 
referring to the state and its institutions, such as the military, government, or 
ministries, and local spellings when referring to specific territories.  
7.3 Context of Child Soldiering in Myanmar 
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The main target of international actors in terms of child soldier use in Myanmar is 
the Tatmadaw. In order to make sense of the unique role the military plays in 
Burmese society up until today, we must connect the history of the Tatmadaw since 
independence from the British Empire in 1948 with its history of child soldier use. 
Whereas child recruitment is most often directly related to the outbreak of conflict, 
the civil war in Myanmar has been going on for decades and is considered to be the 
world’s longest-running civil war, having started shortly after independence.475 
However, while there definitely were underage fighters in the Burmese military from 
its official foundation and even before, the recruitment of children into the Tatmadaw 
in their thousands only became a widespread practice after the military defeat of the 
1988 uprisings.476  
7.3.1 Independence, Conflict, and Founding the Tatmadaw  
Burma in its entirety officially became a province of British India, and thus part of 
the British Empire, after the remnants of the Konbaung dynasty lost the Third Anglo-
Burmese War in 1885.477 World War II provided an opportunity for Burmese 
nationalists in their fight for independence or at least for increased autonomy. Some 
tried to negotiate with the British in return for their assistance in the war effort 
against the Japanese. Others, influenced by Marxist thought, sought assistance from 
the Chinese Communists. One of them was Aung San, the father of now-State 
Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, who escaped to China after facing arrest by the 
British for his activities in the leadership of the Freedom Bloc, a party which was 
formed in 1939 as a merger of Burmese Nationalists, Student Activists and a party 
representing the poor rural class, lead by later head of state under Japanese 
occupation, Ba Maw. 
 
Failing in establishing contact with the Chinese Communists and being captured by 
Colonel Suzuki Keiji, Aung San made a deal with the Japanese Empire in 1940.478 
The Japanese, looking to close the Burma Road, which Britain increasingly used to 
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get supplies to Nationalist China to use in their war against the Japanese Empire, 
offered Aung San and his men military training, guaranteed them post-war 
independence and support for an anti-British nationalist uprising in Burma. The 
Japanese Empire invaded Burma in 1942 and Aung San, returning at the same time, 
announced the establishment of the Burma Independence Army (BIA). Going 
through various stages of re-organisation, by 1943, this armed group was renamed 
the Burma Defence Army and became the armed forces of nominally independent 
Burma under de facto Japanese occupation. The Japanese established a puppet 
government, including Ba Maw as head of state, Aung San as war minister and 
Communist as well as Socialist leaders in cabinet positions.479 
 
As it became clear that there was no meaningful independence of any kind under the 
Japanese, most Burmese nationalists and Aung San became increasingly frustrated 
with the occupation. A broad anti-fascist coalition of Burmese nationalists, socialists, 
and communists finally established first contacts with the allied forces in 1944 and as 
the war turned against the Japanese, the Burma National Army (yet another re-named 
version of the BIA) rose up and drove the Japanese out of Burma by May 1945.480 
After the return of the pre-war British Governor of Burma and attempts to stall 
negotiations about independence by focusing on reconstruction were met by strong 
opposition and national strikes, which finally lead to the British realisation that Aung 
San’s popularity in Burma could no longer be ignored. In January 1947, the 
negotiations about Burmese independence from the British were successfully 
concluded. Crucially, Aung San also reached an agreement with the Chin, Kachin, 
and Shan ethnic minority leaders in Panglong, Shan State, on the 12th of February 
1947, agreeing to join an independent ‘Union of Burma’.481 
 
Just months after the Panglong Agreement, Aung San and six other members of his 
cabinet were assassinated, making the establishment of an inclusive and democratic 
independent Burma incredibly difficult from the onset. The tentative coalition with 
the ethnic minority leaders that Aung San had negotiated disintegrated quickly after 
the new Socialist government did not honour the Panglong Agreement and various 
Communist insurgencies challenged it from the very beginning. The internal conflict 
we see in Myanmar until today has its origins in the familiar ways in which the 
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British governed their empire, privileging certain groups over others, emphasising 
and creating religious, ethnic, and geographical divides for decades to last.482  
 
The Burmese Army, now re-named Tatmadaw, which is the name they keep until 
today, was formally created at the same time as Burma became independent in 1948. 
The Tatmadaw, according to Burmese historians, ‘is the direct heir of the BIA: its 
history, its structure, its mythology and much of its raison d’être.’483 General Ne Win 
was instituted as the Chief of Staff of the Tatmadaw in 1949 and had essentially 
uncontested control over the military until the coup d’état in 1962. Throughout the 
Ne Win years (1962-1988) the Tatmadaw remained largely a counter-insurgency 
force, which was ill equipped and underfunded. The history of rapidly expanding and 
modernising the Tatmadaw, as we know it today and its systematic child recruitment 
practices started only in 1988. Nonetheless, it is crucial to keep the founding of the 
Tatmadaw and its intrinsic links to the formation of independent Burma in mind. 
Even though the predecessors of the Tatmadaw were often small, armed contingents 
with shifting loyalties, they were always seen as fighting for independence, first from 
the British and then from the Japanese.484 In fact, the BIA was the first indigenous 
Burmese army representing the majority of the Burmese people. Furthermore, many 
of its leaders around the time of independence continued to be the leaders of the 
country for the next decades.485  
 
This founding story is later relied upon by Tatmadaw propaganda and is the first part 
of the story used for building their identity as the great unifier and protector of 
independent Burma. It also provided a framework for the organisation of civilian life 
in the absence of a functioning state during the unstable years after independence, 
‘thereby indelibly immersing military with civilian components.’486 The second part 
concerns the civil war with various ethnic armies, which has been going on ever 
since the failure of the Panglong Conference in 1947. One of the main reasons for the 
continued relative popularity of the military throughout decades of junta rule was the 
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extensively made claim that only thanks to Tatmadaw rule and engagement in 
fighting the ethnic armed groups, is the territorial integrity of Myanmar still intact.487 
7.3.2 Tatmadaw in Contemporary Myanmar Politics 
When trying to understand the embeddedness of the military within Burmese society, 
we need to separate ourselves from any meaningful distinction between any notion of 
civilian control of the armed forces. After turning the Burmese state into a military 
junta after the coup in 1962 and again after the student protests in 1988, when Ne 
Win was ousted and replaced by the State Law and Order Restoration Council 
(SLORC), the Tatmadaw became the state.488 Legislative and executive power was 
bound in the hands of the SLORC, established in 1988, which was later reformed and 
renamed to the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997. Until the 
SPDC was dissolved in 2011 and the junta agreed to hand over power to a semi-
civilian government, the military controlled every aspect of the state apparatus and 
much of society and public life as well.489 What is more, not only state institutions 
such as the judiciary, the single political party and the police, but also more or less 
any part of public life was controlled by the junta, which basically controlled the 
economy, education system, and media. Steinberg summarises: ‘In the contemporary 
world, there is probably no other country […] in which the military has as much and 
as pervasive power, and has held it for such an extended period—four decades, as in 
Burma/Myanmar.’490 
 
The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)—essentially the successor 
organisation to the junta—won the 2010 general elections by a landslide. These 
elections are widely regarded as heavily manipulated and were boycotted by the 
NLD and other opposition parties.491 However, the junta subsequently handed over 
power to the USDP and many former generals and military officials changed their 
uniform for civilian clothing and continued to serve in their previous posts. Although 
viewed with scepticism by many international observers and opposition leaders 
domestically, the government under President Thein Sein, a senior military official 
who has been the president of the SPDC, paved the way for political, economic, and 
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social reform and free and fair elections five years later, which would eventually lead 
to the victory of the National League for Democracy, the main opposition party to 
the junta, formed after the 1988 student protests and headed by Aung San Suu Kyi. 
 
When the NLD actually won the absolute majority in the General elections in 
November 2015, the international community looked to Aung San Suu Kyi to deliver 
on her promises to further liberalise and democratise the country. After the new 
government under President Htin Kyaw, a trusted long-term friend of Aung San Suu 
Kyi, and her as State Counsellor took power in February 2016, expectations were 
flying high both domestically and internationally.492 The Myanmar people expected 
an expedited peace process, an economic upturn with lifted sanctions and increased 
international investments and increased civil and political liberties; the international 
community expected the new government to end the Rohingya crisis, cooperate with 
international agencies and embed themselves fully in the international community at 
large, meaning signing and ratifying a number of international treaties.  
 
At the time of the fieldwork for this thesis in summer 2016, after roughly a year in 
power, the assessment of the new government, both by international and Burmese 
observers, was often hesitant and already tentatively critical, having failed to deliver 
in key areas such as reaching a comprehensive peace agreement with all ethnic 
armed groups or resolving the Rohingya crisis. This cautiously optimistic mood has 
since shifted, especially with increasing escalation of the Rohingya crisis since late 
2016 and the lack of intervention by the civilian government. In fact, it seems as if 
the perception, especially of Aung San Suu Kyi personally, has dramatically shifted 
from almost messianic praise of her as the harbinger of peace, democracy, and 
freedom to stark critique for remaining passive and silent in the face of atrocities 
committed by the Tatmadaw against the Rohingya in Rakhine state, or in the case of 
journalists being prosecuted for critically reporting about the military.493 Tatmadaw 
offensives against ethnic armed groups in Kachin and Shan state have recently 
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continued with increased intensity, with international observers being concerned that 
this might lead to rising levels of child recruitment both within the Tatmadaw and the 
ethnic armed groups.494 
 
In light of this development, it is essential to understand that although the military is 
no longer directly in power, the Tatmadaw is still the most important institution in 
Myanmar with extensive influence in the political, social, and economic organisation 
of the country as well as full control of all domestic security policies.495 Having 
made fortunes throughout the 1990s and 2000s under military rule, many of the 
cronies are still controlling large parts of the economy today—and even benefitting 
from more international investment and partially lifted sanctions, both individually 
and against certain industries.496  
 
Under the 2008 constitution, which is still in force today, three key ministries remain 
under Tatmadaw control regardless of electoral outcomes: defence, home affairs, and 
border affairs. 497  Furthermore, the military controls the National Defence and 
Security Council, an 11-member council, 6 of which are appointed by the military 
and report directly to the Commander-in-Chief, which oversees the Tatmadaw and 
has the power, in the case of emergency, to hand power over to the military. Aung 
San Suu Kyi, as the foreign minister, also sits on the council—often regarded as one 
of the main reasons she chose this office in the first place.498  
 
Apart from the formal continuation and guarantee of Tatmadaw influence through 
the maintenance of ministries and councils, there is also the continuation in staff, 
mostly with a military background, in existing state structures and bureaucracies.499 
One example is the Committee for the Prevention of Military Recruitment of 
Underage Children, which was established in 2004 by the SPDC after pressure from 
international actors. This government committee is officially responsible, in 
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cooperation with UNICEF and other UN bodies, for releasing any children from the 
armed forces, overseeing changes in recruitment processes and establishing 
accountability for recruiters, i.e. administering punishment for these offences as well 
as raising public awareness.500 Immediately after the elections in November 2015, 
according to current ILO staff who are frequently liaising with this committee, it was 
disbanded until further notice. This raised expectations among the Tatmadaw 
personnel who sat on the committee that the process would terminate at this point. 
However, after a few months, the committee was re-instituted with exactly the same 
staff on it. Negotiations with the new civilian government about including fewer 
military and more civilian participants in the committee were fruitless and so the 
previous, military-dominated body was simply reinstated.501  
 
This shows that even though the first civilian government in Myanmar since 1962 
has taken steps to liberalise the country and increase protection for human rights, the 
military, with its decade-long history and entrenched institutions and practices is still 
the single most important actor in the country. Especially regarding a topic as 
sensitive and directly related to military practices, such as child soldiers, the power 
of the military today can and should not be underestimated by any external actor 
trying to affect change in Myanmar. 
 
7.4 Child Soldiering in the Tatmadaw  
The Tatmadaw is by no means the only party in Myanmar that uses children in its 
armed forces and the UN still lists seven other ethnic armed groups who recruit and 
use children today (2016): the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), the 
Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA), the Karen National Liberation 
Army Peace Council (all in Karen State), the Kachin Independence Army (Kachin 
State), the Karenni Army (KNPP/KA), and the Shan State Army South (SSA-S) as 
well as the strongest ethnic army today, the United Wa State Army (UNWSA) in 
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Northern Shan state.502 However, this study focuses on the Tatmadaw and its 
interaction with international actors for three main reasons: 
 
Firstly, access to armed groups or the territory they control has until recently been 
almost impossible. With access to Myanmar already being difficult for foreigners, at 
least until 2010, there were severe travel restrictions imposed on most areas with 
heavy fighting and the most prolific use of child soldiers. Furthermore, compared to 
the Tatmadaw, the ethnic armies had relatively few problems with desertion and 
therefore hardly any deserters made it across the border and ended up in—mostly 
Thai—refugee camps where they could be interviewed about their experience in the 
conflict, the primary way of gathering data on child soldiers in the Burmese army 
prior to 2006/7.503  
 
Secondly, the military regime was a pariah state in the international community, 
being labelled by Condoleezza Rice in 2005 as an ‘outpost of tyranny’ next to North 
Korea, Iran, Cuba, Belarus and Zimbabwe.504 The mass recruitment and use of child 
soldiers by such a regime fitted the general picture fairly well and so it was relatively 
easy to construct the Tatmadaw as the enemy with egregious accounts of child 
recruitment and human rights abuses abound. This climate of mistrust has defined the 
relationship between the military regime and international actors at least since 1988. 
A former member of the military government describes the dynamic:  
That mistrust is well established on both sides for well over 20 years. Even 
the IOs have the perception of the military as the worst. During that time, the 
child soldier issue was combined with political pressure and sanctions on 
Myanmar. Even Aung San Suu Kyi and other people were raising this issue to 
pressure the military government; it’s the whole package. During that time 
the ethnic armed groups were fighting with us so automatically they 
[international actors] look the other way, they don’t raise this issue about 
them.505  
The vilification of the junta was mainly based on dissidents reporting after they have 
fled the country and are reporting from exile, some of whom were actively 
supporting certain ethnic armed groups. Similarly, it was easier to believe that if 
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there were child soldiers in the rebel armies—which there undoubtedly were many—
they fought for a purpose rather than being forced to do so. Reports range from youth 
who joined ethnic armed groups to defend their villages against Tatmadaw atrocities, 
who sought revenge for violence committed by the state against their families to 
some areas in which jobs and education by the ethnic armed groups were the only 
means of attaining either.506  
 
Thirdly, most international advocacy focuses on state actors since the assumption is 
that they should be more susceptible to international pressure than non-state armed 
groups. It is states that sign international treaties and are members of international 
organisations. As we have seen in chapter four, in the case of child soldiers, 
international law is clear on placing the responsibility for protecting children from 
being recruited into armed forces—associated with the state or not—in the hands of 
the state. For these reasons, along with most international actors, the Myanmar case 
study of this thesis predominantly focuses on the Tatmadaw. 
7.4.1 International and Domestic Legal Regulations 
The international norm against the recruitment and use of child soldiers is codified in 
a range of legal stipulations and provides a framework within which international 
actors engage. Considering international legal commitments, Myanmar has signed 
both UN conventions in relation to the elimination of the use of child soldiers: 
Starting with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which Myanmar 
ratified in 1991, and continuing with the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, which entered into force in 2002 and 
stipulates 18 as the minimum age for recruitment into armed forces. Myanmar has 
signed, but not ratified, the Optional Protocol in September 2015.  
 
A significant step forward in terms of international efforts to change the Tatmadaw’s 
recruitment practices was the negotiation and signing of the Joint Action Plan with 
the UN in 2012, committing the government of Myanmar to take concrete steps 
towards releasing all underage recruits in their armed forces as well as reform 
recruitment practices so as to prevent any further underage recruitment. Concrete 
steps agreed to in the Action Plan include: allowing UN access to military units, 
battalions, and training facilities, centralising recruitment processes, training of 
                                                




military recruiters on age assessment guidelines, establishing accountability and 
enforcing disciplinary and punitive measures for individuals recruiting children. 
Furthermore, the Ministry of Defence committed to monthly review meetings with 
UNICEF.507 
 
Domestically, Myanmar’s 1993 Child Law defines ‘a child as a person who has not 
attained the age of 16 years and a youth as a person who has attained the age of 16 
years but has not attained the age of 18 years’.508 Due to the very limited amount of 
information that left the country at the time, the legal situation within Burma and 
especially relating to the armed forces was largely unclear until recently. Most 
international actors had to rely on the Myanmar government providing more or less 
voluntary information, mostly within the UN, such as the Universal Periodic Review 
or the Committee on the Rights of the Child. In 2002, responding to requests by 
Human Rights Watch, the Permanent Mission of the Union of Myanmar to the 
United Nations clarified that according to the Regulation for the Persons Subject to 
the Defense Services Act, the minimum age of recruitment into the Tatmadaw and 
any other part of the Myanmar armed forces is officially 18 years. At the time of 
writing (August 2018), the Myanmar Parliament has been debating a new Child Law 
for several years now without passing it. Officials of the Ministry of Social Welfare, 
Relief and Resettlement have been consulting with international and local child 
rights organisations to simplify provisions about age groups—the law currently 
distinguishes 16-18-year-olds as ‘youth’ and not children—and strengthen provisions 
for example on child labour.509 Even though the text of the proposed law is not 
publicly available, activists within Myanmar are cautiously optimistic about 
increased protection clauses being included in the new law—if it ever comes into 
force. However, they also caution against a lack of detail on the protection of child 
recruitment into the armed forces, which is said not to go far beyond very basic 
provisions.510 
 
International treaties and the Joint Action Plan are only the most superficial level of 
engagement of the international community with Myanmar. In order to understand 
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the complexity and nuances of international actors’ efforts to combat child 
recruitment in this context, we first need to look at the role of the military in 
Myanmar, how serving in the army is embedded within Burmese society and how 
children are situated within their social contexts.  
7.4.2 History of the Use of Child Soldiers in the Tatmadaw 
Most activists and researchers agree that child recruitment happens a lot less today 
than it used to, even up to 2012.511 With ceasefires signed and fighting in Shan and 
Kachin remaining at a low level until 2017, there were hardly any verified cases of 
child recruitment happening until recently. According to the ILO, most cases that 
were brought to the ILO in 2015 are of underage recruitment that happened in 
2009. 512  However, according to the most recent report by the UN Special 
Representative, there were over 20 verified cases of child recruitment into the 
Tatmadaw in 2016 and numbers are expected to rise with the intensification of 
conflict and a lack of sustainable change in military recruitment.513 The following 
chapter will explore the dynamics of change within the Tatmadaw and its interaction 
with international organisations in more detail. 
 
Giving a comprehensive account of the history of child soldiering within Burma, 
including the Tatmadaw and ethnic armed groups, that goes back further than the 
1990s is almost impossible without extensive further primary research. Speaking to 
former government soldiers as well as individuals associated with ethnic armed 
groups, as well as reading individual accounts of certain battles fought between 
them, the presence of children and youth on the battlefield and certainly among the 
ethnic armed groups was a usual sight. One former fighter, who took part in the 
battle of Manerplaw in 1995 notes how it took him a while to remember how many 
children were actually involved in Manerplaw, simply because it was nothing out of 
the ordinary and he did not actively take note of them.514 
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As far as I am aware, beyond individual accounts of former fighters and refugees in 
bordering countries, there are hardly any historical accounts available in English, of 
either the recruitment practices of the Tatmadaw or the presence of child soldiers 
within their ranks, limiting any attempt at tracing this history systematically. Until 
2012, any newspaper and media outlet would be censored to limit any potentially 
damaging reports about the country, the junta, the military, or the conflict. The 
government did at times cooperate with various UN bodies, such as submitting a 
report to the first UPR cycle in 2011, although the regime denied any knowledge of 
the presence of child soldiers within their ranks and referred back to the Child Law 
of 1993 which sets 18 as the minimum age for being recruited into the Tatmadaw.515 
As of 2018, journalists, activists, and protesters are increasingly prosecuted under 
Penal Code section 505(b), which criminalizes statements ‘likely to cause fear or 
alarm to the public, or to any section of the public, whereby any person may be 
induced to commit an offence against the State or against the public tranquillity’.516 
This provision has also been used to convict child soldiers who have been released 
from the Tatmadaw for talking about their experience of forcible recruitment 
publicly.517 
  
However, connecting individual accounts by former child soldiers, current soldiers—
both on the government and ethnic armed group side—and former recruiters by 
drawing on exile media and NGO reporting gives at least a first glimpse of the 
development of the recruitment practices within the Tatmadaw. It should come as no 
surprise that the first accounts about the systematic use of child soldiers emerge after 
the ratification of the Convention of the Rights of the Child in 1991, when this issue 
first came under scrutiny by activists worldwide. This coincided with a massive 
restructuring of the Tatmadaw after the student protests of 1988 and the reforming of 
the junta, led by General Ne Win, into SLORC.518  
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With almost 44% of the Burmese population being under the age of 25, a fairly small 
military like the Tatmadaw before 1988 could rely on voluntary subscriptions.519 
Benefitting largely from their historically good reputation, joining the military was 
seen, mostly among the Bamar population, but also among some other ethnic groups, 
e.g. the Chin, Mon, Karen, Kayah and Kachin, as a reputable choice to increase ones 
education and enhance ones technical skills, which were difficult to obtain in 
Burmese civilian life and beneficial for future employment.520  
 
The recruitment practices changed drastically after 1988, turning a roughly 180,000 
strong Tatmadaw Kyi into an estimated 370,000 by 1997.521 This was achieved 
through first, a sizable recruitment drive, predominantly in impoverished areas; 
second, through a significant propaganda campaign and third; by relaxing more or 
less any minimum standards for recruitment.522 Previously, only about half of all 
volunteers were found fit for service, whereas medical standards from 1988 onwards 
were largely non-existent. Forcible recruitment was commonplace and often villages 
were provided with a quota of men that had to join the military with little care given 
to the age of these recruits.523 Simultaneously in the early 1990s, fighting picked up 
against the ethnic armed groups, especially the Karen, further encouraging 
recruitment drives on both the government and ethnic armed group side to provide 
sufficient manpower for battle. However, as outlined at the beginning of this chapter, 
all data from a totally isolated country such as Myanmar at the time, has to be taken 
with a grain of salt. While there certainly was a significant recruitment drive and 
enlargement of the military after 1988, the extent of it cannot really be verified by 
relying on existing accounts, since even today reports of actual fighting strength of 
Tatmadaw battalions vary dramatically depending on the source of the 
information.524  While it is reasonable to assume that there were under-18 year olds 
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as part of the Tatmadaw, not at least due to lacking age verification procedures, these 
seem not to have been a deliberate practice before 1988.525 
7.5 Drivers of Child Recruitment in Myanmar 
The previous paragraphs have lined out the history of child recruitment in the 
Tatmadaw since 1988. However, underlying this recruitment campaigns are a 
number of drivers, which contribute to child recruitment being so commonplace 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s, which we have to shift our attention to in order to 
understand how international actors try to address the practice of child soldiering and 
why some strategies might resonate more than others. Any long-term and sustainable 
strategies aimed at eliminating the recruitment and use of children will have to 
address these dynamics. The following paragraphs focus on poverty, conflict, 
corruption, and the perceptions of child soldiers in Burma. By no means are these 
distinct phenomena, they are all interrelated and only in conjunction do they create a 
situation conducive to the extensive use of child soldiers.  
7.5.1 Poverty and Child Labour 
Poverty is often listed as one of the main drivers of child recruitment worldwide and 
Myanmar is no different in this regard. Exacerbated by decades of civil war and 
international sanctions, a lack of economic opportunity affects both the individuals 
who join the military, their families, as well as recruiters.  
 
Although considered impossible according to international law, voluntary enlistment 
does happen. Now what might motivate children and youth in Myanmar directly to 
join the military? An ILO member of staff puts it bluntly: ‘Kids, little boys, like 
uniforms and shiny guns. You do get kids wanting to join the army—it’s as simple as 
that. The problem here is that in most countries, when a kid goes up to someone 
saying they want to be a soldier, they say: “Well, you come back when you’re 18.” 
Here, they say: “Oh, good!” and take them in.’526 The romanticising of military 
service, without an awareness of what daily life in the army looks like, is just one 
factor. A former Myanmar government employee comments on the realisation of 
voluntary enlisted youth: ‘When he ran away, he’s not lying [sic], he just changed his 
mind because the boy did not know that life would be this hard. Children can’t think, 
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only so far, only until tomorrow. What would happen, how their training would be in 
real life, they don’t know’.527 
 
More common than a child independently deciding to join the military is that a 
family, either a parent or a member of the extended family would encourage or 
coerce a youth in the family to enlist.528 According to a senior ILO official:  
The poverty drive is a family deal sometimes in that this kid needs to eat and 
also potentially support and send money back to the family. So sometimes 
that happens and we had a long period with the Tatmadaw where their 
response to why the kid was recruited was that the parents agreed. People in 
the village, an uncle, an auntie, somebody—you would be amazed at how 
close the relationships are—they would see a kid and because the price of the 
recruiters is about 30,000 kyats [about $22] or a bag of rice. They would 
quietly get the kid and send it into the army; that was a large part of it. Not so 
much by greed but by poverty.529  
 
Beyond direct payoffs, there is also a more long-term monetary incentive on the 
family level. Despite education being nominally free, parents might struggle to afford 
school uniforms, stationery, books or occurring fees. Similarly, healthcare is 
supposedly free of charge. In reality, treatment requires payment, making caring for a 
sick family member often an impossible task for poor families. More so, families 
might depend on the child’s contribution to the family income (10% of children over 
the age of 15 are in paid employment530) or their labour in the house or on the 
land.531 A survey in 2015 found that 18% of poor children aged 10-14 participate in 
the workforce, mostly in selling items, serving or preparing food as well as working 
in factories.532 An ILO employee recounts the instance of a teenage boy who worked 
in the kitchen of his uncle who lived next to military barracks in his village. After 
finding out that he would get paid a soldier’s salary doing the same work in a 
military kitchen, he joined the military.533  
 
Since child labour is a widely accepted practice in Myanmar, the line between being 
a cook for a teashop or for a battalion is sometimes a thin one. Choosing a 
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permanent, stable job with a steady income and some very rudimentary benefits 
might be incentive enough for families to commit a child to military service.  
7.5.2 Recruitment Due to Conflict and Corruption 
The picture is complicated by the incentive structure within the military, which 
encourages unmonitored recruitment. Driven by the ongoing conflict, increasing 
unpopularity and inefficient setup, the Tatmadaw is often left with insufficient 
numbers of new recruits to fill up the ranks. Apart from the violence in Rakhine, 
there are still widely varying accounts of the destructiveness of the current fighting in 
Kachin and Shan state (Sept 2016), with some rebel groups in Kachin state reporting 
significant casualties on the Burmese army side. The problem with having any 
reliable conflict data on Myanmar is that large parts of the area that are affected by 
active combat are still inaccessible to foreigners. Local media occasionally reports 
specific conflict events, but with no journalistic standards to speak of, these numbers 
are hugely varying and potentially unreliable too. ‘The Tatmadaw promised: “We 
will get rid of it [child recruitment, note by author], we probably have to do a little 
bit more recruitment because we’re getting cut to pieces on the front line”, so former 
Human Rights Watch staff.534 It is a familiar dynamic globally that recruitment of 
children escalates if conflict flares up. The intensification of military campaigns by 
the Tatmadaw in Shan and Kachin state in 2018 as well as the increased tension in 
Karen state, despite the ceasefire with the KNU/KNLA, has led to reports of 
potentially increased child recruitment on behalf of the Tatmadaw and their 
opponents between 2016 and 2018.535 
 
An additional, conflict-related factor is the high number of internally displaced 
people (IDP) and especially of internally displaced children. Achvarina and Reich 
have contributed to the understanding of how refugee camps are sometimes used as 
resource pools for the recruitment of new combatants, some of which are children.536 
Estimating a precise number of IPDs in Myanmar at any given point is basically 
impossible since only a very small number of them live in officially designated IDP 
camps (most of them are Rohingya in Rakhine state). Most rely on personal networks 
or on informal assistance from local NGOs from across the Thai border. Estimates, 
even today, with much increased access to conflict-affected areas of the country, 
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range from about 400,000 to 600,000.537 Unaccompanied youth who are travelling to 
big cities, especially Yangon and Mandalay, either in search of work or to visit 
relatives, are particularly vulnerable to be recruited.538 Stories told by escaped or 
released former child soldiers tend to repeat similar patterns of being arrested or 
picked up at train/bus stations or public squares and taken to a police compound or 
directly to a military barrack and intimidated into signing up for the army. 
Intimidation strategies rank from verbal threats of violence to them or their family, 
threats of being incarcerated for long periods of time for a number of fabricated 
reasons (most commonly not being able to produce a National Registration Card, 
which is rarely held by anyone under 18), to actual beatings.539 
 
As described above, the Tatmadaw is officially a volunteer-only force. In reality, 
there are rules regarding recruitment, which are meant to ensure keeping the numbers 
steady. These disperse the responsibility to recruit on regular soldiers, to guarantee 
the granting of benefits for themselves. For example, you are only allowed to take 
holidays or home leave if you bring a new recruit to cover for you during that time. If 
you want to retire—there is no official mechanism for leaving the army once you are 
in it—you only have a chance of doing so if you bring in two new recruits. Apart 
from these incentive structures for regular soldiers, there are also reports of direct 
payoffs for recruiters, monetary and otherwise.540  
 
Whereas the generals are generally aware of the international legal and domestic 
commitments not to recruit children, individual Captains are mostly more concerned 
with bringing their battalion through the next battle, rather than complying with 
international law.541 Similarly, recruiters are primarily concerned with fulfilling their 
quotas and reaping the benefits of providing numerous recruits, regardless of who 
they are. Former Colonel Lieutenant in the Tatmadaw, Ye Htut, confirms this 
pressure to recruit: ‘Another change we have to make is in our army recruitment 
system. […] The pressure is still on the commanding officer of his unit. If they 
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cannot reach the quota, the higher command can put pressure on them.’542 He goes 
on to explain how recruiters might work with local authorities to obtain identification 
cards stating the age of a potential recruit as over 18 even though ‘you understand 
from looking at their physical appearance, they are not reaching the age.’ Wah Eh 
Htoo from World Vision confirms that while there are National Registration Cards in 
Myanmar, often poor children will not have them or their families might acquire fake 
ones, which state they are over 18 already.543 Age assessment procedures, which are 
not based on NRCs, are still a rare occurrence in Myanmar and part of UNICEF’s 
work is to implement these across the Tatmadaw. 
7.6 Burmese Understandings of Child Soldiers 
These material drivers of child recruitment are not the only relevant aspect to 
understanding child soldiering in Myanmar. We also need to pay attention to the 
perception of child soldiers within Burmese society and how this might contribute to 
or even enable the use of children as soldiers. Chapter four of this thesis has shown 
the potentially varying portrayals of child soldiers throughout history and opened up 
avenues for differing accounts around the world as well. Throughout my interviews 
with people from Myanmar, I would often ask them what they thought about children 
being in the army generally and whether they thought it was a problem at all, 
independent of all the international organisations and NGOs that would advocate 
against this. Answers generally fell into two categories and add to a more complex 
picture of children serving in the military in Myanmar than that often painted by 
international activists.  
 
The first set of responses seem to resonate fairly well with the dominant international 
narrative of child soldiers as victims that need to be protected and will almost 
certainly be traumatised after having served in the military. Many of my interview 
partners agreed with the objective of international actors of enforcing the prohibition 
of the use of child soldiers on principled grounds. 544 The question on potential 
similarities between child labour, which is very common and largely accepted in 
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Myanmar, and certain tasks that children fulfil in the military, such as preparing food 
or conveying information, was met with an almost shocked surprise by some.545  
 
The second set of responses places child soldiers in the broader context of growing 
up in a conflict environment. While not advocating for children to serve in the armed 
forces as a viable solution, some Burmese staff of local as well as international 
NGOs, who are well aware of the international legal commitments, suggested that for 
children from impoverished backgrounds and especially for orphaned children, 
having a steady base with the Tatmadaw might not be the worst possible outcome.546 
A lack of social services means that orphaned children often only had three options: 
join a monastery as a novice monk, work in a teashop in one of the cities, or join the 
military. Aung Myo Htwe at Humanitarian Dialogue compares two children who join 
a monastery and the army respectively: 
If one of them goes to the armed base to get education and healthcare and 
safety, and the other one comes to the city becomes a little monk, we have 
both of them and they are the same. Both of them get a place and education 
and food. So in this case, the one who goes to the army base makes people a 
criminal but how about the one that comes to the monasteries? I mean this is 
still questionable but in practicality, on the ground, it is quite difficult to 
comply with international law here.547 
 
Relating back to poverty as a driver of child recruitment, there is an understanding 
among some of the Burmese activists, that parents sending their children to the army 
might not be a morally reprehensible choice. There is awareness that the international 
legal regulations on child recruitment might be too rigid to be strictly applied in a 
context such as Myanmar, even though in principle recruiting children is still 
regarded as wrong. 
7.7 Conclusion 
Child recruitment in the Tatmadaw is not a stand-alone phenomenon, which is only 
due to missing military regulations, but a historically and socially embedded practice, 
including children themselves, parents and extended family, as well as military and 
civilian recruiters. This chapter has shown that child soldiering in the Tatmadaw is 
deeply intertwined with the perception of the military as the guardian of the Union of 
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Myanmar as well as the importance of the Tatmadaw in Burmese politics to date. 
This context and dynamic are crucial to answering the question of how the 
international norm against the recruitment and use of child soldiers is applied and 
implemented in Myanmar. The following chapter takes a closer look at the strategies 
of the two most important international actors implementing the norm against child 
soldiering in Myanmar: UNICEF and the ILO. It highlights the importance of 
background knowledge in developing norm-implementing trategies and shows how 
these strategies have changed, how they differ, before analysing what their 
implications are for the impact on children and the image of the child soldier more 






Chapter 8: Child Soldiering and International Actors in 
Myanmar: ‘This is not like West Africa’ 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has outlined the history of child soldiering in Myanmar and 
shed light on the factors that have made such high levels of child soldier use possible 
in the Myanmar military, the Tatmadaw. It also highlighted problems of researching 
child soldiering in a context like Myanmar due to a lack of systematic data and 
reporting. This chapter introduces the international network of actors working against 
the use of child soldiers in Myanmar before analysing how the international norm 
against child soldiering is applied and implemented in this context. The international 
community started working on child soldiers in Myanmar around 2006/2007 at a 
time when this issue was at the top of the international agenda. Following prominent 
cases in Africa, such as Sierra Leone, international actors turned their attention to 
Myanmar. As the Human Rights Watch researcher for Myanmar puts it: ‘We are not 
just screaming that this is all like West Africa, it is not, but we’ll maintain one 
standard and apply it to everyone.’548 The two key norm-implementing actors in 
Myanmar are UNICEF and the ILO, who both operate with different mandates but 
are part of the same monitoring and reporting body. They are mainly responsible for 
the policy level interaction with the Burmese government and military as well as 
organising and coordinating the release of any underage recruits from the Tatmadaw. 
This chapter shows how the practices of norm implementation have developed and 
changed, as well as how they differ between different actors in Myanmar. I outline 
different understandings of the norm against child soldiering among international 
actors and their local counterparts as well as three mechanisms through which 
international actors try to effect change: the threat of international prosecutions, 
material sanctions and incentives, and the attempt to influence a shift in the self-
perception of the Myanmar military.  
8.2 The Community of Practice Around Child Soldiering in Myanmar 
The international community of practice around combating the recruitment and use 
of child soldiers in Myanmar is organised around the central coordinating body of the 
UN Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting (CTFMR), which is co-
chaired by the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator and the head 
                                                




of UNICEF in Myanmar. Based on UNSC Resolution 1612 from 2005, it was 
established in countries where Grave Violations against children are being 
committed in conflict and is tasked with setting up and maintaining a Monitoring and 
Reporting Mechanism (MRM).549 The CTFMR started working in Myanmar in 2007 
and brings together the ILO, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UN OCHA, the 
UN Resident Coordinator Office, the World Food Programme, as well as two 
international NGOs, Save the Children and World Vision. It is within this task force 
that institutional learning and an exchange about lessons learned takes place.  
 
The next sections explore the involvement of international actors in combating child 
soldiering in Myanmar, focusing on the history of UNICEF’s and the ILO’s work. 
Understanding the history of these organisations’ work in Myanmar helps clarify the 
type of background knowledge they draw on to develop their approach. Much of the 
difference in strategies that UNICEF and the ILO employ can be traced back to how 
they first started working in Myanmar and thus the different background knowledge 
and understandings of the international norm, that they built their work on. Whereas 
UNICEF largely relied on personal relationships and a close connection to the 
military government, the ILO, which entered the country much later than UNICEF, 
built an informant network to get information about human rights abuses without the 
government’s direct involvement. Four more general strategies are identified, each 
with their own more specific ones, which are used to varying degrees by the two 
organisations: relationship building (social incentives), the threat of international 
prosecutions (material sanctions), connecting child soldiering to broader strategic 
interests of the Tatmadaw (material incentives), like international arms deals, and 
finally trying to construct a new Tatmadaw identity as a modern and professional 
military (persuasion). 
8.2.1 UNICEF’s Work on Child Soldiers in Myanmar 
Having started work in Myanmar already in 1950 and continuing through decades of 
military rule, UNICEF found a way of working in a heavily repressive system 
without upsetting the military government, getting their staff arrested or being overly 
critical or confrontational. Compared to ILO engagement, discussed later on in this 
chapter, UNICEF in its original mandate and activities in Myanmar sees itself as a 
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humanitarian organisation, driven by the principles of humanity, neutrality, 
impartiality, and independence. 550  Hence, early UNICEF activities focused on 
vaccination programmes, basic education, community water supply and sanitation 
projects.551 
 
In line with the increased attention by international organisations, Western 
governments and international NGOs on the recruitment and use of child soldiers by 
militaries and armed groups around the globe as described in previous chapters, the 
recruitment practices of the Tatmadaw moved into focus for UNICEF in the early 
2000s. Driven by the Human Rights Watch Report ‘My Gun Was as Tall as Me’ 
published in 2002 and rising international criticism, UNICEF was the first 
international organisation to attempt building personal links to the military 
government with the aim of changing their child recruitment practices 
systematically.552 By now, UNICEF’s work on eliminating the use of child soldiers 
in Myanmar consists of three main areas: training, monitoring and reporting, and 
advocacy. 
8.2.2 Training the Tatmadaw 
The first and longest running aspect of UNICEF’s work on child soldiering in 
Myanmar is the training of government officials and military personnel. After 
lengthy negotiations of about a year, UNICEF started to host training sessions with 
Tatmadaw personnel in 2006/2007. The very first sessions were held in the Army 
Training School in Hmawbi Township, just outside of Yangon, and lasted only about 
20 minutes with mostly captain level personnel attending, covering questions of child 
development—since Myanmar signed the CRC in 1991 already it provided a good 
starting point for any child soldier issues—as well as desertion. A former Burmese 
UNICEF employee who was among the first to hold these trainings describes their 
content in the early days: ‘We do training on child development. You know the 
CRC? Like how a child should be treated, and how a child develops, what age he 
needs to be to join the army.’553 In the beginning, there was hardly any information 
given to UNICEF before the agreed training sessions in terms of who would be 
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attending the event. Over time, however, it was possible to design special trainings to 
cater to different ranks within the Tatmadaw. UNICEF managed to hold trainings 
throughout all ranks, including major generals and the General Staff Officer (G1), 
the highest-ranking Tatmadaw officer responsible for recruitment. Awareness raising 
in the military is not only achieved through training—which sometimes had to be 
labelled as ‘workshops’ as not to give the impression that the Tatmadaw would 
require any more training—but, after lengthy negotiations, also through the 
distribution of roughly 30,000 pocket guides in Burmese. 
 
Apart from raising awareness about child protection among the rank and file of the 
Tatmadaw, the trainings served another purpose, which is to increase interaction with 
the high-level generals, establish a mutual level of trust and to create awareness 
about the international monitoring and reporting processes that the Tatmadaw is 
subject to. The same former UNICEF employee conducting the first trainings 
summarises: ‘We said to them that we have to write a report to the Security Council 
and you should know that what kind of report would be there, what kind of questions 
we’re asking, what kind of changed behaviour is asked from you.’ 554  By 
communicating to the Tatmadaw and also to individual generals that UNICEF has to 
write reports about the amount, type, and attendance of training sessions and that this 
will go into the report written about the level of cooperation of the Myanmar military 
to the Secretary-General, a certain level of accountability is established and 
participation is encouraged. 
 
8.2.3 The Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism 
Precisely this reporting process became institutionalised at around the same time and 
until today, forms the core of international actors’ engagement with the Tatmadaw on 
child soldiers. The Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) to report grave 
violations against children committed by parties to a conflict was established by the 
Security Council in 2005 and, apart from the recruitment and use of child soldiers, 
includes monitoring of killing or maiming of children, attacks against schools or 
hospitals, sexual violence against children, abduction, and denial of humanitarian 
access for children.555 The MRM is set up and maintained by the CTFMR in 
Myanmar since 2007. The UN guidelines on implementing MRMs recommend a 
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significant involvement of the national government since this is the actor mainly 
responsible for guaranteeing child protection, even in conflict situations—even 
though national governments are not part of the MRM to maintain neutrality in 
information gathering processes. ‘The objective of the MRM at first hand is to gather 
more timely and accurate information on violations against children and bring it to 
the attention of the national government for immediate remedial action.’556 Current 
best practices recommend setting up inter-ministerial committees, which guarantee a 
systematic and continued information exchange and coordinated effort between 
national governments and international actors.557  
 
Monitoring and Reporting includes identifying potential perpetrators, on state and 
non-state side, data collection, the verification of reported incidents and their 
documentation. There is UNICEF staff who are full-time monitors but all other 
CTFMR staff, UN personnel (e.g. from other organisations or peacekeepers, 
depending on context) and associated NGOs who come across violations in their 
regular line of work will report to the MRM. The mechanism further relies on local 
media reports as well as direct reporting from victims and witnesses. Save the 
Children and World Vision are the two NGOs officially associated with the CTFMR. 
NGO partners have a dual function as part of the CTFMR: Firstly, they are 
community-level connections and have a much larger field presence, putting them in 
a unique position to contribute to the MRM and secondly, their advocacy work is 
directly targeted at the community rather than the governmental level, working with 
parents and relatives, community leaders, and often children directly.  
 
They also work directly with parents and cover issues of child protection as part of 
their broader parenting education programme, informing parents about their rights 
and needs as specified by the Child Rights Convention.558 The programme focuses 
on changing mindsets of parents; to make them sensitive to their children’s needs and 
to the detrimental effect of spending time in the army will have on their individual 
and social development. According to current World Vision personnel, the most 
important work, however, are mass media campaigns aimed at changing the public 
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perception of children serving in the military in society at large. The most prominent 
is probably the installation of billboards in every township across the country but the 
campaigns also include radio broadcasts and television ads, for example on 
Democratic Voice for Burma.559 
 
 
Image 7 Billboard on road leading into Yangon, 'What is the choice for a child under 18?' 
announcing that the Tatmadaw will no longer accept anyone below the age of 18, sponsored by 
local NGOs and UNICEF, picture taken by Richard Wainwright560 
A crucial aspect of the monitoring and reporting on violations relating to child 
soldiers in Myanmar is the establishment of a hotline, which is maintained by World 
Vision and UNICEF where individuals can directly contact the international agency 
responsible for the issue.561 World Vision started operating a hotline in June 2011, 
which was brought under the CTFMR umbrella in November 2012. According to 
data from World Vision, from June 2011 until November 2012, only 10 complaints 
were made via the hotline. However, the numbers increased drastically over the 
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following years, totalling a number of 743 complaints by June 2016.562 Even though 
monitoring and reporting focuses on finding out and verifying violations that have 
occurred, the aim is to elicit an appropriate response and establish accountability of 
the perpetrating parties and ultimately to prevent such violations from reoccurring.563 
The data collected through the MRM is used for the Global Annual Report by the 
Secretary-General on CAAC as well as for country-specific reporting. Several other 
UN bodies and processes may request and rely on data gathered by the MRM. On the 
national level, the information from the MRM is fed back to national stakeholders, 
especially the military and the government and was used for example to develop the 
2012 Joint Action Plan. 
 
Apart from the MRM and the training of military personnel, UNICEF further 
engages in advocacy—of individual cases as well as the issue at large—and direct 
policy negotiations with the government. Obtaining reliable information about the 
direct policy negotiations between UNICEF and the Myanmar government is very 
difficult, according to local journalists and human rights activists. To guarantee 
continued cooperation, also from the military, all of these negotiations are held 
behind closed doors and deal with issues such as punishment for recruiters of under 
18-year olds, the changing of legislation and implementation of already existing 
domestic and international legal commitments.  
8.2.4 The ILO’s work on Child Soldiers in Myanmar 
Although also being part of the CTFMR, headed by UNICEF, the primary work on 
underage recruitment by the ILO in Myanmar is through the Forced Labour 
Complaints Mechanism (FLCM). After three years of negotiations, the Myanmar 
government finally agreed to an institutionalised complaints mechanism for 
individuals ‘in full confidence that no retaliatory action will be taken against them’ 
which was instituted in 2007 as a result of a renewed Memorandum of 
Understanding between the government of Myanmar and the ILO in February 
2007.564 The three main objectives given to the new ILO liaison and deputy liaison 
officers Steve Marshall and Piyamal Pichaiwongse in 2007 were first, to support 
democracy building, second, to eliminate the use of forced labour and third, to have 
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all children released from the armed forces. Prior to this agreement, the ILO had 
been preparing to lodge an official question to the International Court of Justice 
relating to Myanmar’s continued use of forced labour, including underage 
recruitment, which was put on halt after the FLCM was signed.565  
 
 
8.2.5 Child Soldiering as Forced Labour  
The FLCM, starting in 2007, marks the first time during military rule, first under 
SLORC and then SPDC, in Myanmar that an international agency was awarded 
independent access to monitor and record human rights abuses directly, paving the 
way for example for the World Vision/UNICEF hotline established four years later. 
The ILO, the junta and some international human rights group described the 
agreement as a ‘historic deal’ and a ‘welcome and positive development’566, whereas 
minority human rights groups, such as the Karen Human Rights Group, remained 
sceptical due to a lack of access to the framework for rural villagers most likely 
affected by forced labour as well as disbelief in the junta’s guarantee not to retaliate 
against informants.567 The FLCM does not only deal with underage recruitment but a 
much broader set of issues, classified as forced labour.568 A current ILO Project 
Coordinator who is mainly responsible for underage recruitment says, when 
comparing the ILO to the UNICEF mandate:  
It is because the Special Rapporteur to the Secretary-General for CAAC is 
about children and armed conflict, whereas our approach has always been 
that it is always just another form of forced labour. We have no mandate that 
is specific to children or not, our mandate is forced labour. Whether you’re 
an adult or not, it’s forced labour, therefore we take it.569  
 
This frame of reference allowed the ILO to situate child soldiering in a different 
context. As I have shown in previous chapters, internationally, and also from 
UNICEF, activism against the use of child soldiers is generally embedded within 
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human rights, child protection, and development discourses—rarely as an issue of 
forced labour. Addressing child soldiering as an issue of forced labour also opens up 
the possibility to employ a different range of actions.  
 
For the FLCM to function, the ILO either needed informants across the country or 
locals reporting directly. Since other UN organisations, such as UNDP, UNICEF, 
and UNHCR already had staff working across the country who were sensitive to the 
issue, especially of child recruitment and child forced labour, they were the first 
point of call for the ILO. However, as mentioned, UNICEF and most other UN 
bodies in Myanmar at the time were mainly working on humanitarian issues and 
steering clear of anything too sensitive and therefore refused to work with the ILO on 
their complaints mechanism up until 2011. Faced with the impossibility of training 
and relying on any UN staff for monitoring and reporting purposes, the ILO started 
building the Forced Labour Voluntary Facilitators Network largely on their own 
from 2007 onwards. This network of informants, in the early days, mainly consisted 
of Burmese political activists who were willing to risk their personal safety to report 
on these issues and regular people who all went through under-the-radar training on 
risk management, recording and reporting skills. In the Myanmar context, existing 
practices of information sharing among UN agencies seemed to have broken down 
and ILO staff had to come up with an ad-hoc solution thus adding to the development 
of two parallel structures of dealing with issues of child soldiering in Myanmar.  
 
In the first year of the FLCM, the ILO received very few complaints, mainly due to 
the uncertainty of whether the junta would indeed refrain from retaliating against 
informants. Officially, this policy was upheld but at the same time, in the first year 
alone, 26 individuals were arrested for meeting with or talking to ILO staff.570 The 
reports received via the FLCM concerned first, the traditional use of forced labour 
for infrastructure projects, such as building bridges or roads, second, the use of 
forced labour for military purposes, such as carrying supplies or sweeping 
minefields, and finally, and by far most common in terms of number of reports, the 
underage recruitment of children into the Tatmadaw.571  
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Apart from the Complaints Mechanism, the 2007 agreement also provided for the 
ILO liaison to travel unaccompanied and without restrictions to verify any case that 
was being brought to the ILO through the FLCM. A senior ILO official summarises 
how the mechanism works:  
[The] agreement was that the residents of Myanmar, not citizens, residents, 
which is very important572 had the right to complain to me about the use of 
forced labour including recruitment and that I had the right to travel 
anywhere in the country without security clearance in order to assess that 
complaint. If I found there was a case to be answered then we negotiated with 
a high-level working group laid out by the government and military—then it 
was a military government of course—and our job then was to negotiate 
justice for the complainant and punishment for the perpetrator. It was an 
alternative legal system and it still exists and it still operates today.573  
 
A current ILO employee describes the FLCM as acting as an ombudsman, since 
there is no immediate redress available with the perpetrator being the state, limiting 
potential remedies through the formal justice system.574 Once the ILO has received 
and verified cases of child recruitment, they bring them to a committee chaired by 
the department of labour. The CTFMR mainly deals with the department of defense 
whereas the ILO’s focal point is the department of labour. While this means that the 
ILO does not have to deal with the military officials directly, it also means that the 
ways of communicating are slower since any release from the army has to be 
negotiated with the Tatmadaw directly.575 
8.3 Comparing ILO and UNICEF Approaches in Practice  
There are two lines of tension between UNICEF and the ILO: First, they have 
fundamentally different approaches in dealing with the Tatmadaw, as evidenced by 
how they build relationships and their self-perception. Second, they also seem to 
have different understandings of the norm against child soldiering itself and what a 
successful implementation of the norm would look like. Hence, it is not always clear 
what interpretation of the norm international actors are promoting, whether these 
interpretations and the corresponding strategies are in competition or complementary 
and which approach is suitable, appropriate, and most effective in this context. 
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Beyond these internal differences, there is an obvious mismatch between the 
Tatmadaw seeing the international norm against child soldiering as a strategic 
obstacle, which has to be negotiated around, and the international actors who 
understand the norm as a basic, inviolable principle. The rest of this chapter will go 
through these differences, trace them historically, and connect them to current 
strategies. It looks at the strategies of norm implementation that these organisations 
use, their different understandings and implementation of the international norm 
against the use of child soldiers as well as how these strategies connect to broader 
international discourses, such as sanctions as well as geopolitical concerns around 
the relationship with China and the West. 
8.3.1 Relationship Building 
Personal relationships between individuals, between UNICEF staff and government 
officials; and also within the government, have been indispensable for building a 
level of trust that allows for meaningful cooperation—what UNICEF calls 
‘partnerships’.576 At this point, it is still very difficult to give a comprehensive and 
accurate account of relationships within the Burmese military and government since 
access to relevant people and their willingness to talk about informal structures and 
relationships is very limited. The opening of the country after 2011, if continuing 
despite recent setbacks, and the slowly increasing transparency of political processes 
might make a more accurate account possible in a few years. Personal relationships, 
especially among politically motivated individuals in Myanmar, often go back 
decades and originate in cellblocks during the military junta rule, which imprisoned 
thousands of political activists, journalists, and student protesters over its 40-year 
rule.577 With the release of hundreds of political prisoners under Thein Sein, many of 
these relationships transferred into civil society space and the civilian government 
post-2015. 
 
It is somewhat less difficult to trace personal relationships when they extend to staff 
of international organisations. Throughout the interviews that were conducted in 
Myanmar, when asked about how first contacts to the Tatmadaw were established or 
why a particular programme was agreed to, the response was often that there was a 
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particular personal contact, which enabled either calling in a favour or actually 
opening up the space to convince a particular official of what the organisation is 
trying to achieve.578  One former Burmese government official and legal expert who 
started working for UNICEF before the establishment of the CTFMR describes how 
he first came to work on child soldiers: ‘I joined UNICEF, […], my job was child 
protection specialist we call it. CAAC [children and armed conflict], we call it, was 
not really my mandate or my ToR [Terms of Reference] but I know the government 
counterparts so the Rep [UNICEF Representative] asked me to do this. That’s how I 
came to be involved in this issue.’ He further refers to the fact that the reason the 
head of recruitment at the Tatmadaw allowed him to start holding trainings was that 
his wife was a colleague of his in his previous job as a judge.579  
 
UNICEF negotiated its position in close proximity to the government, making sure 
that they had access and contacts to the individuals who were actually able to make 
decisions on recruitment practices. Through decades of ‘non-political’ work focused 
on healthcare and community development, they had built a reputation among the 
military that they could be trusted. A former Burmese government official of over 30 
years who started coordinating UNICEF’s work on child soldiers early on and 
established first contacts with the Tatmadaw recounts: ‘During those early days, we 
were very much sidestepped. I was privy to a defense ministry internal memo, which 
said “UNICEF could be trusted. Only UNICEF could be trusted.” Others, they didn’t 
have the staff that was connected.’580 The Tatmadaw ultimately started working with 
UNICEF since they could somewhat rely on them not to taint their reputation too 
much, not to be too outspoken about the ongoing negotiations.581 
 
The ILO, in stark contrast to UNICEF, built their work against the use of child 
soldiers in Myanmar on a secret network of informants, trying to stay under the radar 
and working against the military government from the onset. While having a formal 
agreement with the junta, guaranteeing access and legitimating the existence of their 
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work and the mechanisms they set up, the early years of ILO engagement relating to 
child recruitment were characterised by a largely hostile relationship between the 
organisation and the Myanmar government. The underlying strategy, strongly 
defended by the key personnel at the time, was to build a level of respect between the 
government and the ILO based on a ‘no-nonsense’ approach, which does not reward 
merely rhetorical commitments and is not afraid of offending the government, 
risking access or connections. While this approach is based on strong moral 
principles and a stern belief in releasing as many children as possible from the 
Tatmadaw, it does raise the question of whether a permanent and sustainable change 
in recruitment practices is better achieved by harsh criticism and sticking to one’s 
beliefs unapologetically or by engaging the other party on their turf and attempting to 
change mindsets through continued interaction and communication.  
 
If we listen to Myanmar government officials, neither approach resulted in 
meaningful trust-building with the military but rather a necessity to achieve 
respective goals. In the words of former spokesperson for the President and 
information minister Ye Htut about cooperating with international organisations 
regarding child soldiers:  
We have to work with international organisations to overcome this issue but 
we never like them. Sometimes we feel they never understand the complexity 
of the issue. So instead of trying to understand that and work with us, they 
start with the blame game. For me, I don’t like them but I understand what 
we have to do to achieve their norm standard. Not because we like them, I 
never trust them, these organisations.582  
 
The different kinds of relationships established by UNICEF compared to the ILO 
also affect what kind of information is gathered by these organisations, which in turn 
informs the approaches for dealing with the military. The next section looks in more 
detail at knowledge production systems around child soldiers in Myanmar.  
 
These two different kinds of engagement, of building different relationships, also 
have implications for the way both organisations gather knowledge about the 
recruitment practices of the military and the severity of the child soldier problem. We 
have seen the way UNICEF implements the MRM, being largely dependent on the 
Tatmadaw giving them access to military training facilities and following up on 
reports they have received over the joint hotline. The ILO relies much more on direct 
                                                




information from their informant networks as well as child recruits and their parents 
directly. As well as background knowledge based on experience in previous contexts 
and engagements, this is the way international actors create background knowledge 
within Myanmar. 
8.3.2 Institutional Culture  
First, there seems to be a tension between different approaches in dealing with the 
Burmese military on the level of international actors. The previous paragraphs have 
introduced the work of the ILO and UNICEF regarding the use of child soldiers in 
the Tatmadaw. They have developed different mechanisms of addressing child 
soldier use and do not only differ in their practices but also in the way they approach 
their military counterparts.  
 
The main ILO objective with regards to child soldiers in Myanmar has been and 
continues to be getting every child and every underage recruit released from the 
armed forces. They share this aim with UNICEF, however, the tools and strategies 
they employ to achieve this differ, as shown in previous sections of this chapter. The 
ILO stresses the need to build mutual respect when dealing with the Tatmadaw and 
the importance of not being too accommodating, of not giving in easily in 
negotiations or appeasing their practices. A senior ILO official in Yangon describes 
dealing with the military:  
To be honest, the old regime were [sic] street fighters, military street fighters. 
If you rolled over in front of them, they would kick you, they would not 
respect you at all. If you stood up to them and you said to them: “What 
you’re doing is bloody wrong and I’m going to chase you for it!”, they 
accepted it. Over a period of years, we developed a relationship. Not trust, 
not love, but respect.583  
ILO negotiations mainly focus on investigating individual cases, establishing 
accountability and pushing for prosecution of recruiters for violating the military’s 
own rules. 
 
Taking a more principled, and crucially also more confrontational, approach also 
meant that ILO representatives would risk persecution, less so for themselves but for 
their Burmese staff, informants, and supporters. Especially in the early years of ILO 
presence in the country, established UN organisations, like UNICEF, refused to work 
with them so as not to risk their already established relationship with the regime. ILO 
                                                




staff was not invited to wider UN meetings for the first four years of their presence in 
the country. The flipside of the ILO approach is a lack of nuance and willingness to 
compromise, which would have complicated cooperation, especially in the early days 
from the mid-2000s. Linking back to the institutional structure and mandate of both 
organisations, the former ILO liaison officer summarises the differences between the 
two: ‘The ILO is an organization, which is based on rights; it is basically founded on 
firm fundamental principles. We are a development organisation, not as you would 
see UNDP, but our role is about development, our role is not humanitarian. They 
[UNICEF] are. Basically, they’re a humanitarian organisation and that brings a 
different philosophy.’584 He further insists, that not allowing themselves to be 
intimidated by repressive tactics of the military government ultimately contributed to 
building mutual respect. Only through this approach was anything beyond cosmetic 
change possible.  
 
UNICEF, on the other hand, developed a more cooperative engagement with the 
Tatmadaw, which can be linked to how they first started working on the issue. As 
outlined above, UNICEF started with a largely humanitarian mandate and used the 
government contacts that were established through this work to approach more 
sensitive issues gradually, such as child soldiers. UNICEF emphasised the 
importance of building bridges, compromising when necessary and being culturally 
sensitive to the Burmese context—often this meant facing criticism for being 
ineffective. 585  This sensitive approach based on building trust and accepting 
compromises has certainly made an initial engagement with the Tatmadaw possible 
in the first place. UNICEF over the years has managed to set up training sessions for 
members of the military at different levels and negotiate (albeit limited) access to 
military training facilities, opening doors for international agencies to monitor 
recruitment practices. What it does not address is a fundamental difference in 
understanding the norm against the use of child soldiers and its corresponding 
international commitments.  
 
Nonetheless, former UNICEF employees remember having to cover for ILO staff 
who were not allowed to attend meetings with high-ranking Generals.586 UNICEF 
would appease certain sensibilities by dressing accordingly, saving face in 
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negotiations, not bringing women to the negotiating table and on occasion even 
introducing high-level ILO representatives as UNICEF staff so as not to offend the 
Generals. This allowed for almost unique access to Tatmadaw training facilities both 
for inspections and for training sessions, to distribute leaflets educating rank-and-file 
soldiers about child soldier use, as well as being allowed to start talking to some 
ethnic armed groups, such as the Wa State Army, about their child recruitment 
practices.587 
 
This cooperative approach is not without its difficulties. As UNICEF’s work is 
largely built on access and connections, opportunities for voicing criticism, 
especially publicly, are limited. It is unlikely that UNICEF staff would risk 
jeopardising their connections by publicly calling out and thereby offending their 
partners. The UNICEF approach seems emblematic of the general stance of the UN 
operation in Myanmar and its consequences became clear with regards to handling 
the Rohingya crisis. In autumn 2017, a number of reports by major international 
newspapers unveiled the deliberately minimal response of most of the UN in 
Myanmar to the emerging human rights abuses against the Rohingya in Rakhine state 
in order not to risk government relations. A BBC report quotes a senior UN staffer: 
‘The government knows how to use us and to manipulate us and they keep on doing 
it - we never learn. And we can never stand up to them because we can't upset the 
government.’ 588  Apart from toning down any criticism of the government’s 
behaviour and advocacy on this issue, the head of the UN Country Team was also 
accused of suppressing a 2015 internal report outlining the UN’s shortcomings in 
response to the Rohingya crisis. Recent changes in the leadership of the UN in 
Myanmar have suggested that their conciliatory approach might be revisited at the 
moment.589 
8.3.3 Child Soldiers or Underage Recruits?  
At first glance, there seems to be a fairly linear story of international norm diffusion 
happening in Myanmar: Increasing activism by an increasing number of international 
actors has gradually lead to an improvement of the situation of children in Myanmar, 
the military continues to release underage recruits, fewer and fewer instances of 
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underage recruitment are recorded every year, and there seems to be a shared 
understanding that children should not serve in the military among a variety of local 
actors. However, there is a fundamental misunderstanding between the principled, 
norm-oriented approach of the international agencies and how the Tatmadaw views 
the issue. The following sections first unpack the different understandings of the 
norm among international actors before moving on to how the Tatmadaw perceives 
both the international normative framework and how international actors implement 
it.  
 
As outlined above, the two main actors to consider in terms of international activity 
with regards to child soldiers in Myanmar are UNICEF and the ILO. Both have a 
mandate to work towards the elimination of the use of child soldiers in the Tatmadaw 
and are crucial both in terms of policy efforts and direct contact for victims and their 
families. However, their mandates differ in terms of who they are given by—in the 
case of UNICEF, their office is implementing the Joint Action Plan signed by the 
Myanmar government and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General for Children and Armed Conflict in 2012, which reports to the General 
Assembly and the Human Rights Council (see chapter four about international 
framework)—whereas the ILO operates on their own Memorandum of 
Understanding, negotiated between the government of Myanmar and the ILO in 
2007.590 The different understandings of the norm lead to a somewhat confused 
message about what it means to be a child soldier according to the two main 
organisations who are advocating against it in Myanmar. 
 
UNICEF’s mandate is specifically restricted to child soldiers, defined as currently 
under-18-year-olds still actively serving in the military. This is not limited to active 
combatant roles but can include anything from porters, spies, and cooks to couriers 
and drivers. Crucially though, in order to access UNICEF support, the individual in 
question has to be under 18 at the time of receiving assistance. This means, as soon 
as a recruit turns 18, they do not fall under the UNICEF mandate anymore and would 
usually be referred to the ILO Forced Labour Complaint Mechanism.  
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The ILO, however, operates on a broader understanding as a result of embedding 
their work within the framework of forced labour, rather than children and armed 
conflict. They understand their work as dealing with ‘underage recruitment’. The 
crucial difference to the UNICEF framework is that, for the ILO, the age at which the 
person joins the military determines whether they can access support on leaving the 
army. Since the Burmese government signed the Joint Action Plan with the UN in 
2012, this marks the cut-off point for the ILO framework. This means that any 
soldier, who was under the age of 18 at the time of signing the action plan, even if 
they are now over 18, can access ILO resources and has the possibility to be released 
from the army as a result of having been recruited as a minor.591 
8.3.4 Child Soldiers as Bargaining Chips 
As shown in previous chapters, the norm against the recruitment and use of child 
soldiers has been largely internalised in the West, both on an individual and state 
level, and is seen as a fundamental principle without any negotiating space around it. 
Using child soldiers is considered a cruel and abhorrent practice that needs to be 
stopped immediately and without compromise. Most international and also local staff 
working on this issue in Myanmar seem to share the same conviction. ‘Child soldiers 
to me is unacceptable in any form, absolutely unacceptable!’, so senior ILO staff.592  
 
When international agencies first started advocacy on the issue in Myanmar in the 
late 2000s, there was overall little knowledge among Tatmadaw and non-state 
recruiters about what was meant by the term ‘child soldier’. Ye Htut, former Minister 
for Information and Spokesperson for Thein Sein, explains:  
I would like to say, yes, since 1948 in our country, on both sides, the 
government and also the ethnic armed groups are using child soldiers. We 
never think it is a crime. It is against the international norms but this is based 
on our history. When the Myanmar [people] were fighting against the British 
and the Japanese, during that time when the BIA was coming in with Aung 
San, many people joined. Many of them are underaged.593  
 
While there might have been some awareness that the use of children as fighters in 
active combat was not acceptable internationally, the fairly far-reaching definition, 
including the use of children as porters, lookouts, messengers, or cooks remained 
largely unknown. A former UNICEF employee recounts first negotiations with the 
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vice chair of the United Wa State Army about their use of child soldiers and their 
complete surprise at the fact that 16 and 17-year-old youth who would assist or cook 
for the armed group would be considered as child soldiers under international law.594 
 
Nowadays, the ruling elite of the Tatmadaw is not denying the awareness of 
international legal commitments, or the existence of child soldiers within their ranks 
anymore. However, according to Ye Htut, this awareness does not extend beyond the 
officer ranks: ‘The officers, we understand the issue. But the soldiers who actually 
conduct the recruitment process on the ground, they still think: “If they want to fight, 
why shouldn’t we give the chance to them?” Some of them also joined the military as 
children. “I also joined, why don’t we use them?” This is still happening, [the 
international community is] still trying to change the mindset of the people.’595 Most 
Tatmadaw negotiators, who are dealing with UN or ILO staff, have realised that their 
cooperation regarding the release of child soldiers and complying with requested 
changes in recruitment procedures can be used as a powerful bargaining chip to first, 
demonstrate goodwill and second, guarantee continued assistance in other areas. 
 
There is a disparity in what international actors and the Tatmadaw are trying to 
achieve through engaging in negotiations about child soldiers. Eliminating the 
recruitment and use of child soldiers, for international actors, is an absolute and 
moral issue and all measures have to be taken to achieve that goal. For the 
Tatmadaw, this is an opportunity ‘to improve their image as a professional army, an 
opportunity to show they can be respected by the international community and to get 
off the Security Council blacklist,’ so White.596 He recounts several negotiations 
within the Labour Committee where their Myanmar counterparts would start 
bargaining over which underage recruits to release and which to keep in the military. 
‘We’ve had situations where they say to us: “Okay look we’ll concede, we’ll give 
you that boy […] but then give us this boy.” We’re not horse-trading over kids!’597 
From the perspective of the Burmese military, releasing child soldiers from the 
armed forces is one of the issues that will help them increase their international 
standing. It is a strategic, not a moral choice.598 This chapter later discusses these 
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dynamics in more detail, focusing on how the Tatmadaw uses the child soldier issue 
as a way to recreate their identity as a modern and professional military. 
 
Just looking at the application of the international norm against child soldiering 
through the specific activities of UNICEF and the ILO at the local level in Myanmar 
would lead only to a superficial understanding of the strategies of international actors 
in this context. In order to connect these activities, understandings of the 
international norm, and different types of background knowledge, the next section 
explores the broader discourses and developments that they are embedded in. 
8.4 Strategies of International Norm Promotion  
Given these different perceptions of the norm against the use of child soldiers, what 
are some of the strategies that international actors either employ directly or play into? 
The following sections analyse three different modes of engagement: Threatening 
international prosecution (material sanctions), embedding the issue in broad 
geopolitical concerns (material incentives), and connecting the Tatmadaw identity to 
the issue of child recruitment (persuasion). 
8.4.1 Threat of International Prosecutions 
On occasion, international organisations staff has used the potential threat of an ICC 
investigation to clarify the seriousness of breaching international regulations on child 
soldier use. While enlisting children under the age of 15 into armed forces is clearly 
defined as a war crime in the Rome Statute, Myanmar has not acceded to it and is 
thus not a member of the ICC. This means that the ICC does not have automatic 
jurisdiction over acts committed in Myanmar or by a Myanmar citizen. It is however 
possible for the UN Security Council to refer cases to the Prosecutor for 
investigation—which it has done in the case of Darfur and Libya—or the country in 
question can accept the jurisdiction of the ICC for this specific situation. However, if 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide are committed by the national of a 
country who is not a member of the ICC but in the territory of a country that is, the 
ICC has jurisdiction. Indeed, in September 2018, the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC 




people from Myanmar’s Rakhine state to Bangladesh, which is a member of the 
ICC.599   
 
The ILO has been fairly explicit in using the threat of international prosecutions to 
pressure the military into cooperating. Several people interviewed explained that 
mentioning ICC investigations and convictions of individuals responsible for 
recruiting and using children in conflict in DRC, Uganda, and CAR, would 
sometimes help to ‘encourage’ cooperative behaviour by individual Generals who do 
not want to see themselves the target of a potential ICC investigation.600 Just prior to 
the Tatmadaw agreeing to the FLCM in 2007, the ILO writes the following in a 
report, threatening ICC involvement in no uncertain terms:  
As regards the question of making available a record of the relevant 
documentation of the ILO related to the issue of forced labour in Myanmar to 
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court for any action that may be 
considered appropriate, it is noted that these documents are public and the 
Director-General would therefore be able to transmit them.601 
 
A senior ILO official confirms that in his assessment of the situation, the government 
agreeing to institute the Forced Labour Complaint Mechanism was a direct result of 
explicitly holding international legal repercussions over their heads:  
This [the FLCM] was very far-reaching, and frankly, we achieved it by pure 
blackmail. Essentially, we had in the ILO a National Commission of Inquiry, 
and the government ignored it completely. So we said: “Well, you got the 
choice, you can either sit down and talk to us about making this work […] or 
we’ll take you to the International Court of Justice.” And they didn’t want to 
go to the ICJ and so they talked to us.602 
 
UNICEF does not use explicit threats. However, when first negotiating access to 
battalions and organising trainings for members of the military in 2006, former 
UNICEF negotiators would explain to Tatmadaw Generals that, under UN 
Resolution 1612 from 2005, they were obliged to write reports about the situation of 
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child soldiers in Myanmar. Depending on their level of cooperation, these reports 
could either note the general positive attitude of the Tatmadaw and their willingness 
to change, or they could report the blank out denial of any issues and the refusal to 
work with international actors. However, it is largely unfeasible for UNICEF to 
resort to more coercive tactics like threatening legal proceedings given its reliance on 
good relations with the government as the starting point of their engagement. Instead, 
this is less of an implicit threat of legal proceedings but rather an appeal to what kind 
of international actor the Tatmadaw wants to be and the potential (non-legal) 
consequences, which might result in uncooperative behaviour. The next two sections 
explore these two lines of argument further. 
8.4.2 Embargoes, Sanctions, and Incentives 
The international community’s critique of the use of child soldiers by the Tatmadaw 
does not stand isolated as a particularly egregious human rights violation. Instead, 
international actors explicitly frame the issue as part of broader human rights 
concerns, which ultimately are the given reason for continued sanctions, especially 
military sanctions, against the regime. This section shows how international actors, 
mostly informally, use the aim of the Tatmadaw to have the arms embargo lifted and 
connect it to their ongoing violation of international law and international norms, and 
ultimately the recruitment of children.  
 
World Vision child protection worker Wah Eh Htoo, who grew up in Maymyo 
(official Pyin Oo Lwin) next to a military academy, explains the Tatmadaw’s efforts: 
I think one of the main concerns is very practical, they want new weapons 
from Western countries. They buy it from China, they buy it from Russia, they 
buy it from Pakistan, Belarus. But they want the good stuff from Western 
countries; it is a most practical reason. I don’t think it’s very much related to 
the moral kind of things but it’s the practical things.603  
 
Connecting this to child soldiering becomes possible as a result of the self-perception 
of the Tatmadaw as the guardian of the Republic and the great unifier of Myanmar, 
as the next section will show in more detail. Former minister for Information and 
Lieutenant Colonel Ye Htut explains the military’s rationale:  
[From 2008] they selected issues, which were becoming obstacles with our 
relationship with the international community, especially the West. That’s 
why the military started taking  human rights education. The main 
strategic objective is to reintegrate with the international community, so 
                                                




every ministry has selected the issue, which is an obstacle to achieve this. 
Child soldiers is one of the issues.604  
 
Summer and autumn 2016 marked a crucial, albeit short-lived shift for Myanmar’s 
position in the international system. In September/October 2016, and after years of 
negotiation, which were accelerated by the NLD election win in November 2015, the 
United States dropped most economic sanctions still in place against Myanmar and 
reinstated access to the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), a set of 
preferential tariffs for developing countries.605 This pertains to key industries in the 
country, including controversial ones such as the jade mining industry, which was 
long criticised for financing military cronies. However, as a response to the 
escalation of the Rakhine crisis, the US and Canada have imposed sanctions against 
individual Generals in late 2017, with European countries debating whether to re-
introduce them.606  
 
Furthermore, as of 2018, and most importantly for the Tatmadaw, most military 
sanctions are still in place, meaning no arms sales or sales of equipment that could be 
used for internal repression. Some European countries, as well as the US, UK, and 
Australia, had started re-engaging the Tatmadaw, mostly focusing on English 
language courses and non-combat trainings on democracy and leadership. With the 
reinstatement of some sanctions and the increasing international critique, as of 
2017/18, all but Australia have ceased cooperating with the Burmese military.607 
 
The international arms embargo puts the Tatmadaw in a difficult position. They are 
dependent on China for most of their weapons, with additional supplies coming from 
Russia, Belarus, Pakistan, North Korea, and the black market.608 Most weapons they 
can currently acquire are either outdated or of low quality, which makes military 
activity and engaging in ongoing fighting with ethnic armed groups increasingly 
arduous. Thus, one of the main aims of the Tatmadaw leadership is establishing 
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themselves as a respectable military internationally in order to contribute to a speedy 
lifting of the arms embargo: 
What they have been trying has been to upgrade fighting capabilities. If 
they’re going to modernise in terms of military equipment, they need to buy 
from other countries, developed countries, UK, US, or others. To be able to 
buy from them, they need to address their own problems here, to be in 
compliance with international standards, only then can they buy those things. 
This is something they need to match on the ground for them to be able to be 
a credible country down the road.609  
 
Wa Eh Htoo further notes that most Western governments that are prolific arms 
traders, such as France, Germany, the UK, Spain, or Italy, have a set of conditions 
attached to potential arms deals, which prohibits them from exporting to Myanmar, 
even if the arms embargo was lifted. For example, the Arms Trade Treaty from 2014 
(signed for example by the UK, Germany, France,…) bans international arms deals 
where weapons are likely to end up being used for human rights abuses.610  
 
A former senior military government official sees the reinstatement of sanctions 
against the military and repeated criticism of the current regime as a missed chance 
for Western powers to have an impact on the transition in Myanmar. ‘The only one 
making profit is China. Because the Myanmar military and the Myanmar government 
is trying to walk away from China, now you push them to the Chinese.’611 Since 
China fairly freely disregards the international arms embargo and continues to invest 
heavily in the country (other FDI has been decreasing rapidly between 2016 and 
2018), this leaves less room for human rights concerns of Western government and 
international organisations to resonate.  
8.4.3 Constructing the Tatmadaw’s Identity: How to Be (Perceived as) a 
Modern Military  
One of the most consistent findings throughout almost all interviews is the emphasis 
of the fairly recent desire of the Tatmadaw leadership, meaning top-level generals 
and government officials, to be recognised internationally as a modern and 
professional military. This comes out in interactions and negotiations with 
international actors, mostly the ILO and UNICEF who negotiate with the army 
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directly, in press releases and statements to local media as well as in official 
documents published by the Tatmadaw itself.612  
 
Throughout decades of military rule and based on the founding story of independent 
Burma, the Tatmadaw has extensively portrayed itself as the protector of the 
Republic of Myanmar.613 Huge propaganda campaigns instilled the message that 
without military rule, Myanmar would have become a pawn in Cold War politics, 
similar to their neighbouring countries, and it would have certainly been ripped apart 
by various secessionist movements. 614  The major political change from 2011 
onwards has affected the Tatmadaw’s self-perception and was part of a process of 
identity change, which international activists are trying to connect to. Starting during 
the Thein Sein government and until today, the Generals made clear that it was 
thanks to their liberalisation policies, and not a result of international pressure, that 
Myanmar is seeing the economic upturn and political changes it is experiencing 
today—again, protecting the nation. Former government minister under Thein Sein, 
Ye Htut, emphasises that although ‘sometimes Western countries think we make the 
change because of their pressure or their achievements—it’s not true. Myanmar did 
nearly 60 years under isolation and we can live another 40.’615 As part of the 
‘roadmap to democracy’ and the establishment of the new constitution in 2008, the 
military government started imagining their reintegration into the international 
community.616  
 
Going into the 2015 elections, Thein Sein’s party (USDP) was confident that they—
in combination with the 25% of the seats in parliament that are reserved for the 
military anyway—would comfortably win a majority. However, the NLD won a 
landslide victory and with the regime change, regular Burmese people became more 
outspoken about their criticism of the military.617 This domestic dissent along with 
the continued international criticism about the widespread human rights abuses 
committed by the army and the continuous failure to decisively defeat the ethnic 
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insurgencies lead to the realisation that steps have to be taken to modernise and 
professionalise the Tatmadaw, beyond just the possibility of buying better 
equipment.  
 
Another recent expression of the desire to be perceived as a professional military, 
both domestically and internationally, is the attempt to contribute Tatmadaw 
personnel to UN peacekeeping operations. First reports of the Tatmadaw being in 
discussions with the UN Department for Peacekeeping emerged in March 2014 when 
it was reported that UN Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on Myanmar, Vijay 
Nambiar, had invited the Tatmadaw to start discussing how to contribute to UN 
peacekeeping operations. After quickly ensuing outrage by Human Rights Watch and 
other NGOs,618 the UN later clarified that the Myanmar Commander-in-Chief was 
informed by Nambiar that Myanmar was 'invited to discuss its interest in specific 
terms with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations which would consider such a 
request in accordance with its regular parameters'.619 This response suggests that 
contrary to previous reporting, there has been no ‘invitation’ on behalf of the UN but 
rather a request from the Burmese side to contribute peacekeepers. Indeed, these 
discussions, whoever they were originally initiated by, have been successful and the 
Tatmadaw indeed contributes troops to two UN Peacekeeping Missions, to UNMIL 
in Liberia and to UNMISS in South Sudan. This engagement started in September 
2015 and as of summer 2017, there were two Burmese Army soldiers in both of 
those missions. 620  Considering the desire of the Tatmadaw to participate in 
peacekeeping and the experience of successfully using the carrot of participation in 
peacekeeping to encourage a complete sweep of the armed forces of any child 
soldiers, as has been achieved for example in Chad in 2013, the international 
community seems to have thrown away the opportunity to engage the Myanmar 
military on this issue.621  
 
Several interviewees, from the IO, NGO and government side suggested that the key 
to making significant progress regarding this issue is to connect this desire to 
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professionalise to the necessity to eradicate the use of child soldiers at the same 
time.622 To be respected internationally as a serious military means fulfilling a 
number of criteria. International activists seem to be at their most successful when 
they can convince the Generals that eliminating the use of child soldiers is one of the 
first steps in this process. It signals good intentions and the willingness to change to 
the international community. Appealing to the Generals’ professional pride along 
with delivering the message that no serious military could rely on using child soldiers 
in their ranks connects the identity the Tatmadaw aspires to with compliance 
regarding the international norm. A senior ILO official at the time describes the first 
breakthrough: 
In the beginning, the government was in absolute denial. The breakthrough 
came when Anonymous and I were in a meeting with UNICEF and the 
Tatmadaw, lots of brass on the other side of the table. And they were going 
on and on, denying and saying it was only the non-state armed groups that 
were using children. I got angry and I said: “Deny as much as you like, but 
I’ve got 13-year-old kids wearing your uniform, running away and coming 
into my office. You’re calling yourselves a professional army, professional 
officers, but actually, I consider you to be babysitters and until such time that 
you’re prepared to be professional militaries, I am not sure I even want to 
talk to you.” And I got up and walked out and the others weren’t quite sure 
how to react and eventually, UNICEF walked out and two weeks later I was 
contacted by a very senior military person and he said: “I think we need to 
do something about these kids.”623 
 
Despite this seemingly successful mechanism, whether consciously or 
unconsciously, international actors might be contributing to a somewhat perverse 
trade-off. Focused on achieving their aim of eliminating the use of child soldiers, 
they are playing off the Tatmadaw’s expressed interest to modernise and lift the arms 
embargo—potentially encouraging and enabling them to keep fighting and thereby 
prolonging the civil war. ‘The arms embargo still stands, so they will try everything. 
All the soldiers want good weapons, especially since they are still fighting,’ 
according to independent journalist Toe Zoe Latt.624 If the Tatmadaw’s calculation 
were to pay off—which in 2018 is looking increasingly unlikely given the 
reputational losses over Rakhine—they would have succeeded in increasing their 
military capacity by paying lip service to international norms. None of the 
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international actors interviewed for this study seemed to be aware of or concerned by 
this potential consequence. 
 
With the help of UNICEF and the ILO, the Tatmadaw has indeed been continuously 
releasing child soldiers from its ranks since signing the action plan with the UN in 
2012, over 850 by 2017.625 These releases are usually accompanied by big press 
conferences with local and sometimes international media present.626 International 
organisation and NGO staff are part of the proceedings, having assisted with the 
release, and will give speeches about the ever-improving cooperation of the military 
and the continued efforts to work towards a complete stop of child recruitment and 
the release of all underage recruits. The rhetoric, especially by UNICEF, which is the 
main organisation coordinating releases, has developed from critical to strongly 
encouraging of the Tatmadaw’s efforts. Basing an analysis of the changing practices 
in the Myanmar military on media reporting as well as IO and NGO reports would 
paint the picture of a slow but certain upwards trend.  
 
The number of underage recruits that are being released certainly marks an 
improvement to pre-2012 practices. Nonetheless, direct participants and observers of 
the process, both on the side of international organisations and local journalists, do 
not attribute this to changing attitudes but to an ongoing attempt to keep improving 
the Tatmadaw’s international standing little by little. Releasing underage recruits is a 
low-cost concession to demonstrate goodwill. Current ILO staff notes that it would 
be easy for the Tatmadaw to agree to let UN personnel inspect their army bases and 
military training facilities; identify and release all child soldiers and underage 
recruits in a very short amount of time and afterwards assist with a fundamental 
reform of their recruitment practices to prevent underage recruitment in the future.627 
If they were to do that, however, the expectation is that international attention would 
move on to another human rights issue to pressure the military about, be it about 
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their tactics in fighting the ethnic armed groups, even outside Rakhine state,628 or the 
treatment of their regular soldiers.629  Considering this, and keeping reputation costs 
as well as costs for changing behaviour in mind, it makes more sense for the 
Tatmadaw to keep releasing child soldiers little by little, usually about 50-80 at a 
time, to demonstrate the willingness to change without having to face potentially 
more far-reaching international demands.  
 
A good example, which powerfully demonstrates the different attitudes towards child 
recruitment between the Tatmadaw and the international agencies, happened prior to 
a planned child soldier release ceremony facilitated by UNICEF and the ILO in 
2014. The Tatmadaw, conjointly with the international agencies, had already sent out 
an announcement and invitations to a press conference ceremony where around 100 
underage recruits were supposed to be released from the military—many of whom at 
this point are not under 18 anymore but were recruited when they were under 18.630 
The day before the ceremony, two soldiers who were about to be released received 
note from their commanding officer that they got an assignment in Rakhine state and 
had to leave immediately. Instead, they went AWOL, probably with the intention to 
desert and avoid being sent to a potential active fighting zone. Prompted by the ILO 
liaison to amend the press release to accurately reflect the number of soldiers to be 
released the following day, the senior Tatmadaw official responsible for organising 
the release from the military’s side saw no need to change the press release and 
instead guaranteed the ILO liaison that they would simply find another two underage 
recruits to replace the absentees. ILO staff remembers the Tatmadaw response: 
‘There was one mass discharge, it was like 95 boys to be discharged. Then the day 
before, they were coming to us saying: “Okay, we have 93 of them but we can’t find 
these other two. But here’s another one, there’s another one there.” You can’t store 
them! The commitment is different.’631 Rather than a principled commitment to end 
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child soldiers, so this ILO staff member, the Tatmadaw perceives that they need to 
do PR exercises in order to change international perception.632  
8.5 Conclusion 
Many scholars have pointed out already that the process of international norm 
distribution is not a one-directional one. Norms do not simply get ‘delivered’ to their 
local recipients who then either adopt or challenge them.633 As outlined in chapter 
two, local actors can use international norms to their advantage. Knowing that norm-
violating behaviour will be punished and norm-conforming behaviour rewarded, they 
can play into this dynamic by appearing or attempting to conform to international 
expectations without changing anything substantially. This seems to be largely the 
case with the Tatmadaw’s efforts to limit the use of child soldiers in its own ranks.  
 
This chapter has shown how the international norm against child soldiering is applied 
and implemented in Myanmar. It has explored the strategies of the international 
community, specifically UNICEF and the ILO, to combat the practice of child 
soldiering in the Tatmadaw. By tracing the history and relationships that these two 
key norm-implementing organisations have in the country, I have shown that their 
differences in approach are a result of this and the different types of background 
knowledge they build their work on. UNICEF, who has a much longer established 
presence in Myanmar, relies largely on personal relationships and close connections 
to the Tatmadaw in order to safeguard access and build trust with their military 
counterparts. The ILO on the other hand, who only started work in the country in the 
2000s, started to build an informant network and take a confrontational approach 
with the military in order to gain their respect rather than their trust. The chapter has 
also drawn out different understandings of child soldiering by the Tatmadaw, 
UNICEF, and ILO as well as highlighted three different ways international actors 
connect child soldiering to other issues of interest to the military, such as the threat 
of international prosecutions, potential sanctions and embargoes, and re-constructing 
the Tatmadaw’s identity in line with international normative standards. The 
following chapter compares the findings of the two cases, traces how and why 
strategies of norm implementation have changed over time and space, as well as 
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what the implications of the application of the norm are in terms of its impact on 





Chapter 9: The Universal Child Soldier 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter ties the results of the empirical analysis together. It combines the 
findings of the first part of the thesis, focusing on the emergence of the norm against 
child soldiering and the structure of the international network, with those of the 
second part, analysing the actual influence of the international efforts on actors on 
the ground. It answers the question of how and why practices of norm 
implementation have changed between the two cases analysed before drawing out the 
implications of the application of the norm in terms of its impact on children and the 
image of the child soldier.  
 
The first part of this chapter focuses on the comparative analysis of the two case 
studies and their position in the larger international normative framework. I first 
show how the international norm against child soldiering on the international level 
and its implementation on the ground has changed since the ratification of the 
Optional Protocol in 2002. Secondly, I trace the change in implementation practices 
of international organisations by looking at inter-institutional politics, knowledge 
production and institutional learning within and between the cases of Sierra Leone 
and Myanmar. A few key issues are drawn out to illustrate how the strategies of 
international actors developed between the two and how lessons learned have 
travelled between cases and contexts: first on an institutional level by comparing 
how different international actors interact and (try to) cooperate in both contexts 
second on a more issue-based level by analysing whether major lessons learned in 
earlier contexts, such as Sierra Leone, were addressed and implemented differently in 
later contexts, such as Myanmar. I highlight the debate around female child 
combatants and reintegration of released child soldiers as two examples of how 
institutional learning can take place and what its limits are.  
 
The second part of this chapter then broadens the discussion to draw more far-
reaching conclusions about the relationship between international actors and the 
states, in which they are active, relating back to the discussion in chapter two about 
areas of limited statehood and capacity building. Finally, the discourse around child 
soldiers is read as emblematic of a broader discourse on power relations between the 




based, and the global South, where most conflicts in which child soldiers partake are 
located. There are colonial overtones, not used to legitimise direct colonial control 
anymore but to justify the continued presence of humanitarian and development 
organisations. The implications of this discourse are structured along three main 
themes: (1) physicality, (2) rationality, and (3) agency. 
9.2 From Sierra Leone to Myanmar: The Era of Application 
On the international level, by the time the war in Sierra Leone ended, the institutional 
framework governing the recruitment and use of underage soldiers had formed. It is 
in 2004, when Olara Otunnu, the Special Representative for Children and Armed 
Conflict at the time, calls for an ‘era of application’ of all the agreed measures, 
advocacy successes, and development of standards. The following section focuses on 
the comparison and change in the strategies of norm implementation between the two 
case studies in this project. Change in practices at the international level is analysed 
by looking at, for example, the institutionalisation of Child Protection Advisors 
(CPA) as part of peacekeeping operations, the establishment of the Monitoring and 
Reporting Mechanism (MRM), and the continued evolvement of DDR programmes 
focusing on children—more often now with specific attention being paid to girls 
affected by armed conflict as later parts of this chapter will show.  
 
Sierra Leone has been a key case for the development of the international network 
against the use of child soldiers and is the first time that many instruments were 
tested. For example, the Lomé Peace Accord in 1999 was the first peace agreement 
that explicitly included a provision for all parties to the conflict to release any child 
combatants from their armed forces, which is by now a fairly standard practice to 
push for during peace negotiations.634  
 
On an institutional level, UNAMSIL was the first peacekeeping mission in which the 
UN deployed a Child Protection Advisor (CPA), which would later develop into 
standard practice. The experience in Sierra Leone was of a rather ad-hoc nature, 
described by a senior UN official in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO) in New York as ‘a good experiment’. She describes their deployment: ‘The 
idea was to send an advisor and the advisor would sort of work their way through 
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and help the political mission respond better to child protection issues. Identify the 
concerns and help leverage the military and security component for the benefit of 
children. There was only one advisor at the time.’635 The lessons learned in Sierra 
Leone were paramount to later cases, which saw much higher numbers of CPAs 
deployed for example in DRC, and Liberia. As of now, Child Protection Advisors are 
routinely deployed with every UN Peacekeeping Mission.636 
 
One of the key features in terms of institutionalising the norm that were newly 
introduced after Sierra Leone was the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism 
(MRM), agreed on by the Security Council in 2004 and established in 2005. The 
purpose of this mechanism is to standardise the practice of reporting on violations 
against children in the context of armed conflict, and of gathering reliable and timely 
data, which should allow for more concerted and effective advocacy.637 It is also an 
initiative to ensure coordination between different organisations in the UN family 
and to utilise existing personnel on the ground, such as peacekeeping troops as part 
of the process. Under the MRM, there was a clear agenda on which violations were 
monitored, focusing resources and attention on specific issues rather than on a vague 
idea of child protection broadly defined.638   
 
While the MRM has definitely contributed to gathering more structured data about 
child soldier use across the globe, it also suffers from shortcomings that are worth 
noting. Chapter four has already detailed the problems of gathering reliable data 
about child soldier numbers in general. However, the MRM does not attempt to 
provide a comprehensive picture but instead limits its attention to situations on the 
agenda of the Security Council. As of 2018, there are monitoring mechanisms in 
place in 20 conflict contexts in 14 countries.639 Its high standards of verification and 
scrutiny result in the numbers that are reported being in all likelihood much lower 
than actual numbers of child soldier use.640 This, in turn, might lead to a legitimising 
function of the MRM, for example for the Myanmar military, the Tatmadaw, which 
                                                
635 Makome, Interview, New York, 15th June 2017. 
636 Makome. 
637 “Guidelines Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Grave Violations against Children in 
Situations of Armed Conflict,” 7. 
638 Makome, Interview, New York, 15th June 2017. 
639 Tremblay, “Monitoring and Reporting on Grave Violations.” 




can now—backed by UN numbers—claim that there are only isolated cases of child 
recruitment happening anymore.  
9.3 Changes in the Salience of the Norm 
Chapter two has theorised the importance of salience and contestation of a norm as a 
factor that influences how it operates in different contexts. Chapter four has then 
outlined the emergence of the international norm against the recruitment and use of 
child soldiers and its increasing regulation in international law and UN resolutions 
throughout the 1990s until around 2002 when OPAC and the Rome Statute were 
ratified. Since then, which coincided with the official end of the civil war in Sierra 
Leone, the norm has remained fairly stable and there is hardly any occurrence of 
validity contestation of the core tenets of the norm. More and more states have 
ratified the Optional Protocol, committing themselves to 18 as the minimum age of 
recruitment into the armed forces. As far as state and non-state actors who recruit and 
use child soldiers are concerned, as of 2018, all 28 parties that were listed on the 
Security Council list since its establishment in 2002 have signed Action Plans with 
the UN. Of those, 11 armed forces and groups have been delisted because they have 
complied with the requirements of the Action Plans—the Tatmadaw is not one of 
them.641  
 
The salience of the issue on the international advocacy agenda affects how much 
attention is given to different contexts with child soldiers at different points in time. 
Around 2002, child soldiering was at the forefront of the children in armed conflict 
agenda and even of the child protection agenda more broadly, with development 
focused NGOs and human rights organisations expanding their work to cover this 
issue. Carpenter’s network analysis of the transnational network of children and 
armed conflict in 2005 provides a useful snapshot of the issue salience at that 
particular moment. She finds that ‘child soldiers’ is the most frequent agenda item on 
websites of the key players in the advocacy network with 76% of websites 
mentioning it.642 In comparison, only 36% of websites mention ‘girls’ as a separate 
issue—this is not only relating to girl soldiers but girls in the context of armed 
conflict in general. Since then, and as several diplomats and activists at headquarter 
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level in New York have confirmed, the issue is no longer at the forefront of child 
protection advocacy with attention having moved to for example attacks on schools, 
and most recently, children on the move.643 Whereas the main aim of the activist 
network in the 1990s and 2000s was to establish legally binding instruments that 
enshrined the minimum age of 18 into international law and get as many countries as 
possible to sign up to these commitments, the last decade has seen a shifting focus to 
improve existing standards and focus on implementation. Both activists and 
diplomats note that while there is an awareness that devising ever more and new UN 
resolutions is not always conducive, there is pressure to keep the issue at the top of 
the agenda and sustain member states’ attention and funding especially given current 
funding cuts at the UN.  
 
Since age 18 has been more or less established as the minimum age of recruitment 
and the definition of child soldiers has been clearly defined as including a large 
variety of roles, the content of the norm as it is legally and institutionally prescribed, 
has not changed. What has changed is the salience and contestation of the issue and 
how much international attention and resources are dedicated to its promotion.  
 
However, the norm as it is internationally defined does not directly translate into a 
set of actions for actors on the ground trying to implement or apply it to a specific 
situation. It has to be interpreted in terms of contextual relevance and corresponding 
modes of action and specific strategies have to be chosen by international actors that 
prescribe how to engage. A common thread highlighted throughout the empirical 
chapters of this thesis is the different interpretations of the international norm based 
on different perceptions of child soldiers by international actors, mostly international 
organisations like UNICEF but also international NGOs like Save the Children or 
Caritas and the local actors, such as governments, communities, parents, and the 
children themselves.  
 
In Sierra Leone, international actors mostly adopted a victim-centric narrative when 
working with former child soldiers and their communities. NGOs and the UN have 
been successful in creating this narrative and identity for former ex-combatants, 
which helped them to convince communities to take their children back. Rendered 
innocent and at no fault for the atrocities they may have committed, returning 
                                                




children were expected to subordinate themselves to village hierarchy again and 
return to their pre-conflict lives. International and local child protection workers, as 
well as some former child soldiers, found this narrative useful—it enabled them to 
access certain benefits and not be held accountable for their actions throughout the 
war. However, it contributed to standardising children’s experiences, ultimately 
underestimating the potential agency that some combatants might have had, and 
insufficiently addressing some grievances in communities that had suffered at the 
hands of the rebel forces.  
 
In Myanmar, this victimisation narrative largely exists in international NGO accounts 
about children who had been abducted by the Tatmadaw and forced to join. At the 
same time, there is awareness that voluntary enlistment or being sent to the army by 
parents and relatives has been and is happening for a variety of reasons, such as 
securing a stable income, accessing housing, healthcare, or a pension. This is 
particularly prevalent in the ILO’s reframing of child soldiering as a form of forced 
labour rather than the child protection focus that UNICEF adopts. The main 
discrepancy in perceptions of child soldiers in Myanmar is not between affected 
communities and international actors but between the Tatmadaw and international 
actors. Whereas UNICEF and ILO see the prohibition of the recruitment and use of 
child soldiers as an absolute principle, the Tatmadaw is using the issue partly as a 
political bargaining chip vis-à-vis international organisations and as a tool to improve 
their reputation internationally. The result of these different understandings of the 
norm and resulting aims of behavioural change—international actors want a stop of 
child recruitment and the release of all underage recruits, the Tatmadaw wants to 
improve its international reputation to reduce sanctions—is often miscommunication 
and only surface level cooperation. As exemplified by the main mechanism through 
which the Tatmadaw cooperates with international actors, media-effective release 
ceremonies, these bring a lot of positive press to the progress the military is making 
without substantially changing recruitment practices or implementing long-term 
change, such as passing an updated Child Law.  
9.4 Changing Implementation Strategies  
The key to understanding how international norms operate in different contexts is not 
just to analyse them as a set of abstract international rules and regulations that are 




of international practice. By focusing on the interaction of local governments, civil 
society actors, affected communities, and child soldiers with international 
organisations and child protection NGOs who are active in affected contexts, we can 
trace the continuity and change of the different practices of norm implementation 
meant to combat the use of child soldiers around the world. 
 
Norm implementation practices are analysed throughout this thesis on two levels: on 
the ground, where international actors actually fund, plan, and implement 
programmes that deal with child soldiers directly; and secondly, on the international 
level, where pressure on states is exercised mostly from an advocacy angle. The 
Sierra Leone case study has focused more on the ground-level work of international 
actors, such as the difficulties in implementing the child section of the DDR 
programme, whereas in Myanmar, advocacy and state-level interactions have been 
the focus, such as the negotiations between ILO, UNICEF, and the Tatmadaw. Still, 
both cases also include the other level respectively: Sierra Leone is embedded within 
a larger debate on aid dependency and development politics whereas the Myanmar 
case also highlights important ground-level implications, mostly the inability of 
international actors to actually work with (former) child combatants directly. Both 
levels of course interact, build on each other, and are co-constitutive of each other. 
The next sections outline the role of inter-institutional politics, the lack of 
coordination between different international actors and the use of contributing to 
peacekeeping missions as an incentive.  
9.4.1 Inter-Institutional Politics 
One of the issues that affect international actors’ work in country is the lack of 
coordination between different international organisations active in the same context. 
Operating under different mandates and with different institutional memory, 
experience, and background knowledge, actors might disagree about the best 
strategies of norm promotion. It might also be a less deliberate divergence and 
institutions are just ineffective in communicating and coordinating with each other. 
This can lead to suboptimal delivery in what they are trying to achieve, to varying 
perceptions of their work by local governments and targeted populations, and the use 





In Sierra Leone, there are different fault lines among different international actors. 
The first is between organisations that are part of the UNICEF-lead Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programme and those that also work on 
child protection issues but are not UN partners. The latter group largely consists of 
development organisations, often with a missionary background, that have a longer 
presence in the country, often starting work already during the late phases of the civil 
war in the 1990s. These groups, such as HANCI or Children Associated with War 
have extensive knowledge of the local conditions and the context in which children 
have grown up, how community structures work, and who needs to be taken into 
account for community reconciliation methods to work. Their work was largely 
based on Sierra Leonean models of child protection, such as fosterage.644 This local 
knowledge, however, remained mostly unutilised by the UN and its partner 
organisations and these organisations largely continued running their operations in 
parallel to the UN system, although being drastically outspent and ‘out-staffed’.645 
The lack of UN engagement with these groups led to increasing frustration at the 
missed opportunity to rely on already existing expertise and instead importing 
models of child protection from elsewhere. 
  
The second instance of missed coordination in the Sierra Leonean context is between 
the state and international organisations responsible for DDR and post-DDR 
reintegration efforts. As shown in more detail in the Sierra Leone case study in 
chapter six, there is a gap between the end of the (shortened) skills training provided 
as part of DDR and the intended follow-up by the National Commission for 
Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation, which was supposed to place 
people into apprenticeships or job programmes upon completion of their training. 
Apart from organisational difficulties in a chaotic post-conflict context, another 
reason for the failure to provide jobs to the trainees was the lack of market 
assessment regarding the skills provided. Training adolescents in computer skills or 
driving is of little immediate use when there is a dearth of computers or cars. In the 
eyes of child protection workers in Sierra Leone, this gap is what dramatically 
increased the numbers of street children in Freetown, impeded reintegration in 
communities, and resulted in disappointment with the programme overall, as chapter 
six has detailed.  
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In Myanmar, the lack or inefficiency of coordination between different international 
organisations is less of an unintended consequence than a deliberate policy decision. 
The case study has focused predominantly on the different approaches by ILO and 
UNICEF in dealing with the Tatmadaw. UNICEF’s conciliatory approach to the 
military and civilian government has provided them with unique access to active 
military personnel and high-level government officers. Some argue that this has 
come at the cost of sacrificing their critical distance from a (maybe now semi-
)authoritarian government necessary to hold them accountable to international human 
rights standards and risks them becoming a mouthpiece for the government or at least 
legitimising their efforts to improve their standing internationally without 
substantially reforming their recruitment practices at all. A further critique is aimed 
at the ineffectiveness of the UNICEF approach that is largely focused on monitoring 
and reporting rather than ‘getting the kids out of the army’ at all costs.646 
 
The ILO on the other hand has a somewhat more confrontational approach to the 
Burmese government. Having built a network of informants around forced labour, 
the largest number of cases brought to them once the reporting mechanism was 
established in 2007 related to soldiers who had joined the military or were recruited 
when they were under 18 years old. Parents, recruits themselves, and members of the 
community are continuously bringing cases to the ILO, which are then investigated. 
In interacting with the military and the previous military regime, the ILO emphasises 
the importance of building mutual respect and not accepting vague promises but 
rather insisting on implementing the existing domestic regulations and international 
commitments that the military has made, such as signing the CRC. The potential risk 
of this approach is a denial of access to relevant personnel, such as recruiters in the 
military. Furthermore, it would have probably been impossible to set up the forced 
labour complaints mechanism without UNICEF clearing the way with a more subtle 
approach.  
 
Although UNICEF and the ILO are both members of the country task force—headed 
by UNICEF and Save the Children—their strategy in dealing with the military differs 
fairly significantly. Resulting from the divergent processes of knowledge 
production—how they know about cases of child soldiering in the Tatmadaw—the 
                                                




ILO takes a much more confrontational approach in dealing with the military than 
UNICEF. Built on the assumption, that only by showing strength and limiting 
compromises is it possible to build a level of respect with the military. Rather than 
building respect, through decades of careful and gradual relationship building with 
the regime, UNICEF has managed to build trust with the military. This at least is the 
assessment of former Burmese UNICEF staff. The few military personnel that were 
interviewed for this project recognised the necessity to work with organisations like 
UNICEF but strongly denied that they could be trusted in the first place, mostly due 
to the assumption that it is basically impossible to satisfy international requirements 
and that IOs, regardless of their original mandate, will always find either another 
issue or more cases to continue their work and interference in the country. 
9.4.2 Peacekeeping as a Material Incentive 
One material incentive that has developed on the international level based on the 
experience with the Chadian armed forces in 2012-13, is connecting states’ desire to 
contribute peacekeeping troops to UN missions to their child soldiering practices. 
After the end of the civil war in 2002, the Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) were 
in no position to contribute peacekeeping personnel to any mission. Barely existent 
in a coherent and disciplined manner during and immediately after the war, years of 
security sector reform and money poured into professionalising the army, largely by 
the British but also by the UN and others, have been successful over the years.647 Part 
of this reform is the institutionalisation of a strict screening and age verification 
procedure for anyone wanting to enlist in the armed forces. However, potential 
peacekeeping was not a major incentive for the RSLAF to reform its recruitment 
procedures this significantly. The RSLAF today has a fairly good reputation and has, 
despite significant underfunding, contributed personnel to peacekeeping missions in 
Darfur and Somalia on dry-lease.648 
 
Regarding Chad, although the government had committed to end child recruitment 
into the state military years before, there was hardly any progress in terms of 
screening or substantially reforming recruitment practices until 2012. However, upon 
the Chadian government wanting to contribute troops to the UN peacekeeping 
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mission MINUSMA in Mali in 2013, the UN, specifically the Head of the DPKO, 
Hervé Ladsous, advised by UNICEF and members of the office of the Special 
Representative for Children and Armed Conflict started talks with the Chadian 
government. He clarified that it was not possible for the UN to accept troop 
contributions from the Chadian army as long as there were reports of children being 
recruited. 649  A member of the delegation from the Office of the Special 
Representative for Children and Armed Conflict in Chad at the time summarises the 
talks: ‘We had a conversation with the President, and he understood well that we 
couldn’t have them as peacekeepers if they had children in their ranks. And that is 
when they moved—so when they see the consequences, they move.’650 As a result, 
the Chadian government agreed to a screening of the entire military and was 
subsequently delisted from the Security Council list in 2014 and is until today 
contributing significantly to MINUSMA.651 
 
From around 2014, the Myanmar military expressed an interest in contributing troops 
to peacekeeping missions.652 Part of the Tatmadaw’s plan to present themselves as a 
modern and professional military and to improve their international reputation from a 
military junta to a responsible political actor having initiated a democratic transition 
in the country involved showing that they have the capacity and willingness to 
contribute to UN peacekeeping missions. According to UN reports, by summer 2017, 
there were indeed four Tatmadaw soldiers involved in two peacekeeping missions, in 
UNMIL in Liberia and UNMISS in South Sudan.653 Upon finding out about the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations talking to the Myanmar military about 
contributing peacekeepers, Human Rights Watch issued a public letter, criticising the 
UN for considering accepting troop contributions from a military that routinely 
violates human rights and still has large numbers of child soldiers, or soldiers who 
were recruited when they were under 18 in their ranks.654 This may have been an 
opportunity for the international community to push for better implementation of the 
2012 action plan, using peacekeeping as an incentive or payoff. 
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On the international level and after significant advocacy pressure, the Secretary 
General officially implemented that countries ‘who are persistently listed’ for 
enlisting and using child soldiers cannot contribute personnel to peacekeeping 
missions in 2015.655 There is still a lack of clarity regarding countries who contribute 
troops already, like Yemen, and regarding so-called ‘secondments’ of individual 
officers as in the case of Myanmar.  
9.5 Institutional Learning  
One process through which new strategies evolve and existing ones change and adapt 
is institutional learning, which often happens as a response to a change of external 
circumstances or by realising that existing approaches and practices are 
inappropriate, ineffective, or not feasible. While taking the very different conflict 
contexts and actor constellations in Sierra Leone and Myanmar into account, the 
following section shows how there was an opportunity for institutional learning to 
take place as international actors moved from one context to the other with regards to 
reintegration of released child soldiers and in addressing the issue of female child 
combatants.  
9.5.1 Reintegration 
The focus of the Sierra Leone case study has been the DDR programme since this 
has been the main engagement of the international community with regards to child 
soldiering there, especially the reintegration part of the programme. Hailed as a 
major success as shown in chapter six, we have seen the significant shortcomings of 
the planning, implementation, and effects of the programme in this context, which 
should caution international actors in taking Sierra Leone as an exemplary case to 
model future interventions on. The key lessons regarding reintegration that were 
learned in Sierra Leone were that programmes, especially skills trainings, were 
underfunded and thus significantly shorter than originally intended (from 1 year to 
around 3 months), were insufficiently targeted at the demands of the economy post-
conflict, and as a result rarely resulted in long-term employment after. Short-term 
assessments of reintegration measures, which most international evaluations are 
based on, for the most part, based on the number of former combatants who had been 
disarmed and then completed the programme, showed a largely successful 
programme.  
                                                





However, criticism was also voiced at the lack of follow-up once children had 
returned to their communities as well as the lack of awareness of the situation of girls 
who had been members of the armed groups. Some practices developed within 
communities, sometimes with the help of international actors, sometimes with the 
help of local NGOs like Fambul Tok, to tackle the challenges of reintegration at 
community level.656 Despite its shortcomings, reintegration of former child soldiers 
was the main focus for international actors in post-conflict Sierra Leone. Later 
sections of this chapter will unpack the rationale behind this type of intervention and 
the underlying assumption that only by going through reintegration measures, such 
as psychosocial counselling administered by Western experts, can former child 
soldiers be saved from growing up to be troublesome adults who are a potential risk 
to the future stability of the country.657   
 
In terms of lessons learned from the implementation of reintegration programmes in 
Sierra Leone, as mentioned before, the lack of coordination between organisations 
administering skills trainings and those supposed to place ex-combatants in 
employment after, was one of the key issues. A staff member of a consulting firm 
specialising in post-conflict reconciliation from Sierra Leone reflects on this:  
I worked on almost all the DDR programs in the world. We argue with the 
UN all the time, that you have to base all activities on assessments on the 
ground, by experts and it has to be participatory and promote local 
ownership and leadership. But all these countries are still affected, the UN 
will only attempt to do that when they initiated something that failed and then 
they will come back to it. Like in Congo, they did the reintegration, which 
failed woefully and there was an attempt in the Eastern region to do an 
assessment. And even that was not fully funded and was not properly done. 
The same with Darfur, the same with Sudan proper, and South Sudan. We 
developed the reintegration strategy in South Sudan with the mission and 
UNDP and it was properly done but the investment into the assessments was 
not there. So they call us, piecemeal pieces, come train UNICEF on this, 
come train the mission on this, come train… instead of saying: “Come, 
develop a team, go to the field, we provide this, to develop activities and 
components that will help us to resolve this.”658 
 
The conversation around reintegration of former child soldiers in Myanmar differs 
radically from Sierra Leone. At first glance, the number of former child combatants 
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is vastly higher in Sierra Leone, with circa 6800 children going through DDR alone 
with an estimated population of around 4.2 million in 2002—the higher estimated 
number of the actual former child soldiers is given at roughly 15,000 across all 
armed actors. Myanmar, a country with a population of over 52 million, has seen the 
release of fewer than 1000 former child combatants from the Tatmadaw. Thus, there 
is less pressure on communities to take back large numbers of children. Furthermore, 
most child soldiers in the Tatmadaw, if sent to combat, will most likely fight in 
remote areas of the country that they have no family connection to. The main theatres 
of combat in Shan, Kachin, and Karen state were far removed from their home 
villages and thus, their return was not complicated by the possibility of having 
committed atrocities in their own villages—a crucial issue faced by many RUF 
fighters in Sierra Leone. Similarly to the CDF in Sierra Leone, most child soldiers in 
the ethnic armed groups in different areas of Myanmar were defending their homes 
and villages from Tatmadaw (or rival ethnic armed groups’) attacks and thus faced 
no stigma when returning to their communities.  
 
All these factors lead to limited community pressure to implement reintegration 
programmes on a large scale. Former child combatants are not widely perceived as a 
threat to the stability of Burmese society. However, based on NGO reporting, 
newspaper stories, and anecdotal evidence, individual child soldiers that are released 
from the Tatmadaw often still face psychological problems as a result of abuse and 
violence or substance abuse.659 Furthermore, the estimated actual number of child 
soldiers in the Myanmar military is much higher than the few that have been released 
and if they were serious about change and released all of them, reintegration would 
become a much more pressing concern. Although the narrative of the traumatised 
child soldier as a problem for post-conflict society does not feature in international 
actor rhetoric, the military seems to be aware of the potential repercussions that the 
stories of these released child soldiers could have in the public domestic and 
international domain and is very effective in supressing them.  
 
Thus, reintegration measures are hardly on the agenda in Myanmar. In 2009, the 
Special Representative’s annual report mentions that the government informed the 
UN country task force that rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for ex-child 
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combatants had already been put in place. However, it is impossible to verify this 
information since neither UNICEF nor any other IO or NGO has officially been 
allowed to follow up with released child soldiers.660 In fact, remaining in touch and 
supporting released ex-child soldiers proves increasingly difficult under the current 
regime. In the few cases that make it to the national media outlets, released child 
combatants return to their families and are welcomed back with open arms. These are 
often accounts of individual children being followed up on by journalists to hear 
about their stories in the military and how they are adjusting back to civilian life. 
There have been a number of these stories between 2015 and 2017. However, in the 
last year or so, the gag order on released soldiers has become even stricter. The most 
prominent case, which has sparked international outrage, is that of Aung Ko Htway 
who has been sentenced to two years in prison and hard labour in March 2018 for 
giving an interview to Radio Asia about his forcible recruitment into the Tatmadaw 
in 2005 when he was 14 years old. The penal code’s section 505(b) under which he 
was prosecuted targets individuals who incite fear or alarm to the public and violence 
against the state.661  
9.5.2 Girl Soldiers 
The second major lesson learned from Sierra Leone, as detailed in chapters five and 
six, concerns girl soldiers. Although child protection workers had come across 
female underage fighters in other recent conflicts before, such as in Angola or 
Mozambique, the sheer number of them in Sierra Leone made a targeted response by 
international actors unavoidable. 
 
First brought to the attention of local and international child protection staff during 
family tracing activities in the late stages of the conflict, they soon realised that there 
were vast numbers of girls that had been part of the armed forces—apart from in the 
CDF, which did not systematically recruit women and girls, although they were 
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associated as well—that they were unaware of.662 After the war, these girls did for 
the most part not participate in the DDR programme, they returned to their families if 
they could, made their way to the cities, or stayed with their commanders and ‘bush 
husbands’. The latter became increasingly likely if the girls had children as families 
and communities were often unwilling to accept ‘rebel children’ back into the 
community. The particular needs of this group of former child soldiers were not 
addressed by existing programmes and only came into focus once it became clear 
that parents were often unwilling to take their daughters back and the number of sex 
workers in Freetown had increased significantly. The ‘Girls Left Behind’ project was 
initiated by UNICEF in 2004 and targeted girls and young women who were still 
living with their abductors. This came with its own set of complicating factors, 
ranging from the fact that some of the women chose to stay with their partners from 
the time of the conflict, to the circa 50% of women and girls who did not end up 
staying with their families after having been reunified during the course of the 
project (this was evaluated in 2004 already so it is unclear how this number 
developed with a longer time frame).663 As a result of these challenges, most longer-
term evaluations of the response to the concerns of children affected by armed 
conflict in Sierra Leone and most of the people interviewed for this project named 
the issue of girl soldiers as one of the main lessons learned that should be taken from 
the Sierra Leone case.  
 
In Myanmar, the situation is quite different indeed. Girl soldiers as a category were 
not mentioned by any of the people interviewed for this project, regardless of 
whether they were working for the UN, an NGO, advocacy organisation, or for the 
Burmese military or government. The 2002 Human Rights Watch report, which 
largely put the issue of child soldiers in Burma on the international agenda, hardly 
mentions female fighters on either side, although they do state that ‘[o]f the groups 
researched by Human Rights Watch, none appear to be recruiting any women or girls 
or have any women or girl soldiers with the exception of the Kachin Independence 
Army’664 and regarding the Tatmadaw, that ‘[i]n practice, neither women nor girls 
are recruited into the armed forces.’665 
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The Tatmadaw and other armed groups in Myanmar have been reported on in the 
annual Secretary General Report on Children and Armed Conflict since its inception 
in 2002. There are two instances mentioned of individual girls being recruited into 
the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in 2007 and into the Democratic Karen 
Buddhist Army (DKBA) in 2010.666 Finally, in the 2017 report, there is a note of 4 
verified cases of girls being recruited by the Tatmadaw. Most observers agree that 
the number of verified cases is just the tip of the iceberg, being the result of limited 
access to conflict areas and military facilities.667 While there seems to be no large-
scale systematic recruitment of girls by the military, based on official UN reports 
alone, there are a number of underage female soldiers associated with the Tatmadaw. 
They remain absent from NGO reports, UN programmes, and any debate about child 
soldiering in Myanmar. Child protection workers interviewed in Sierra Leone, when 
reflecting on the situation in Myanmar and the absence of any discussion about girls 
remark: ‘It will come up. It will definitely come up. [laughs] People were focusing 
on boys here, too.’668 
9.6 Capacity Building and Material Vulnerability 
Thus far, this thesis has mainly focused on the interaction of international actors with 
the targeted armed forces or former child soldiers directly. However, this relationship 
only exists in the broader context of the state’s relationship with the international 
community and its position within it at large. We can see that the role of capacity 
building as a strategy of norm promotion is dependent on the positionality of the 
targeted state in the international system, specifically on their material and social 
vulnerability.  
 
Historically, continuing throughout the war, and surging after the end of the conflict, 
annual aid to Sierra Leone has been extremely high. Between 1970 and 2007 it 
averaged at 14.2% of GDP, which is dramatically higher than the average 3.7% for 
the whole continent.669 The central government in Sierra Leone remained largely 
dependent on international assistance in the aftermath of the civil war; to rebuild 
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infrastructure, to reform the security sector, to establish a stable civilian government 
after 2 military coups in the 1990s and to reconstruct an economy that had been 
devastated by 11 years of civil war. While this international funding was much 
appreciated immediately post-conflict, many Sierra Leoneans are concerned about 
the unsustainable use of the money. Without effective institutions being created, 
there is a continued dependence on the financial and operational assistance of 
Western donors. There is continuity between the lacking institutional response for 
example to child protection concerns in post-conflict and post-Ebola Sierra Leone.670 
Local child protection worker Sannoh in Sierra Leone, after having worked in the 
country for Save the Children UK for many years gave his perspective:  
I just compare that to Ebola, where I think sustainability of our programmes 
was a major concern. 15 years down the line [after the war], we must have a 
strong child protection system in this country so that if there’s another shock, 
an emergency, you can do it. But when Ebola came, to deal with children’s 
issues, they had to come back to UNICEF. It was all again international 
NGOs.671  
Civil society activist Lavali echoes this analysis:  
In terms of the social contract between citizens and government, it’s 
distorted. At what point do you start national execution as opposed to UN 
direct execution? You can see quite a lot of direct execution going on by the 
UN until 3 or 4 years ago and what Ebola did then was to make Sierra Leone 
go back to that, direct execution.672  
 
Sannoh assigns responsibility for this partly to the unwillingness and inability of the 
Sierra Leone government to invest in sustainable institutions and to create 
accountability mechanisms for their citizens and partly to international organisations 
and NGOs who are seemingly unwilling and unable to make themselves and their 
work redundant—which should be the overall aim of their activity in the first place. 
As a response to donor pressure to show measurable results, NGOs and IOs end up 
implementing projects directly rather than assisting in building state institutions, 
which might take longer to deliver results but would then be able to provide these 
services themselves in the long term. 
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Until today, the Sierra Leone government is heavily dependent on international aid 
for its budget, service provision, and expertise. International organisations and 
donors continue to have a significant influence on which issues are funded, which 
programmes are implemented how and for how long. UNICEF and its partner 
organisations were almost completely in charge of the Disarmament, Demobilisation, 
and Reintegration of former child combatants while the British largely executed 
security sector reform.673 Thus, it is no surprise that in terms of dealing with former 
child combatants and child recruitment practices more broadly, international actors 
were predominantly in charge.  
 
Although the situation in Myanmar differs in terms of aid dependence, there are 
similarities in perception about the self-sustaining role of international development 
organisations and NGOs in the country—a backlash to the humanitarian and human 
rights rhetoric brought forward by international actors. First, it is important to note 
that Myanmar has been subject to extensive and decade-long international sanctions 
until as recently as 2017. Thus, economically and in terms of military equipment, the 
Myanmar government has been largely reliant on China for trade and the import of 
weapons—although therefore also less materially vulnerable to Western pressure.674 
The narrative about why the military government decided in 2011/2012 to start a 
democratic transition process differs unsurprisingly among international and local 
actors. According to international actors, the sanctions regime had finally put enough 
pressure on the Myanmar government to be forced to open up to prevent economic 
collapse. The Tatmadaw does not deny economic difficulties but they emphasise the 
agency of the Myanmar government in deciding to start opening the country and 
reintegrating Myanmar in the world economy and international community.675  
 
Contrary to Sierra Leone, the Myanmar government has gone through a very 
controlled transition from a purely authoritarian regime to a somewhat managed 
democracy. The state, and especially the Tatmadaw, is very much intact. In terms of 
ending the practice of child soldiering, the Tatmadaw will at best cooperate with 
international actors. In no way are international actors predominantly responsible for 
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managing the release of underage recruits or following up on them once released. 
UNICEF might be allowed to hold trainings for Tatmadaw soldiers and the ILO 
might be allowed to gather information about cases of child recruitment from 
affected populations directly. Ultimately though, it is the Tatmadaw who remains in 
charge of monitoring recruitment procedures, selecting soldiers to be released in 
widely publicised release ceremonies and refuses access to military facilities.  
 
Former Burmese government minister Ye Htut has a somewhat cynical interpretation 
of the work of international organisations than the child protection workers in Sierra 
Leone: 
Maybe they start with good intentions. After a little while, it’s becoming their 
job. From 1992 up until now, I saw a lot of UN and INGO involvement in our 
country. None of them ever say: “Mission accomplished!” They set up, they 
work, they say the problem is still here, they still have to be here, you have to 
get the funding for us. You always find a new issue, it’s job security for 
them.676  
 
He agrees that IOs often underplay the complexity of the issues they are dealing 
with, such as child recruitment, and they are just interested in shaming the 
government. In his opinion, international organisations largely do understand the 
context they operate in but they choose to look the other way, as their main intention 
is to justify their continued engagement in the country. This Burmese government 
official seems to share the opinion that promoting liberal international norms 
ultimately serves to legitimise the intervention of Western NGOs and international 
organisations. What is presented as a potentially better future, if states like Myanmar 
abide by international normative standards, is unlikely to look much different than 
the status quo in which human rights abuses are used as justification for military 
interventions and sanctions. 
9.7 The Universal Child (Soldier) 
This chapter has shown so far how the international norm against child soldiering 
and the practices of international actors have changed and developed between Sierra 
Leone and Myanmar. While the international norm was at its most salient moment in 
terms of international attention at the time that the Sierra Leone civil war ended in 
2002, international actors only had a set of fairly underdeveloped and context 





unspecific tools at their disposal, resulting in the ad-hoc development of strategies of 
norm implementation, for example on reintegration and girl soldiers, based on 
background knowledge that child protection workers brought with them. By the time 
pressure on the Myanmar regime intensified around 2010—first conversations 
between UNICEF and the Tatmadaw started around 2007—the international norm in 
its core had not changed, but the practices of international actors have evolved 
significantly. At country level, child protection advisors are being sent as part of 
peacekeeping missions, child DDR is happening separately from regular DDR 
programmes, there is an institutionalised monitoring and reporting mechanism with 
the involvement of various UN agencies, etc. At the international level, the annual 
reports to the Secretary General and the list in the annex of these reports are used to 
pressure states into signing action plans with the UN and in fact, as of 2018 all state 
actors on the list have committed at least rhetorically to end the use of child soldiers 
in their state militaries by signing an action plan with the UN.  
 
However, this thesis has also shown that beyond the tangible impact on the ground, 
international actors contribute to (re-)creating the imagery of the child soldier in a 
particular light. This representation and its accompanying discourse can tell us 
something about how international actors perceive child soldiering as well as how 
the knowledge to understand child soldiering is produced. The following section is 
structured to draw out three main themes: (1) physicality, (2) rationality, and (3) 
agency. Child soldiers in the Western imagination, especially in an African context, 
are often presented as ‘innocent victims’ whose ‘childhood was stolen’ from them. 
This representation has several implications, especially regarding Western states’, 
donors’ and NGOs’ interactions with child soldiers and their local contexts. 
 
Many state armies and even more non-state actors have used soldiers under the age 
of 18 over the past decades all across the world. However, as chapter four has shown, 
most international discourse and representations of child soldiers focus on conflicts 
on the African continent. In line with the understanding of some scholars of civil war 
and the ‘new wars’ literature, conflicts in Africa are depoliticised and criminalised. 
Rebel interests are portrayed as limited to seeking financial gain and fighters and 
supporters are characterised as ‘barbaric criminals’.677 This discourse contributes to a 
differentiation between underage soldiers in the West and underage soldiers in sub-
                                                




Saharan Africa especially. Child soldiers, being employed in a context of barbaric 
civil war, are thus a foreign category to Western observers. Furthermore, even 
though several Western countries, including the US and the UK, still accept recruits 
between 16 and 18 into their militaries, they are hardly ever referred to as child 
soldiers although they would be categorised as such, following for example the Paris 
Principles or OPAC.678  
 
The knowledge that ‘African child soldier problems’ are somehow worse or of a 
different category than the practice elsewhere was continuously present throughout 
the interviews conducted in Myanmar. Often before even turning on the tape 
recorder, upon explaining the two cases analysed in this thesis, my Burmese 
counterparts would sometimes be offended by the idea that child soldiering practices 
in West Africa and Myanmar were comparable. The perceived severity of the issue 
in Africa and what kind of states are dealing with ‘child soldier problems’, to them, 
seemed far removed from the situation in Myanmar. 
9.7.1 Physicality  
Firstly, children’s abilities when serving in militaries are seen as being dictated by 
their physical attributes. Macmillan points out that it is a small step from 
constructing child soldiers as physical subjects to the ‘construction of them as 
subjects to that physicality’.679 Descriptions often focus on small stature, young age 
and physical weakness, which inhibit the ability to carry weapons, sustain physical 
duress but also to withstand mental pressure. This heightened physicality, at least in a 
Western context, is associated with a more natural, instinctual state of being, less 
shaped by social norms and expectations compared to adults. It also means that 
children’s actions are perceived to be driven by spontaneous urges and instincts 
without necessarily considering the medium- or long-term consequences of their 
actions. Accounts of children as some of the most ‘vicious fighters’ who would 
commit disproportionate acts of violence in Sierra Leone or bringing themselves and 
their battalions into unnecessary danger because of their inability to assess the 
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situation in Myanmar are examples of this.680 Adopting this viewpoint can lead to a 
belief in an ‘innate evilness’ in children’s nature which helps explain instances of 
child soldiers committing war crimes, killing their parents, or drinking blood.681  
 
Although seemingly contradictory to the ‘innocent victims’ narrative, both are united 
by the ascribed lack of awareness of consequences and consistent with the idea that 
childhood is a more ‘pure’, natural state of being.682 ‘These new soldiers are not 
simply children; they can also be callous killers capable of the most terrible acts of 
cruelty and brutality’, according to Singer.683 This representation reduces child 
soldiers and children in general to their biological attributes, which are the same 
regardless of potentially differing social norms, contexts, and histories. Of course, 
childhood, especially infancy, has universal features, such as the need for care, 
shelter, food, and emotional attachment.684 However, especially when talking about 
adolescents who, in their physical ability, are not as clearly separable from young 
adults and who constitute the large majority of child soldiers, this emphasis becomes 
less convincing.  
9.7.2 Rationality  
The previously mentioned lack of awareness of consequences leads to the second 
theme in child soldier discourse: irrationality. The presumed irrationality—or ‘pre-
rationality’ as it is sometimes labelled—of child soldiers manifests in a number of 
ways. In Fleischman’s words: ‘It is easier to convince kids [than adults] to fight for 
almost nothing.’ 685  Furthermore, it feeds into a malleability, which is often 
emphasised when investigating reasons for child soldier use despite their physical 
disadvantages as fighters. A lack of education and life experience also contributes to 
a possible irrationality in expectations both about what life as a soldier might be like 
and also how one’s actions affect other people. A senior ILO official in Myanmar 
explains that ‘Kids, little boys, like uniforms and shiny guns and you do get kids 
wanting to join the army because of that’, being unaware that they cannot easily 
reverse their decision or leave.686  
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Lastly, the most powerful trope to explain the irrationality of child soldiers is 
‘exceptionless trauma’. Being exposed to the atrocities of war and committing them 
themselves, child soldiers ‘who ultimately survive combat are without exception 
traumatised’.687 Branding child soldiers as traumatised also excludes them from 
future participation in society as rational individuals. Without having gone through a 
protected, innocent childhood, they are expected to pass on the trauma and continue 
the cycle of violence after finishing their time as an active combatant.688 This 
narrative has come out particularly strongly in the Sierra Leone case study where 
child protection workers in international organisations and NGOs repeatedly 
emphasised that children who did not leave their ‘war mindset’ behind were 
becoming problems for post-conflict society. 689 However, some also point out that 
the stigma against ‘DDR children’ is exaggerated and they are often wrongfully 
accused for incidents of rioting or unrest.690 This is not to say that child soldiers, and 
generally soldiers who experience violence, are not likely to be traumatised by what 
they have witnessed or done. It is simply to caution against a universal labelling of 
child soldiers as traumatised and in the same vein casting them as a threat and ‘time 
bomb’ once the conflict is over. 
 
From a Western NGO or IO perspective, the idea of ‘exceptionless trauma’ provides 
ample grounds for intervention. Only through counselling, education, and 
appropriate re-socialisation can this cycle be broken and ensured that the 
reintegration of former child soldiers into society does not result in protracted 
violence.691 This narrative relates closely to the idea of the universal child outlined in 
chapter four and the homogeneity of acceptable childhoods. It becomes clear how the 
framing of child soldiers exclusively as traumatised victims with the potential for 
exhibiting violent behaviour might not only be a result of globalised notions of 
childhood applied to non-Western contexts but also self-serving to justify NGO, IO, 
or state intervention in post-conflict situations. We have seen that perception of the 
community of practice around child soldiering in Myanmar from the perspective of 
the government at times seems to be that of self-serving organisations predominantly 
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concerned with maintaining a presence in the country. According to former General 
and government minister Ye Htut:  
[As an IO] You always find a new issue; you never say “Until now they had a 
child soldier problem.” It’s job security for them if they keep finding them. I 
think most of them, especially the UN organisations, I sometimes doubt what 
is their real intention. […] Some say the West will never be satisfied without 
reform. If you achieve something, they will change the goal post, they will 
raise the bar. So don’t trust them.692 
 
It also deepens the rift between Western children who are able to grow up in a 
sheltered environment to become responsible, rational adults and (mostly African) 
children who grow up in a chaotic, barbaric, and violent environment, which turns 
them into violent and unpredictable adults, unable to contribute to the social fabric of 
society and likely to pass on the violence they have experienced. At the same time, 
military service of adolescents in the West is not presumed to have the same 
damaging effect but can be a way to learn and practice values of hard work and 
camaraderie, as a stepping stone, especially for underprivileged young men, to build 
a more productive life.693 In fact, there has been a shift by some scholars to explore 
the longer-term post-conflict lives of former child combatants, which do not seem to 
fit this homogenising picture. For example, Boothby and Thomson, in their 
longitudinal study of former child combatants from Mozambique, find that most of 
the participants in their study 16 years after the end of the conflict have become 
‘productive, capable, and caring adults.’694  
9.7.3 Agency 
Finally, the notion of agency combines the two previous aspects and the empirical 
mismatch of representation and actual numbers we have seen in chapter four. A 
focus on very young child soldiers makes the paternalist argument that they have to 
be protected from harm and freed from their oppressors readily believable. As a 
government official and former member of the NCDDR in Sierra Leone puts it upon 
reflection on their work with child soldiers after the conflict: ‘They are young, they 
don’t know what they want, we basically build an institution around them, they can’t 
make decisions on their own.’695 The Sierra Leone case has further shown that, in 
fact, some former child combatants adopted the identity of the innocent victim to 
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carve out a space in post-conflict society in which they could access benefits and 
resources. Claiming non-agency during the conflict has allowed them to exercise 
agency post-conflict. Within international law, there is a debate about agency and 
accountability of child soldiers as perpetrators. In principle, and also under 
international human rights law, persons under the age of 18 are not precluded from 
bearing criminal responsibility; they can be found culpable and punished with the 
exemption of the death penalty.696 However, informed by the innocent victims 
narrative outlined throughout this thesis, prosecuting child soldiers for the acts they 
have committed is increasingly considered inappropriate and illegitimate. Neither the 
ICC nor hybrid courts like the Special Court for Sierra Leone are prosecuting under-
18-year-olds, thus contributing to what Drumbl calls the ‘legal fiction of faultless 
passive victimhood’.697 However, the ICC prosecutes adults who were themselves 
recruited as children, such as in the Ongwen case—in part for crimes that he was a 
victim of himself. As discussed in chapter four, this brings up interesting questions 
about the boundaries of the ‘exceptionless trauma’ narrative.  
 
Taking the empirical picture seriously and appreciating that the broadening of the 
term ‘child soldiers’, which was pushed by NGOs in the 1990s to include youth 
between 15 and 18, means that the large majority of ‘child’ soldiers will actually be 
‘youth’ soldiers, has complicated this picture. Adding the observation that most child 
soldiers become part of armed groups through voluntary enlistment—which under 
international law is simply not possible—and the credibility of the argument that 
child soldiers have no agency of their own diminishes. Most of the existing work on 
child soldiers from a policy/activist perspective denies the possibility of independent, 
autonomous action to children in militaries, both at the point of recruitment and 
whilst being part of an armed force.  
9.7.4 Implications of the Narrative  
This discourse serves a number of different purposes: First, it silences other 
conceptualisations of childhood and renders them illegitimate. This relates to what 
childhood means, what it entails, with which roles and responsibilities it comes and 
how it is embedded within its own social world. Chapter four details the Western 
conception of childhood, as it is embedded and enacted through international law and 
various international actors. This model presumes that childhood is to be separated 
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from adulthood, that it is a time for play and education. Wells calls this the 
‘neoliberal model of childhood’ as it ‘constructs healthy childhood as one that 
orientates the child towards independence rather than interdependence, towards 
school-based rather than work-based learning, and separates them from the wider 
forces of politics, economy and society.’698 The category of the child is thereby often 
used in the singular; one child’s experience stands for the universal experience of the 
child globally, such as the naming of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. If this idea of childhood is not protected, or if children do not grow up in 
this way, they are rendered deviant and damaged. Deviant children are those who 
work, who are in gangs, who are sex workers, who fight. These children are a 
problem regardless of the numerous different contexts that produce them. Along with 
this homogenisation of childhood comes a homogenisation of the contexts in which 
‘the wrong’ model of childhood is lived.699 This context is most often characterised 
by conflict, which leads to the breakdown of the social order, of the family unit 
(imagined as the nuclear family), in which children go to school and spend their free 
time playing. Crucially, this neo-liberal conception of childhood is understood to be 
not just different, but better than other models of childhood.700 
 
Rosen shows how this homogenization of context finds expression in depictions of 
child soldiers in contemporary film adaptations. He finds that:  
Literary treatments of African children at war, almost all geared to Western 
audiences, magnify this perspective by the lingering tendency to see Africa 
with Conradian eyes, seeing only the heart of darkness. In fact, the general 
Western discourse about war in Africa, whether precolonial, colonial, or 
postcolonial, has remained remarkably consistent since the middle of the 19th 
century. In this discourse, warfare in Africa is invariably cast as irrational, 
meaningless, and criminal.701  
 
Stripped of any political motivation, children in movies such as ‘Blood Diamond’ or 
‘Beasts of No Nation’ fight and die for nothing—a depiction that is very close to the 
humanitarian understanding of war as senseless slaughter.702 In ‘Blood Diamond’, 
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which is set in Sierra Leone, diamonds are the only motivation of the RUF for 
fighting. ‘Beasts of No Nation’ on the other hand, takes place in an unnamed African 
country, although clearly inspired by conflict dynamics in Sierra Leone. 703 Other 
examples include ‘Johnny Mad Dog’, based on an account of the Congolese civil 
war, which is moved to Liberia or ‘War Witch’, set in Congo, which according to the 
writer-director Kim Nguyen was inspired by Johnny and Luther Htoo, twins who 
rose to fame as supposed leaders of the rebel group God’s Army in Burma in the late 
1990s. 704  These contexts become interchangeable, the conflicts devoid of any 
specific political meaning, the child soldiers abused victims.  
 
Second, it necessitates and legitimises intervention by Global North actors, mostly 
NGOs or international organisations in the case of child soldiers. This reinforces the 
colonial narrative of external actors establishing and maintaining asymmetrical 
relationships with actors and states in the Global South, predicated upon the notion 
that they are less civilised, engaged in barbaric warfare, and underdeveloped. The 
African child soldier thereby ‘reflects and reinforces pre-existing notions of the 
Global South as a morally defunct zone of tragedy’ that can only be rescued by 
Global North intervention.705 As part of the civilising mission, states need to stop 
using child soldiers and adopt, if they have not already done so, a conception of 
childhood in line with the CRC, as outlined before and in chapter four. This narrative 
thus legitimises interventions by humanitarian and development agencies. This has 
become clear both in the framing of former child combatants in Sierra Leone, which 
are framed as potential threats for post-conflict stability unless they lose their ‘war-
time mind-set’ through counselling by NGOs and by the perception in Myanmar that 
IOs might be most interested in maintaining their presence and relevance rather than 
‘solving’ a particular issue.706 
 
As shown in the previous section, it also creates specific knowledge about the child 
soldier and the wider context and conflicts he is embedded in. Lee-Koo elaborates on 
the hypocrisy and double standards employed when representing and morally 
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evaluating children in military service broadly conceived in Western and non-
Western, especially African, contexts.707 She analyses a campaign by the Australian 
military advertising a gap year with the armed forces to recent high school graduates 
and dropouts. This position is portrayed as an empowering experience, giving 
underprivileged adolescents a decent income as well as valuable life experience and 
transferable skills. Juxtaposed with this idea of militarising children, the iconic image 
of the child soldier as an armed African boy is a particularly striking contrast, 
‘constructed as a menacing yet pitiable product of the so-called new wars of the 
Global South.’708 This construction and representation of child soldiers in this way 
does not only tell us something about the imagined idea of childhood but also about 
the broader implications for processes of knowledge production in the contexts these 
children operate in. According to Lee-Koo, the images of child soldiers are symbols 
of a global politics that constructs moral and political knowledge about conflict, 
conflicting actors, and relations of power between the global South and North.709 
Post-colonial scholars have pointed to the similarity of the aesthetics of childhood in 
development politics and savagery during colonialism, which are connected by the 
pre-existing metaphor of Africa as a child, that needs protection but also disciplining.  
 
Third, and building off the previous two points, the infantilising and victimising 
narrative is at times used by the very actors it describes—former child soldiers or 
conflict-affected communities—to access benefits or claim agency. Claiming a 
victim identity in a post-conflict context might allow former child soldiers to avoid 
taking responsibility for their actions during the war and take part in reintegration 
programmes or skills trainings rather than returning to their villages and subsuming 
themselves under village hierarchy. Ultimately, this might be a framework through 
which former child soldiers can access resources and cave out a post-war identity. 
Either way, even if children who have participated in conflict can claim post-conflict 
agency by presenting their experience in the ‘child soldier’ discourse that 
international actors operate in, these child soldiers interventions will always only 
target the individual child while ignoring structural factors leading to children and 
youth joining the military and the causes of the war.710  
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9.8 Conclusion  
The preceding four chapters have given an in-depth look into the work of 
international actors in Sierra Leone and Myanmar. While allowing space for the very 
different contexts to evolve, this chapter shows how the practices of norm 
implementation compare in these two cases and how they have developed and 
changed between them. Since the establishment of the international norm against 
child soldiering and the almost universally accepted Straight-18 principle, 
international activists and organisations have moved on to focus on the 
implementation of the established regulations. This chapter thus first highlights 
institutional changes on the international level between Sierra Leone and Myanmar, 
such as the establishment of the MRM or the regular deployment of CPAs as part of 
peacekeeping missions. Secondly, it also traces changes in practice by focusing on 
(the limits of) institutional learning in the areas of cross-agency/institution 
cooperation, the use of contributing to peacekeeping as an incentive for reform, and 
reintegration efforts generally and with a specific focus on (the lack of attention on) 
girl soldiers.  
 
Finally, and taking a step back, the relationships of international actors with the 
states they are active in is analysed in more detail by paying attention to relations of 
power and social and material vulnerabilities. Unpacking the implications of this 
discourse helps to understand how international actors perceive child soldiering and 
how the international knowledge about the issue is produced. I have argued that child 
soldiers are largely defined generally in international discourse, and specifically in 
my two cases, by their physicality, their physical weakness and limited mental 
capabilities; by their lack of rationality as a result of this; and finally by their lack of 
agency. Following from this understanding of ‘the child soldier’ by international 





Chapter 10: Conclusion  
10.1 Summary of Evidence and Findings 
This thesis has explored the emergence, development, and implementation of the 
international norm against child soldiering. To start, it has traced the development of 
the international norm against the recruitment and use of child soldiers historically, 
normatively, and institutionally. We have seen that children have been part of armies 
and fought in combat for centuries, as far back as Ancient Greece or the so-called 
Children’s Crusade in the 13th century and as recent as the Second World War in 
Europe or National Liberation Wars in Asia and Africa.711 So if the participation of 
children in warfare is not a new phenomenon, how do we explain the now almost 
universal perception of child soldiers as a major problem and moral wrong as well as 
the activist movements trying to stop this practice? Key to this is a 
reconceptualization of childhood in the West throughout the industrial revolution, 
which increasingly demarcated childhood as a period of time separated from 
adulthood. Children in pre-industrial societies largely lived, worked, and learned 
alongside adults without explicit distinctions of childhood, youth, or adolescence. 
The rise of formalised schooling and children spending the day separated from adults 
contributed to the perception of childhood as a stage of life for studying and playing, 
to be protected from arduous work and the seriousness of adult life.  
 
The second key shift, which leads us to the understanding of child soldiers today, is 
that after the end of World War Two, the protection of human rights became an 
international issue. The human rights discourse, after gaining prominence in the 
1970s, also influenced the framing of child protection concerns. This thesis has 
shown that child soldiers have until relatively recently often been portrayed as heroic 
warriors; with a significant shift in representation and discourse as a result of the 
developments described above, which have rendered the child soldier of today, 
almost universally, as innocent, traumatised, and victimised.  
 
The idea of the modern child soldier became institutionalised over the last 30 years 
in various human rights treaties, UN resolutions, and domestic laws. The 
international regulations on child soldiering, including the minimum age for 
recruitment and the different roles and activities that are considered as child 
                                                




soldiering (and not for example as child labour), form the institutional backdrop to 
the work international actors are doing in terms of international and local advocacy, 
monitoring, as well as direct engagement with child soldiers and recruiters. This 
particular framing of the child soldier and its codification in international law 
obviously has effects on the work of international actors but it also affects how the 
issue is understood in the first place.  
 
This thesis has answered two main research questions: (1) How the international 
norm against the recruitment and use of child soldiers emerged and diffused, and (2) 
how this norm is then applied and implemented in Sierra Leone and Myanmar. I 
argue that by focusing on the daily work of international actors in norm creation as 
well as strategies of norm implementation, we can improve our understanding of the 
processes of norm diffusion across different contexts within a constructivist 
framework. Focusing on the strategies of norm implementation helps to connect the 
international level, on which norms exist as largely abstract sets of rules and beliefs 
to concrete actions by international actors on the ground, such as implementing child 
sections of DDR programmes or advocating for governments to change their 
recruitment practices. I also focus on knowledge production as part of norm diffusion 
processes and how knowledge about cases and child soldiers affects institutional 
learning within and between cases. 
 
Sierra Leone and Myanmar were chosen as case studies to illustrate how strategies 
and practices of international actors to combat the recruitment and use of child 
soldiers have developed and changed over time and space. The cases of child 
soldiering in each context and the interaction of international actors with it differs 
according to the salience of the norm at the time of child soldiering, the geopolitical 
context, the level of international attention attributed, and in how far international 
narratives match the particular context.  
 
The thesis has unpacked the image of the child soldier perceived as being African, as 
an innocent victim who has been abducted from his family and was forced to fight, 
as fighting in active combat as part of non-state groups, and as young and male. This 
particular reading of the child soldier finds its seemingly most direct expression in 




the modern child-soldier crisis’.712 Being one of the most well-researched instances 
of child soldier use713, this thesis does not provide new empirical information about 
the use of child soldiers in the civil war but instead contributes to the critique of 
international actors’ work there, especially regarding the Disarmament, 
Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) programme as an expression of the 
operation of the international norm against child soldiering. I have shown that the 
vastly differing evaluations of the success of the programme are due to different 
markers of success, processes of institutional learning before and during being active 
in the country, and different timelines. This becomes particularly clear when looking 
at first, how the knowledge about ‘the Sierra Leone child soldier’ and his identity is 
produced—mostly based on experience in previous conflicts and international actors’ 
assumptions about childhood and victimisation—and second, how international 
actors first failed to acknowledge and then tried to learn and accommodate female 
child combatants in their programming. As a result, certain structures in pre-conflict 
society that may have lead to the outbreak of the civil war in the first place remained 
untouched or were reinforced by post-conflict reintegration efforts. Former child 
soldiers were encouraged to reintegrate themselves into the same power structures 
they fought against during the war (voluntarily or forcibly) after having participated 
in skills trainings, which were largely inefficient and most often did not help in 
finding a job in the post-conflict economy. Continuing from the existing perceptions 
of and regulations about child soldiers internationally, UNICEF, Save the Children 
and others recreated the child soldier identity in Sierra Leone as almost exclusively 
focused on their status as victims. This is not to imply that child soldiers are fully 
responsible makers of their destinies who should be held fully accountable to their 
actions. Of course, they are often victims of circumstance, of poverty, of violence, of 
abuse and they often do suffer as a result of these experiences, sometimes in different 
but very frequently in similar ways to their often only a few years older comrades.  
 
While Sierra Leone was one of the key cases for developing and advancing the 
strategies of the international network against child soldiering, Myanmar is one of 
the still ongoing cases of a state military recruiting and using children. With the 
country recently having taken steps of transitioning to a more open and democratic 
political system—although this development has arguably stalled in the last two 
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years since 2016—international actors have become more active in their engagement 
with the Burmese military, the Tatmadaw, in working towards eliminating the use of 
child soldiers. While child soldiering is often portrayed as an ‘African problem’, 
Myanmar is believed to be the state with the most underage recruits in their official 
armed forces worldwide. Similarly to how we had to understand the colonial and 
civil war context in Sierra Leone, we have to understand the foundational role of the 
Tatmadaw in Burmese society. Child recruitment in the Tatmadaw is a socially 
embedded practice and deeply intertwined with the history and perception of the 
Tatmadaw as the guardian of the Union of Myanmar and its control over Burmese 
politics until today. Thus, international actors trying to effect change must treat child 
soldiering not as an isolated phenomenon but a practice that is the result of and 
connected to much wider societal, developmental, and even geopolitical concerns. 
This thesis has drawn out the work of UNICEF and the ILO. Tracing the history and 
strategies of these two organisations in Myanmar allows us to understand the 
background knowledge they build on to develop their approach to the military. 
UNICEF’s approach, having been working in the country since the 1950s, relies 
much more on direct personal relationships and connections to the military 
government. The ILO on the other hand, which only starting work in Myanmar in 
2006/7, started gathering information on human rights abuses and child recruitment 
through on an informant network of regular citizens, members of the opposition and 
civil society activists. We can understand the work of ILO and UNICEF based on 
four strategies: relationship building (social incentives), threatening international 
repercussions and prosecutions (material sanctions), connecting the Tatmadaw’s 
strategic interests to their practice of child soldiering (material incentives), and trying 
to affect the re-constructing of the Tatmadaw’s identity as a modern and professional 
military (social incentive).  
 
Having shed light on the strategies of international actors in dealing with the various 
aspects of child soldiering, recruitment, release, and reintegration in these two 
contexts has allowed me to trace the work of international actors around the 
international norm against child soldiering since the early 2000s. Analysing 
institutional learning and knowledge production processes within and between Sierra 
Leone and Myanmar draws out the differences and development of the practice of 
norm implementation after we have reached the ‘era of application’ of the norm. 




protection advisors as part of peacekeeping missions, the establishment of the ‘List 
of Shame’ by the Security Council and the monitoring and reporting mechanism are 
complemented by changes in practices on the ground. Finally, this thesis has argued 
that not only does the work of international actors on the international and local level 
affect child soldiering practices of third parties, it also contributes to (re-)creating the 
image of the child soldier in a particular way. First of all, it creates the child soldier 
in the Third World as differentiated from childhood and even children connected to 
military actors in the West. He (and it is almost exclusively a ‘he’) is defined by his 
physicality, small stature and physical weakness; his irrationality and inability to see 
the consequences of his actions; and as a result of both, his lack of agency. This 
framework renders conceptualisations of childhood that differ from the one 
embedded in international law and regulations illegitimate, it homogenises these 
conceptualisations as barbaric and chaotic, as in need of saving. Humanitarian and 
child protection actors must intervene to save these children from their environments 
and communities, which are unable to protect them.  
10.2 Limitations and Generalizability 
This study has a number of limitations as a result of the methods and cases chosen. I 
will address them in the following section, focusing on access, methods, and 
generalizability. 
10.2.1 Access 
First and foremost, conducting research in an on-going conflict context such as 
Myanmar brings with it a range of complications. Since the issue of child soldiering 
is currently one of the key issues that international activists are focusing on in 
Myanmar in terms of human rights abuses, it quickly becomes a sensitive topic of 
conversation for the Myanmar government and military.714 In the case of conducting 
interviews for this study, it has led to a level of hesitance on behalf of many potential 
interview partners to talk to researchers, even with the guarantee of anonymity. 
Oftentimes, especially within the government or military, individuals might be the 
only ones who have a particular piece of information and thus would be easily 
identifiable. Staff members of international organisations or NGOs, on the other 
hand, are at this point still in ongoing negotiations with the military about releasing 
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underage recruits or more far-reaching policy change and thus also often reluctant to 
talk about their current work. Furthermore, it is basically impossible to research child 
soldiering practices within the state military and ethnic armed groups at the same 
time. Reaching out to one side would have meant jeopardising access to the other. 
Despite these complications, researching international advocacy on child soldiering 
practices in Myanmar at this point in time provides an insight into the knowledge 
production processes and changing practices as they are unfolding. Thus far, to my 
knowledge, there are no comprehensive academic studies of the child soldiering 
practices of the Tatmadaw, never mind international advocacy efforts to stop them. 
There are ample future research opportunities for scholars both interested in the 
history of child recruitment within the Myanmar military and especially in the 
practice of child soldiering among ethnic armed groups, which might be subject to 
quite different dynamics than the state military. As of 2018, seven non-state actors 
are still listed on the SRSG list for child recruitment in Myanmar.715 Based on 
anecdotal evidence gained during conducting this study and based on very limited 
NGO reports, voluntary enlistment is much more common with the ethnic armies and 
requires a different type of engagement and analysis. This study can also just provide 
a snapshot of the developments until now and with the political and conflict situation 
in Myanmar being as volatile as it currently is, the first developments towards a 
democratic transition of the country and the continued release of child soldiers might 
be reversed or overturned in the coming years.  
 
The research context in Sierra Leone is characterised by somewhat different issues. 
Most importantly, it is one of most intensively researched child soldiering contexts 
both within academia and among practitioners. This was one of the reasons for 
choosing it as one of the case studies, although it comes with its own set of issues: 
Firstly, there is a somewhat established knowledge production network in Sierra 
Leone, mostly in Freetown, that has made an industry out of providing Western 
researchers with information about atrocities, child soldiers, and war stories that they 
are presumed to be after (which in most cases is precisely what they are after). The 
struggle in conducting this study was communicating the emphasis on the work of 
international actors with child soldiers rather than the experience of former child 
soldiers themselves. Secondly, since the conflict ended in 2002 and the last child 
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soldier reintegration programmes were finalised a few years after, it was at times 
challenging to connect with people who had actually worked for international 
organisations during that period. However, especially local staff members often still 
work in Sierra Leone and were able to provide a long-term perspective on the effects 
of international involvement back then. Also, it was beneficial to work on an already 
finished process, which did not continue to evolve and change as the research was 
being conducted.  
10.2.2 Methods 
The second set of limitations relate to the methodological choices of this thesis. I 
have outlined in detail in the methods chapter (chapter 3) why I decided not to 
interview (former) child soldiers in this study. However, this decision might impact 
the project in two ways: First, my findings might lack a potentially distinctive 
perspective by former child combatants themselves. Second, I am criticising 
international actors who work with child soldiers without taking their agency into 
account. One could argue that this thesis falls into the same trap. However, in my 
view, since my main focus is the work of international actors and not to redesign and 
implement interventions aimed at child soldiers, the ethical considerations of why I, 
within the realm of this thesis, should not rely on interviewing child soldiers 
ultimately outweigh the other concerns.  
 
A related point concerns the choice of interviewing as the primary method of data 
collection for the case studies. Especially in Myanmar, I was only able to provide a 
snapshot of the work of international actors in the country since I did not spend long 
time periods embedded within their in-country offices. I had to rely on their accounts 
and their wider network to get an impression of their role. The previous section has 
outlined the challenges of Myanmar as a case study given the volatility of the 
conflict context, which of course also impacts international actors’ work. In Sierra 
Leone, the limitation is of a different nature. Since the conflict ended in 2002 
already, different narratives are likely to have solidified, which are told and re-told 
by different actors. I unpack the narrative of Sierra Leone as a success story on the 
international stage in detail. However, the narratives within Sierra Leone might be 
equally one-sided. Nonetheless, in the long term, the perception of a particular 
intervention by the affected population might overshadow the ‘actual’ events. 




necessarily influenced the responses of my interview partners. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that, for example, a PhD student from the Global South, or a senior white 
male academic from the US would leave with the exact same impressions and 
interpretations if they had interviewed the same people I did.  
 
Overall, while this study has investigated the work of international actors on 
combating child soldiering in different conflict contexts, it does not aim to provide a 
comprehensive account of Burmese or Sierra Leonean understandings of childhood 
or child soldiering per se. This undertaking would require extensive ethnographic 
work, which was beyond the remit of this thesis. It has however provided an 
explanation for why and how the international norm against child soldiering has 
taken the particular form it has today, which claims universality but is mostly a 
product of Western ideas of childhood. As mentioned in chapter four, more work 
needs to be done to develop a historically sound and deeper understanding of the 
conception of childhood in these contexts.  
10.2.3 Generalizability 
Finally, this thesis has studied the strategies of implementation of the norm against 
child soldiering in two specific contexts, Sierra Leone and Myanmar. The specifics 
of each case, for example linking the issue of child soldiering to the desire of the 
Tatmadaw to be perceived as a modern military, are not directly generalizable to 
other contexts. However, there are broader inferences we can make from the results 
of this study.  
 
One of the key lessons learned from this study, and it might seem obvious at first, is 
that we must take the context within which international actors operate seriously. 
This requires a deep engagement, not only with the conflict context and actors but 
also with the content of the norm that international actors are promoting. In the case 
of child soldiering it means that we must pay attention both to the histories that have 
been embedded in the meaning of the norm today—chapter four elucidates this in 
detail—and how the concepts it regulates are conceived of in different contexts. Thus 
I caution against generalising from the contexts analysed in this thesis to other 
seemingly similar cases. This is not to imply that all cases of child soldiering and the 
dynamics that occur in the post-conflict space are isolated incidents and no insights 




be learned from other cases or taken to other cases is that programmes and initiatives 
are not effective, perceived well, successful, or sustainable if they are not conceived 
and designed with a thick understanding of the context they are implemented in 
mind. Practitioners who have been interviewed for this project have intuitively 
learned this lesson many times and highlighted the importance of already existing 
expertise and ‘market assessment’ strategies before planning for example skills 
training or reintegration projects. While governments and communities are usually 
officially part of child soldier reintegration projects, they are not engaged on their 
own terms but instead required to ‘talk the talk’ and only taken seriously if they can 
express their requests in the human rights and child protection language international 
actors are using.   
 
Thus, we should not ask which dynamics that have been observed in Sierra Leone or 
Myanmar might be generalizable to other contexts but which ways of understanding 
and developing context-specific approaches might travel to other situations. For 
example, there are several instances of within-case learning that this study has 
observed in Sierra Leone and Myanmar that can and should be applied in other 
country contexts.  
 
A second concern of potential generalizability might be the question of whether the 
findings of this thesis regarding the norm against child soldiering might apply to 
other international norms as well. As chapter four highlights, this norm is part of a 
broader international normative structure and closely connected to other children’s 
rights as part of the human rights agenda, to the children and armed conflict 
framework, as well as to developmental and humanitarian relief discourses. The 
following section explores whether the dynamics of the international norm against 
child soldiers as shown in this study might tell us something about other normative 
projects. There are two key features that have emerged from the analysis of the 
emergence of the international norm against the recruitment and use of child soldiers: 
the idea of the universal child and the victim narrative that dominates the imagination 
of the child soldier by the international community.  
 
The universal child forms the basis of most international legal regulations on 
children and child soldiers as detailed in chapter four. Based on the developments 




childhood as a space separate from the seriousness and responsibilities of adulthood 
has to be protected and the innocence of children must be maintained. I have shown 
how this universal understanding of childhood silences and renders other conceptions 
of childhood illegitimate. This homogenises not only the different experiences of 
children but also the contexts in which they take place. It further legitimises 
intervention by Global North actors to protect or rescue the children of the Global 
South and produces knowledge again both about the child soldier and his context. 
These universalising and homogenising tendencies as a result of how international 
norms are created, diffused, and applied are common features of international 
normative projects. Especially when relating to children, we can see similar 
dynamics happening when we look at the promotion and diffusion of norms against 
child labour or female genital mutilation. The debate about child labour has over the 
last decades become more nuanced and now commonly distinguishes between ‘worst 
forms of child labour’ and other types of work children do. The key takeaway on this 
issue that should be learned from this project is that we must pay attention to the 
historical contingency of the international norm in question. The histories and power 
relations embedded within the conceptualisations of the norm will determine both the 
content and influence the implementation and effects of it, the norm does not exist in 
a vacuum.  
 
While all children are perceived as vulnerable, (former) child soldiers are often 
exclusively characterised by their victim status. This is partly a result of the 
conception of the universal child outlined before and partly a result of the imagined 
context the child soldier exists in—as outlined in chapter nine. The discourses around 
vulnerability and victimhood might be most pronounced in regards to children but 
they also resonate with other debates around vulnerable populations or those 
conceived as such, i.e. women or minorities. This applies especially in (post-) 
conflict situations where the lines between victims and perpetrators are often blurred 
and the level of international involvement is high. Debates around female combatants 
are often characterised by a similar dichotomy. Especially when women were 
forcibly recruited and are sexually abused or used for sexual labour, the discussion 
revolves equally around questions of physicality and agency, similar to the child 
soldier discourse. ‘Women and children’ as a category are presumed to be innocent 




existing frameworks around victimhood might struggle to contain the complexity of 
the issue.716  
 
The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and 
Armed Conflict, apart from child recruitment, covers five other so-called ‘grave 
violations’: killing and maiming, sexual violence, abduction, attacks of schools and 
hospitals, and denial of humanitarian access. As we can see from the advocacy 
campaigns and discourse that followed the abduction of over 250 schoolgirls in 
Chibok, Northern Nigeria, by Boko Haram in 2014, these girls were also almost 
exclusively framed as victims, neglecting the fact that this is not the only marker of 
their identity. Paying attention to the variety of experiences, as I have argued in 
relation to child soldiers, helps to imagine alternative ways of engaging that do not 
reduce a particular group of people to their victim status.  
10.3 Contributions and Avenues for Further Research 
This thesis has made a number of contributions to the study of international norms, 
implementation strategies, as well as the study of child soldiering in Sierra Leone 
and especially Myanmar. I have focused predominantly on the strategies of 
implementation of the norm against child soldiering. While doing so, I have also 
touched on a number of both broader and more specific issues that are worth taking 
further in future research projects.  
10.3.1 Contributions 
Within a constructivist framework of international norm diffusion, this thesis has 
emphasised the origins of the international norm against the recruitment and use of 
child soldiering. It has shown how the conceptions of childhood embedded within the 
norm influences the promotion and implementation of the norm in two different 
contexts, Sierra Leone and Myanmar. I have first offered a historical reading of the 
emergence of the international norm against the recruitment and use of child soldiers 
by showing that (1) armies around the world have used child soldiers continuously 
for centuries, (2) that the perception and portrayal of child soldiers has changed from 
heroic warriors to traumatised victims as a result of a reconceptualization of 
childhood as well as the rise of humanitarian and human rights discourse and that (3) 
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this history is embedded in the institutionalisation of the norm in international law, 
treaties, and UN resolutions, as well as the kinds of programmes and advocacy 
efforts the international community undertakes, as the case studies have shown.  
 
Furthermore, this thesis reviews the norm implementation practices of international 
actors regarding the reintegration of child combatants in post-conflict Sierra Leone. 
There have been many excellent studies of child soldiering during the civil war in 
Sierra Leone, detailing the different recruitment practices of different actors, their 
behaviour during the war as well as the challenges of reintegration. International 
organisations themselves have invested in evaluation studies to assess the impact of 
their work, often shortly after their programmes finished. This thesis, apart from a 
historical contextualisation of child soldiering, societal power relations, and the 
conflict, contributes to the extensive literature that re-evaluates of the work of 
international actors, especially regarding the DDR programme and its engagement 
with female child combatants. I show how the well-documented failures of the DDR 
programme in Sierra Leone are partly due to the homogenising conception of 
childhood embedded in the international norm, which further influences which 
lessons were learned from Sierra Leone for future interventions. 
 
Most importantly, to date, to the best of my knowledge, there is no comprehensive 
academic account of the history of child soldiering in Myanmar, neither about the 
state military nor about the ethnic armed groups. There is definitely a need for an in-
depth historical study of child recruitment in both but what this project offers is a 
first investigation of the child soldiering practices of the Tatmadaw and their 
engagement with international actors. While there are some studies starting to delve 
into the relationship of the Myanmar government with various international actors, 
be it development agencies, NGOs, or foreign governments717, none have so far dealt 
with the issue of the recruitment and use of child soldiers. This thesis thus provides a 
first investigation of child soldiering in the state with the presumed highest number 
of underage recruits in the state military and of the attempts of international actors to 
combat this.  
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10.3.2 Future Research 
As especially chapter four and nine have shown, the recruitment and use of child 
soldiers is not an isolated phenomenon. It is embedded in internal and international 
conflict dynamics, in international political economy and in international normative 
structures. I have shown that there is a divergence in the perception of the issue, as 
becomes particularly clear in the Myanmar case study, between being a strict moral 
principle, in the eyes of international actors, and a bargaining chip in the eyes of the 
child-recruiting actor. This study currently can only suggest that this international-
local divergence might be the result of structural economic conditions rather than 
divergent cultural norms. I have addressed some of these dynamics in the case 
studies, relating to international aid politics in the case of Sierra Leone and arms 
trade and sanctions in the case of Myanmar. However, in order to establish a link of 
the practice of child soldiering and international structural economic conditions, 
more research would have to be devoted to this important issue.  
 
More straightforward is the question of structural economic conditions of a context 
that ‘produce’ child soldiers. Both in Sierra Leone and in Myanmar, poverty is one of 
the key drivers to conflict and to child recruitment. Whereas this dynamic has been 
well studied in some cases, such as Sierra Leone but also Angola, Mozambique or 
Uganda, Myanmar is still a largely underexplored case regarding the drivers of child 
soldiering.718 Further research on child soldiering in Myanmar, not just focusing on 
the Tatmadaw but also on the ethnic armed groups, is crucial if we are to understand 
the dynamics within Myanmar more deeply. We do not only need more research on 
Myanmar but also on other very recent cases, such as Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Mali, 
Afghanistan, etc. Understanding these structures that bias local parties towards using 
child soldiers could then be linked back to the international origins of the conception 
of childhood that this thesis has outlined in chapter four. Ultimately, local economic 
dynamics are of course connected to and embedded within larger international ones, 
linking this to the previous point.  
 
I, and many other studies as well as increasingly the work of practitioners, have 
emphasised the importance of gender sensitivity, especially paying attention to the 
needs of girl soldiers in the reintegration process. A mostly forgotten and under-
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researched aspect of gender-sensitive work—often misunderstood as only focusing 
on women and girls—are the gendered aspects that affect boy soldiers. Further 
research should be dedicated for example to investigating the role of hyper-
masculine identities in reintegration and sexual violence against boys.  
 
Finally, this study has explored how particular strategies employed by different 
international actors play out and interact with local counterparts in two specific 
contexts. Future research should take a step back and examine more closely how and 
why actors choose particular strategies. What is the background knowledge they base 
these decisions on? Are there particular organizational cultures that would allow a 
deeper engagement with a particular context? Barnett’s study of the UN and its 
institutional and individualised decision making leading to deliberate non-
interference in the Rwandan genocide is an example of such an investigation, which 
reconstructs the moral principles and background knowledge that governed different 
bodies of the UN at the time.719 He shows how UN staff and diplomats in New York, 
overall, believed they were acting properly when they decided not to try to put an 
end to the genocide.720 I have shown that some lessons that seemed to have been 
clearly learned within a particular case (such as the attention to girl soldiers in Sierra 
Leone), but nonetheless do not travel to other contexts. What are the institutional 
barriers that keep this from happening? Conducting extensive ethnographic 
fieldwork, for example within the UNICEF country offices and its headquarter, could 
shed light on these internal dynamics.  
10.4 Implications for Policy and Practice 
Having engaged closely with the work international actors do in different contexts 
regarding child soldiering, this study has important implications for the work of 
practitioners as well. Research on the promotion of international norms, given its 
often normative nature, is often interested in practical implications, especially in how 
a particular norm can be better promoted. My findings do not offer a clear guideline 
of actions and strategies that international actors should follow to best stop the 
practice of child soldiering globally. However, it can highlight particular points of 
caution and suggest alternative ways of thinking about child soldiering.  
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The most generalizable policy recommendation based on this research is to take the 
knowledge that ‘the child soldier’ is not a homogenous category seriously in practice. 
This knowledge, and researchers as well as practitioners have established the facts 
repeatedly, must inform the work international and local actors engage in with child 
combatants. Approaching the design of interventions not with an exclusive focus on 
child soldiers as victims of conflict but as individuals who have had a variety of 
different experiences, some who were abducted and abused, some who joined for 
economic benefit and job security, some in active combat positions, some as cooks in 
the barracks. This multiplicity of experiences should inform all engagement with 
child soldiers.  
 
More concretely, a much repeated aspect that yet again features in my study as well 
as in numerous other accounts about the activities of the UN and large international 
NGOs in various issue areas is the crucial importance of context-sensitivity. 
Regarding the planning and implementation of the child section of the DDR 
programme in Sierra Leone, the urgency of the issue and lack of experience 
contributed to the lack of long-term planning, whereas funding restrictions affected 
the implementation of the reintegration part of the programme. A straightforward 
way to improve context-sensitivity is to conduct what some interviewees in Sierra 
Leone called ‘market assessment’ prior to organising and implementing for example 
reintegration programmes. Without suitably researching the potential for 
employment opportunities in a post-conflict setting, well-meaning skills trainings are 
likely to result in disappointed participants who fail to secure regular employment 
upon completion.  Given that Sierra Leone was one of the earliest cases, these 
lessons, if addressed and fed through the system, could have been learned for the 
implementation of further child DDR programmes. So I join the choir in emphasising 
that holistic market assessment for skills trainings and the utilisation of local 
expertise in designing interventions is absolutely crucial for even creating the 
possibility of offering a legitimate and suitable programme.   
 
Another way of addressing these concerns is to rely more heavily on already existing 
local expertise. In the case of Sierra Leone, child protection actors have existed 
before and throughout the civil war, addressing child protection concerns such as 
violent abuse, street children, and extreme poverty in often improvised and low-cost 




a risk of it becoming a universalised and thereby homogenising instrument. Shepler 
has traced the biographies of individual child protection workers who started 
working in this space in the aftermath of the civil war in Sierra Leone and continued 
to apply their experience in sometimes widely varying contexts, such as 
Afghanistan.721 The conception of ‘local expertise’ as a transferable skill that exists 
independent of the actual context it is based on might lead to a flattening of the very 
‘local knowledge’ it is meant to provide.  
 
The second policy recommendation, which should again be a well-recognised one, is 
to pay attention to the specific needs of girl soldiers. Repeatedly mentioned in this 
study as one of the key lessons learned by international actors in Sierra Leone, this 
topic is still absent from discussions about child soldiers in Myanmar. Although the 
international discourse on and attention paid to girl soldiers has significantly 
developed since the end of the civil war in Sierra Leone, it is still not a baseline 
assumption that women and girls will be associated with militaries and armed 
movements everywhere. Not necessarily in active combat roles—although some 
ethnic armed groups in Burma do have female combatants—but in support and 
associated roles. Since there is no internationally supervised or publicly known 
domestically run reintegration programme for released child soldiers in Myanmar, 
the lack of specific programmes for girl soldiers is not surprising. However, the 
absence of any mention of the issue in all interviews that were conducted, UN, ILO, 
and NGOs alike, is concerning.  
 
A very direct way of offering a material incentives for state militaries to stop 
recruiting and release all underage soldiers within their ranks is to use states’ desire 
to contribute to peacekeeping missions as leverage. Used successfully as a material 
incentive in Chad in 2013/14, after pressure from DPKO, the government there 
agreed to release all underage soldiers from their armed forces and subject 
themselves to UN monitoring as a precondition for contributing peacekeeping troops 
to MINUSMA in Mali. Based on this experience, the UN Secretary-General 
officially banned states from contributing peacekeeping personnel who are 
‘persistently listed’ for recruiting and using child soldiers.722 However, this principle 
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seems to be only selectively applied and this study has shown that there was a lost 
opportunity regarding employing this strategy with the Tatmadaw.  
 
A second strategy that international actors can employ is to offer social incentives. 
For example, countries, which aim to contribute peacekeeping personnel might do so 
out of a material motivation—often maintaining military personnel is a costly 
matter—but they also often seek the reputational reward of being a respected 
member of international society. Even if they have no peacekeeping ambitions, states 
who care about their international reputation can, with the right incentives, be 
encouraged to stop recruiting child soldiers. The Tatmadaw is a good example of 
this. By appealing to their desire to be perceived as a modern military, even though 
they lack the moral conviction to end their child soldiering practice, they see a reason 
to at least superficially cooperate with international actors, as I have shown in 
chapter eight. Finding an issue the target actors cares about and linking it to the issue 
of child soldiering might encourage cooperation.  
 
The Myanmar example, however, also hints at a potential risk in this attempt to link 
compliance to a particular norm to a second issue that can be used as an incentive. 
One reason why the Tatmadaw is interested in improving its international reputation 
is to lift the arms embargo that is still in place and effectively makes them dependent 
on Chinese support. Continuing this line of thought—and for a moment disregard all 
the other factors impacting the sanctions regime, most prominently the Rohingya 
crisis—if successful, it would mean that by adhering to a, arguably not very costly to 
implement, international norm, the Tatmadaw would gain the means to fight its 
internal conflicts with more military might. Although an unlikely scenario, 
practitioners would do well to think creatively about potential unintended 
consequences of their actions, especially when pushing for a particular norm without 
sufficiently considering the broader incentive structure it is embedded in.  
 
Finally, a particularly interesting strategy, which is not directly linked to social or 
material incentives, that might be worth noting for practitioners elsewhere is the 
ILO’s approach to child soldiering in Myanmar. Based on their mandate in the 
country and their relatively late entry, meaning they did not have long-established 
relationships with the regime that they need to maintain, they reframed the issue of 




work around a problem UNICEF continues to face: Soldiers who were recruited 
when they were under 18 but have since passed the minimum age limit for 
recruitment are now outside of the UNICEF mandate to release any underage 
soldiers. It also allows them to addresses the issue of child soldiering within the 
larger context of forced labour and not as an isolated issue. Looking at a specific 
norm violation as part of a broader normative framework internationally and at the 
same time as a socially embedded practice within a particular context helps to 
understand potential implications and connections to other issue areas and allows for 
a more integrated approach that takes not just the immediate stop of the particular 
practice—stop child recruitment, release child soldiers—into account but also asks 
for follow-up—what happens to former child combatants? Using different normative 
frameworks to achieve the intended outcome might be a creative avenue worth 
exploring.  
 
Sending or allowing children to fight in conflicts is an abhorrent practice to most 
people. There is a strong normative commitment in the international community to 
end child soldiering. However, despite almost universal agreement, on almost every 
continent and in almost every newly erupting conflict, we will find children on the 
front lines. This thesis has unravelled the idea of the ‘universal child soldier’ and 
expanded our understanding of child soldiering in two very different contexts, Sierra 
Leone and Myanmar, and further research on other cases that are currently unfolding, 
such as Syria or Yemen, is needed. Understanding and framing these children 
exclusively as innocent victims of circumstance and their communities alone does 
not allow us either to grasp child soldiering as a socially embedded practice globally 
and within each specific context or to develop context-specific approaches to fight it. 
Only when we allow the complexity of childhood in conflict to unfold, will 
international actors be able to work meaningfully with affected communities to 
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